Date: Sun, 26 May 96 14:59:09 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#042 Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 26 May 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 042 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: A Privacy Scenario Re: Privacy Phone Guard Re: Privacy Phone Guard Re: Privacy Phone Guard Re: Biometric Encryption Re: Biometric Encryption Re: Biometric Encryption Re: Biometric Encryption Announcement: Privacy Legislation in Canada BC Voters Can Have Addresses Suppressed Re: Automated Toll Collection Re: Automated Toll Collection Equifax for Employee Background Checks Credit Cards with Internet Fraud Insurance Re: Georgia Law Could Prohibit Web Links New Posters Please Take Note Where to get PGP FAQ [long] Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: bob@rattlesnake.com (Robert J. Chassell) Date: 23 May 1996 18:51:42 -0400 Subject: Re: A Privacy Scenario Organization: Rattlesnake Enterprises References: (Martina Schollmeyer) asks whether ... some new browsers allow web sites to execute programs on the computer that is accessing the web site, possibly without the computer owner's knowledge. This feature allowed the music store to get your friend's login name and computer address to determine the complete e-mail address. Several issues here: * whether a program was executed on the computer owner's machine (the goal of JAVA). * whether a web site can collect info from browsers * whether this is a good idea. Collecting the info may not require running a program on the user's machine. According to the documentation for `url-privacy-level' in GNU Emacs W3 mode, HTTP/1.0 has header fields for various information about the user, including operating system information, email addresses, the last page you visited, etc. Thus a browser that meets the standard could provide that information. Incidentally, in W3 mode, the `url-privacy-level' variable controls how much of this information is actually provided. You can specify a variety of levels. I myself specify the level that says `Don't send anything'. ------------------------------ From: Michael Shreeve Date: 23 May 1996 18:13:18 -0500 Subject: Re: Privacy Phone Guard Organization: Technical Consulting Continuum References: Charles Bryant wrote: If you are demanding a *right*, the burden should be on you to prove the legitimacy of that right. Here, I have options (each costs money, of course). If I want to identify the caller, I can purchase caller ID. If a caller doesn't want me to identify them, they can purchase caller ID blocking. If I don't want to receive "anonymous" calls, I don't have to. I can even have anonymousized calls automatically blocked. Everyone can choose the amount of intrusion, or information given out. RE: Demanding rights. I don't think that it is unreasonable when someone is seeking admission into your home (even if it is just by voice) to want to know who it is. I sympathize with those who have unpublished/unlisted numbers who see caller ID as a privacy invasion against them (when they make outgoing calls), however, I consider not being able to identify the incoming call an equal privacy invasion, and am glad that the service is available to curtail that invasion. -- Michael Disclaimers: My opinions are my own, and free. You get what you pay for. EDS may or may not agree with these opinions. E-mail advertisements will be spell-checked for a $200 fee. Sending an advertisement to this address is acceptance of these terms. ------------------------------ From: EricF@microhouse.com (Eric Fowler) Date: 23 May 1996 23:37:52 GMT Subject: Re: Privacy Phone Guard Organization: Microhouse References: chazl@leonardo.lmt.com says... Do you worry that your phone number is very likely available to anyone who knows your name and has access to a phone book, regardless of whether or not you EVER CALL THEM? I really do not understand all the hullabaloo about how CallerID allegedly violates one's privacy. Here's the way I view it: Well, the hullabaloo *I* make about clrID is due to the fact that it can automate the collection of a lot of information about who I call, and can make it available to third parties. I don't mind if someone knows I'm talking to a friend. I do mind when they write down who initiated the conversation, when it took place, and how long it lasted. I especially mind when I don't know when I am being so observed; and I especially, especially mind if someone were to follow me around all day long collecting this kind of information. CallerID by itself means very little. What happens when the