Date: Wed, 14 Feb 96 07:03:43 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#014 Computer Privacy Digest Wed, 14 Feb 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 014 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail An Apology Big Brother is Listening In Re: AOL Mail Retention Re: Telecomm Bill Translation Privacy, MV Registry Records Access to DMV Records by Rental Car Companies GM unlocks your car with a phone call Re: whois, netfind, finger,etc. Anonymous Remailers are a Virus Spreading Online Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Ming Of Mongo Date: 08 Feb 1996 01:45:50 -0800 Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail Organization: Secret World Government References: Dennis G. Rears wrote: As far as shipping it back in the reply envelopes or suing in small claims court; I am astonished that people have the time to spend doing this. The (supposed) cure is worse than the disease but if it makes people feel better. I know exactly what you mean. I Don't think I would go to all that trouble either, But I am glad someone has the time. It's the little things that kill you. They say a cigarrete takes ten minutes off your life. I wonder how much you loose to a lifetime of annoying junk mail... If its an hour its too much. Personally I am the type of person to make the grand gesture, and take the grand risk, and to completely ignore something like junk mail. But there is a lot of evil out there that depends on all of us saying "not big enough to worry about. But it adds up: junk mail, 5 minutes of ads per ten minutes of tv/radio, potholes in the street, incomprehencible phone company surcharges, unenforcable laws, watered down sodas at fast food places, source code without comments, badly behaved children at the beach with boomboxes running around kicking sand everywhere... -- Ming of Mongo ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 08 Feb 1996 13:47:30 -0600 (CST) Subject: An Apology Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee [moderator: This person posted to a lot of groups due to a mailer misunderstanding. I am removing his name from this posting because it is not necessary to further embarrass him. But his posting contains a few warnings that we all might take. 1) He did not understand his maiing software. 2) The posting below contains a newsgroup list, which he indicates is his entire newsgroup list and that is now visible for all to see. I removed many of the newsgroups. A movie I once saw about a tap dancing magician said that a good motto for a magician is to "know your rabbit". It holds here too.] To: comp-privacy