calling/receiving phone numbers are indexed into one database? I don't want such a record of my calls to exist, and I really have nothing to hide. As with much personal information, each datum means little, but the collection of much data can adversely affect your privacy. This technology makes possible the (eventual) collection of extensive records of individual's calling patterns. This is not happening yet but mark my words, it will. ------------------------------ From: wjanssen@cs.vu.nl (Wouter Janssen) Date: 24 May 1996 13:13:53 GMT Subject: Re: Privacy Phone Guard Organization: Fac. Wiskunde & Informatica, VU, Amsterdam References: chazl (chazl@leonardo.lmt.com) wrote: Do you worry that your phone number is very likely available to anyone who knows your name and has access to a phone book, regardless of whether or not you EVER CALL THEM? Yes. If you walked up to my door and rang the doorbell with a bag over your head, would you be surprised that I would be unlikely to let you in? Is it be a violation of your privacy for me to request that you identify yourself before I decide whether to open the door? No, not at all, but when I ring your doorbell without that bag and came to ask you how to get to the railwaystation would you still ask me for some ID ? Why should my phone [which is another means into my home and life] be any different? Someone calls me and wants to talk to me. Why shouldn't I have the right to know who that individual is before I decide whether or not to grant that request? Because I wouldn't like the idea of you putting me into some sort of database and then sending me add's about the things you/your company sells. I don't understand why you should always know who you're talking to. If someone on the street asks you something, do you ask his/er name, phone# and an ID as well? I don't.. Why do you want the phone system to reveal the other calling party? Because you don't want to ask for the ID of the other person calling yourself or do you think they won't be honest to you? (Gee, I thought I was paranoid ;-) ) I hope I wasn't offensive, because I didn't intend to be, I just wanted to clarify some of us like to keep some info about ourselves for ourselves. Fortunately, in Holland one can still choose whether or not your name,address and phone # are listed in the phone directory and callers-ID is a nono here. --------------------------------------------------------------------- In real life : Wouter Janssen | mail to wjanssen=pgp@cs.vu.nl E-mail : wjanssen@cs.vu.nl | for my pgp-key URL: http://www.cs.vu.nl/~wjanssen/| --------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ From: wiltshir@sover.net (Gary A. Wiltshire) Date: 23 May 1996 23:23:17 GMT Subject: Re: Biometric Encryption Organization: SoVerNet, Inc. References: Phil Agre wrote: ...fingerprint biometrics... I am curious if anybody knows of any criticisms of this approach. Charles Bryant wrote: Two possible problems seem obvious. Firstly, it is very easy to get someone's fingerprints. We can't avoid leaving prints on vast numbers of everyday objects (e.g. drinks cans, door handles). Secondly, it seems that if it were widely used, muggers would start cutting off people's fingers when stealing their cards to be sure of being able to generate the fingerprints. That goes for retina-recognition too! The movie Demolition Man had the bad guy gouge out the warden's eye to get through a locked door. -- Gary Wiltshire ------------------------------ From: lihou@ms2.hinet.net (Lee) Date: 24 May 1996 07:20:20 GMT Subject: Re: Biometric Encryption Organization: SEEDNET InterNetNews News System References: Phil Agre wrote: ...fingerprint biometrics... I am curious if anybody knows of any criticisms of this approach. Charles Bryant wrote: Two possible problems seem obvious. Firstly, it is very easy to get someone's fingerprints. We can't avoid leaving prints on vast numbers of everyday objects (e.g. drinks cans, door handles). Secondly, it seems that if it were widely used, muggers would start cutting off people's fingers when stealing their cards to be sure of being able to generate the fingerprints. I wouldn't say it's so easy to outwit those devices. I saw some that 1. measure temperature of the finger (cutting a finger doesn't work) 2. measure humidity (I'm not sure how this one works, maybe they measure reflection of sweat covering the finger) of the finger 3. request a password too Have some additional features. -- Sean Lee lihou@ms2.hinet.net Taipei ------------------------------ From: Chris Kocur Date: 24 May 1996 09:29:35 -0500 Subject: Re: Biometric Encryption Organization: JCPenney Company, Inc. References: Phil Agre wrote: ...fingerprint biometrics... I am curious if anybody knows of any criticisms of this approach. Charles Bryant wrote: Two possible problems seem obvious. Firstly, it is very easy to get someone's fingerprints. We can't avoid leaving prints on vast numbers of everyday objects (e.g. drinks cans, door handles). Secondly, it seems that if it were widely used, muggers would start cutting off people's fingers when stealing their cards to be sure of being able to generate the fingerprints. This covers two of my three objections. My third is that if something happens to my finger so that my fingerprint is altered or unavailable (i.e. mugger cut it off) I can no longer access my own data/devices. -- Regards, Chris ckocur@jcpenney.com (work), ckocur@plano.net (home) ------------------------------ From: Phil Gilbert Date: 25 May 1996 23:47:20 -0700 Subject: Re: Biometric Encryption Organization: Earthlink Network, Inc. References: IMHO--don't place to much value on the pass phrase. personal experience has lead me to conclude that humans cannot keep secrets even under ideal condiditions. this includes any secret or bit of information that a human might want to keep secret, not just gossip. any effort will have to have several authentication methods each with equal value in the shut down/won't work if equation. imagine the difficulty in trying to tell the difference between a real and severed finger. sound like a step in the right direction though. ------------------------------ From: Colin Bennett Date: 23 May 1996 19:34:23 -0700 Subject: Announcement: Privacy Legislation in Canada Subscribers might be interested to learn that the Canadian federal government today (May 23rd) announced that: As a means to encouraging business and consumer confidence in the Information Highway, the Ministers of Industry and Justice (after consultation with the provinces and other stakeholders) will bring forward proposals for a legislative framework for governing the protection of personal data in the private sector. This announcement was not unexpected. It follows last year's report of the Canadian Information Highway Advisory Council. The initiative was undoubtedly also influenced by the agreement earlier this year of a "Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information" under the auspices of the Canadian Standards Association. Any legislation will probably be based upon the principles within this new CSA standard. Those interested can obtain a copy of the standard from the Toronto offices of the CSA [(416) 747-7000.] There will now follow an intense period of consultation and lobbying, over contentious questions about oversight and enforcement in the context of the Canadian federal system. This announcement is very good news, but there is a long way to go before Canada can claim to have "adequate" data protection and thus satisfy the emerging international standard set by the recent EU Directive. ------------------------------ From: bo774@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Kelly Bert Manning) Date: 25 May 1996 07:10:35 GMT Subject: BC Voters Can Have Addresses Suppressed Organization: National Capital Freenet, Ottawa, Canada I'd read that the Municipal Act had been amended to allow voters to conceal their addresses, even from politicians, but I hadn't heard whether the same applied to the provincial election act. If memory serves the BC Information and Privacy Commissioner expressed the view that not enough had been done to make civic voters aware of this new way of protecting their privacy(decision 95-69). Ditto for the provincial voters list. When I called the 1-800 number for the election the staff who answered didn't seem to have been trained about this, so I called the Chief Electoral Officer phone number and asked. I was told that they no longer peddle lists, and that addresses are severed before lists are given to candidates. It is also possible to ask that your address be "suppressed", which apparently means that even Elections Branch staff can't get at it. I have a very wide cynical streak and fully expected that the provincial politicians would say hands off to their municipal counterparts, but make an exception for themselves. Looks like they decided to apply the same rule to themselves. After the last election I started getting personalized crap mail and dug around until I discovered that a "data extractor" had bought a copy of the voters list and used it to create a computer database of residents, including the 30-40% of people who pay BC Tel to keep their addresses out of the phone books. When I pursued it with Election Branch, pointing out risks such as anti abortion zealots getting addresses, when they run as candiates for family/heritage/christian fringe parties. I got the distinct impression that they didn't consider it a priority issue and that the most they would do would be to get anyone buying a copy of the list to sign a pledge to do no evil with it. I have no idea what changed their minds, apart from the legislative changes. The legislative changes were quite surprising, because when I raised the issue in a submission to the Jones committee that reviewed the FOI/POP act it seemed to dismiss release of voter addresses as nothing to spend a lot of time on. The only immediate result of my submission was that I started getting junk mail from the BC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association. That made me glad I'd used a PO box address. I had already formed quite a poor opinion of FIPA after hearing their spokesman object to proposals such as setting statutory fees for land title searches so high that no organization or consortium could acquire a complete copy of a DB piecemeal, except at a cost that would be prohibitive. FIPA thought that the cost of the disk or tape media would be more appropriate. After the second FIPA solicitation I reported this to the BC Attorney General, who seemed to take the matter seriously in his reply and assured me that FIPA would be required to give up the address list it had created from Jones Committee submissions. -- notice: by sending advertising/solicitations to this account you will be indicating your consent to paying me $70/hour for a minimum of 2 hours for my time spent dealing with it ------------------------------ From: dgillmor@netcom.com (Dan Gillmor) Date: 24 May 1996 05:05:37 GMT Subject: Re: Automated Toll Collection Organization: San Jose Mercury News References: John R Levine (johnl@iecc.com) wrote: Everything I've seen says that losses from credit card usage on the net are slightly lower than for regular 800-based mail order. Is there any remotely authoritative data on this? -- Dan Gillmor, Computing Editor E-mail: dgillmor@sjmercury.com San Jose Mercury News Voice: 408-920-5016 750 Ridder Park Drive Fax: 408-920-5917 San Jose, CA 95190 http://www.sjmercury.com/homepage/gillmor/ ------------------------------ From: johnl@iecc.com (John R Levine) Date: 24 May 96 03:10 EDT Subject: Re: Automated Toll Collection Organization: I.E.C.C., Trumansburg, N.Y. References: As things stand today, without encryption, sending personal information is foolish. ... Simpson's article was indeed interesting, and I'd encourage everyone to read it. If you do read it, you'll discover that First Virtual's attack was a virus-like program that intercepted keytrokes at the PC BIOS level, which means it wouldn't make a bit of difference how much encryption you used over your network link, since their attack is on the user's PC, not the network. It also pointed out that First Virtual's attack was pretty far-fetched, since to be useful to a bad guy they'd have to send the captured card info back to the bad guy, presumably over a network link, and it'd be extremely hard to do much of that without people noticing. (Their point was that FV's system is immune to this particular attack, since they tie your account to your credit card number over the phone, so you never type in your credit card number, just your FV account number.) If you plan to do business with anyone, ever, you have to be prepared to accept some risk of fraud. (I mean, how do you know that the cans and boxes you buy at the grocery store actually contain food?) I've never seen any evidence that the risks of doing credit card commerce over the net, even in the absence of encryption, are out of line with those of doing credit card commerce in person or over the phone. It's also worth considering that credit card security works from both directions: they go to some effort to make it hard to make bogus charges, e.g. the rarely enforced rule that the merchant is supposed to compare signatures, but there's at least as much security due to the auditability of the system. I have on my desk a credit card terminal into which I can type any old credit card number I want, with an amount, and in a few seconds that amount is charged to that card. But it wouldn't do me much good, because the customer can contest the charge, and merchants who have more than a few percent of contested charges get their accounts cancelled. -- John R. Levine, IECC, POB 640 Trumansburg NY 14886 +1 607 387 6869 johnl@iecc.com "Space aliens are stealing American jobs." - Stanford econ prof ------------------------------ From: axinar@one.net (Axinar) Date: 25 May 1996 05:06:51 GMT Subject: Equifax for Employee Background Checks Organization: OneNet Communications HUB News Server Recently I learned of a company who is going to begin doing background checks on future employees through Equifax. Of course I've known that Equifax provides credit information to banks, etc, but what sorts of services do they provide other than credit information that would be useful in doing an employee background check and just how the heck are they getting this information? -- Ax ------------------------------ From: wbe@psr.com (Winston Edmond) Date: 25 May 1996 18:56:50 GMT Subject: Credit Cards with Internet Fraud Insurance Organization: Panther Software and Research A few weeks ago, I got a piece of junk mail asking me to apply for a VISA card. What made the offer unique was that it had the word WEB in big letters on the outside envelope and a novel feature: it explicitly said that the card holder would not be held liable for any charges resulting from the number being stolen in the course of its use over the Internet. This was not limited to encypted transmission. That's clearly one way to solve the problem, and one I hadn't even seen mentioned before: the credit card company itself indemnifies the card holder against misuse following theft of the number via the Net. Simple, easily understood by everyone, requires no new technology, and a competitive advantage for their card. -- WBE (Sorry, no, I don't have the name of the bank any more. It was a U.S. bank and looked like a nationwide mailing to me, so maybe others will get a solicitation, too.) ------------------------------ From: michael@sj-coop.net (Michael Bryan) Date: 25 May 1996 19:30:56 -0700 Subject: Re: Georgia Law Could Prohibit Web Links Organization: San Jose Co-op Internet Services (www.sj-coop.net) References: Keith Graham wrote: Having read what is, I believe, the entire law, it does no such thing. Do you, or anybody else, know where there's an online copy of the text of the law? -- Michael Bryan michael@sj-coop.net Quicken Web Page: http://quicken.sj-coop.net/Quicken.html ------------------------------ From: Len Levine Date: 25 May 1996 19:36:36 GMT Subject: New Posters Please Take Note From time to time people post things like the following, or even worse they post binary files that relate to some specific word processor language. Although they can be decoded, they take a while to save, download into a different processor (often a transfer from unix to dos) and then read (or decode) and re-upload. Please post in ASCII, please post with a 60 character line length, please don't emphasize like this: ^^^^ Stuff like that rarely works across platforms. begin 644 stuff.txt M,;X```"K``````````#'`0``!0`&``8`!@`&``8````````````````````` M``sdf234`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` M``````````````````````````````````````````````````!3=7)V96EL M;&%N8V4O0V]U;G1E is taking over the maintenance of this FAQ until further notice. Some of you sent me (Mike Johnson) corrections and suggestions for this FAQ, and I stored them away on my hard disk to edit from. Then, Windows 95 got indigestion (induced by a sound card) and destroyed all of the data in that partition. If you suggested changes and they aren't in this FAQ, please send them to Peter Herngaard . WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION OF PGP? Viacrypt PGP (commercial version): 2.7.1 (4.0 is due out Real Soon Now) MIT & Philip Zimmermann (freeware, USA-legal): 2.6.2 Staale Schumacher's International variant: 2.6.3i for non-USA (2.6.3ai source code only); 2.6.3 for USA WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? Just call 800-536-2664 and have your credit card handy. WHERE IS PGP ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB? U.S. only availability: PGP: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html PGPfone: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgpfone International availability: PGP and PGPfone: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ WHERE CAN I FTP PGP IN NORTH AMERICA? If you are in the USA or Canada, you can get PGP by following the instructions in any of: ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/README ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/ ftp://ftp.gibbon.com/pub/pgp/README.PGP ftp://ftp.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/README WHERE IS PGP ON COMPUSERVE? GO NCSAFORUM. Follow the instructions there to gain access to Library 12: Export Controlled. AOL Go to the AOL software library and search "PGP" or ftp from ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp or another site listed above. It is possible to get PGP from ftp sites with hidden directories with the following trick: (1) View the README file with the hidden directory name in it, then quickly (2) Start a new ftp connection, specifiying the hidden directory name with the ftp site's address, like ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_xxxxxxx (where the xxxxxxx is replaced with the current character string). WHAT BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS CARRY PGP? MANY BBS carry PGP. The following carry recent versions of PGP and allow free downloads of PGP. US 303-343-4053 Hacker's Haven, Denver, CO 303-772-1062 Colorado Catacombs BBS, Longmont CO 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, up to 28,800 bps. Use ANSI terminal emulation. For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions. 314-896-9309 The KATN BBS 317-887-9568 Computer Virus Research Center (CVRC) BBS, Indianapolis, IN Login First Name: PGP Last Name: USER Password: PGP 501-791-0124, 501-791-0125 The Ferret BBS, North Little Rock, AR Login name: PGP USER Password: PGP 506-457=0483 Data Intelligence Group Corporation BBS 508-668-4441 Emerald City, Walpole, MA 601-582-5748 CyberGold BBS 612-690-5556, !CyBERteCH SeCURitY BBS! Minneapolis MN 914-667-4567 Exec-Net, New York, NY 915-587-7888, Self-Governor Information Resource, El Paso, Texas GERMANY +49-781-38807 MAUS BBS, Offenburg - angeschlossen an das MausNet +49-521-68000 BIONIC-BBS Login: PGP WHERE CAN I FTP PGP CLOSE TO ME? IT ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP FI ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp/ NL ftp://ftp.nl.net/pub/crypto/pgp ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/encryption/pgp NO ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/ NZ ftp://ftphost.vuw.ac.nz SE ftp://leif.thep.lu.se TW ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/ UK ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp HOW CAN I GET PGP BY EMAIL? If you have access to email, but not to ftp, send a message saying "help" to ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com or mailserv@nic.funet.fi WHERE CAN I GET MORE PGP INFORMATION? http://www.csn.net/~mpj http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/pgp-faq.html http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Issues/Crypto/ITAR_export/cryptusa_paper.ps.gz ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-pgp-pgpformat-00.txt ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pem-mime-08.txt http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/pgp-source.html http://web.cnam.fr/Network/Crypto/(c'est en francais) http://web.cnam.fr/Network/Crypto/survey.html(en anglais) http://www2.hawaii.edu/~phinely/MacPGP-and-AppleScript-FAQ.html http://www.pgp.net/pgp http://www.sydney.sterling.com:8080/~ggr/pgpmoose.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ http://inet.uni-c.dk/~pethern/privacy.html WHAT ARE SOME GOOD PGP BOOKS? Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users by William Stallings Prentice Hall PTR ISBN 0-13-185596-4 US $19.95 PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. ISBN 1-56592-098-8 US $24.95 E-Mail Security: How to Keep Your Electronic Mail Private "Covers PGP/PEM" by Bruce Schneier Wiley Publishing The Computer Privacy Handbook: A Practical Guide to E-Mail Encryption, Data Protection, and PGP PRivacy Software by André Bacard Peachpit Press ISBN 1-56609-171-3 US $24.95 800-283-9444 or 510-548-4393 THE OFFICIAL PGP USER'S GUIDE by Philip R. Zimmerman MIT Press April 1995 - 216 pp. - paper - US $14.95 - ISBN 0-262-74017-6 ZIMPP Standard PGP documentation neatly typeset and bound. PGP SOURCE CODE AND INTERNALS by Philip R. Zimmerman April 1995 - 804 pp. - US $55.00 - 0-262-24039-4 ZIMPH How to Use PGP, 61 pages, (Pub #121) from the Superior Broadcasting Company, Box 1533-N, Oil City, PA 16301, phone: (814) 678-8801 (about US $10-$13). IS PGP LEGAL? Pretty Good Privacy is legal if you follow these rules: Don't export PGP from the USA except to Canada, or from Canada except to the USA, without a license. If you are in the USA, use either Viacrypt PGP (licensed for commercial use) or MIT PGP using RSAREF (limited to personal, noncommercial use). Outside of the USA, where RSA is not patented, you may prefer to use a version of PGP (2.6.3i) that doesn't use RSAREF to avoid the restrictions of that license. If you are in a country where the IDEA cipher patent holds in software (including the USA, Canada, and some countries in Europe), make sure you are licensed to use the IDEA cipher commercially before using PGP commercially. (No separate license is required to use the freeware PGP for personal, noncommercial use). For direct IDEA licensing, contact Ascom Systec: Erhard Widmer, Ascom Systec AG, Dep't. CMVV Phone +41 64 56 59 83 Peter Hartmann, Ascom Systec AG, Dep't. CMN Phone +41 64 56 59 45 Fax: +41 64 56 59 90 e-mail: IDEA@ascom.ch Mail address: Gewerbepark, CH-5506 Maegenwil (Switzerland) Viacrypt has an exclusive marketing agreement for commercial distribution of Philip Zimmermann's copyrighted code. (Selling shareware/freeware disks or connect time is OK). This restriction does not apply to PGP 3.0, since it is a complete rewrite by Colin Plumb. If you modify PGP (other than porting it to another platform, fixing a bug, or adapting it to another compiler), don't call it PGP (TM) or Pretty Good Privacy (TM) without Philip Zimmermann's permission. IMPORTANT: Please note that there is an official distribution site for MIT PGP and another for the International version: WorldWideWeb references: U.S/Canada non-commercial use: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html Norway/International non-commercial use: http://www.ifi.uio.no/pgp/ U.S. commercial use: http://www.viacrypt.com WHAT IS PHILIP ZIMMERMANN'S LEGAL STATUS? Philip Zimmermann was under investigation for alleged violation of export regulations, with a grand jury hearing evidence for about 28 months, ending 11 January 1996. The Federal Government chose not to comment on why it decided to not prosecute, nor is it likely to. The Commerce Secretary stated that he would seek relaxed export controls for cryptographic products, since studies show that U. S. industry is being harmed by current regulations. Philip endured some serious threats to his livelihood and freedom, as well as some very real legal expenses, for the sake of your right to electronic privacy. The battle is won, but the war is not over. The regulations that caused him so much grief and which continue to dampen cryptographic development, harm U. S. industry, and do violence to the U. S. National Security by eroding the First Ammendment of the U. S. Constitution and encouraging migration of cryptographic industry outside of the U. S. A. are still on the books. If you are a U. S. Citizen, please write to your U. S. Senators, Congressional Representative, President, and Vice President pleading for a more sane and fair cryptographic policy. WHERE CAN I GET WINDOWS & DOS SHELLS FOR PGP? http://www.dayton.net/~cwgeib ftp://oak.oakland.edu/SimTel/msdos/security/apgp22b.zip http://alpha.netaccess.on.ca/~spowell/crypto/pwf31.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/dc/dcosenza/pgpw40.zip ftp://ftp.firstnet.net/pub/windows/winpgp/pgpw40.zip http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm(Private Idaho) ftp://ftp.eskimo.com/~joelm http://www.xs4all.nl/~paulwag/security.htm http://www.LCS.com/winpgp.html http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/index.html http://netaccess.on.ca/~rbarclay/pgp.html ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/gcppgp10.zip ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pmpgp.zip http://iquest.com/~aegisrcs WHAT OTHER FILE ENCRYPTION (DOS, MAC) TOOLS ARE THERE? PGP can do conventional encryption only of a file (-c) option, but you might want to investigate some of the other alternatives if you do this a lot. Alternatives include Quicrypt and Atbash2 for DOS, DLOCK for DOS & UNIX, Curve Encrypt (for the Mac), HPACK (many platforms), and a few others. Quicrypt is interesting in that it comes in two flavors: shareware exportable and registered secure. Atbash2 is interesting in that it generates ciphertext that can be read over the telephone or sent by Morse code. DLOCK is a no-frills strong encryption program with complete source code. Curve Encrypt has certain user-friendliness advantages. HPACK is an archiver (like ZIP or ARC), but with strong encryption. A couple of starting points for your search are: U.S. only availability: ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/qcrypt11.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://ftp.miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/file/ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/code/ HOW DO I SECURELY DELETE FILES (DOS)? If you have the Norton Utilities, Norton WipeInfo is pretty good. I use DELETE.EXE in del110.zip, which is really good at deleting existing files, but doesn't wipe "unused" space. US ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/del120.zip NL ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/security/del120.zip UK ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/ibmpc/security/realdeal.zip WHAT DO I DO ABOUT THE PASS PHRASE IN MY WINDOWS SWAP FILE? The nature of Windows is that it can swap any memory to disk at any time, meaning that all kinds of interesting things could end up in your swap file. ftp://ftp.firstnet.net/pub/windows/winpgp/wswipe.zip WHERE DO I GET PGPfone(tm)? PGPfone is in beta test for Macintosh and Windows'9 users. The MIT has shut down their ftp distribution of PGPfone for Macintosh and Windows'95, so within the U.S/Canada you must obtain PGPfone using a WorldWideWeb browser. U.S. only availability: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgpfone International availability: DK ftp://ftp.datashopper.dk/pub/users/pethern/pgp/ NL ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/voice/ NO ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/mac/ ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/windows/ WHERE DO I GET NAUTILUS? Bill Dorsey, Pat Mullarky, and Paul Rubin have come out with a program called Nautilus that enables you to engage in secure voice conversations between people with multimedia PCs and modems capable of at least 7200 bps (but 14.4 kbps is better). See: U.S. only availability: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/other/nautilus-phone-0.9.2-source.tar.gz ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/misc ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/voice/ The official Nautilus homepage is at: http://www.lila.com/nautilus/ HOW DO I ENCRYPT MY DISK ON-THE-FLY? Secure File System (SFS) is a DOS device driver that encrypts an entire partition on the fly using SHA in feedback mode. Secure Drive also encrypts an entire DOS partition, using IDEA, which is patented. Secure Device is a DOS device driver that encrypts a virtual, file-hosted volume with IDEA. Cryptographic File System (CFS) is a Unix device driver that uses DES. CryptDisk is a ShareWare package for Macintosh that uses strong IDEA encryption like PGP. U.S. only availability: ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README ftp://miyako.dorm.duke.edu/mpj/crypto/disk/ International availability: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut01/sfs.html ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/disk/ ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/encryption/disk/ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/misc/ ftp://menja.ifi.uio.no/pub/pgp/mac/ ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/disk/ WHERE IS PGP'S COMPETITION? RIPEM is the second most popular freeware email encryption package. I like PGP better for lots of reasons, but if for some reason you want to check or generate a PEM signature, RIPEM is available at ripem.msu.edu. There is also an exportable RIPEM/SIG. U.S. only availability: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/GETTING_ACCESS International availability: ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/code/ HOW DO I PUBLISH MY PGP PUBLIC KEY? Send mail to one of these addresses with the single word "help" in the subject line to find out how to use them. These servers sychronize keys with each other. There are other key servers, too. pgp-public-keys@keys.pgp.net pgp-public-keys@keys.de.pgp.net pgp-public-keys@keys.no.pgp.net pgp-public-keys@keys.uk.pgp.net pgp-public-keys@keys.us.pgp.net WWW interface to the key servers: http://www.pgp.net/pgp/www-key.html http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/pks-toplev.html For US $20/year or so, you can have your key officially certified and published in a "clean" key database that is much less susceptible to denial-of-service attacks than the other key servers. Send mail to info-pgp@Four11.com for information, or look at http://www.Four11.com/ Of course, you can always send your key directly to the parties you wish to correspond with by whatever means you wish. CAN I COPY AND REDISTRIBUTE THIS FAQ? Yes. Permission is granted to distribute unmodified copies of this FAQ. Please e-mail comments to Peter Herngaard Look for the latest html version of this FAQ at http://inet.uni-c.dk/~pethern/getpgp.html ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 17 May 1996 09:14:50 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. 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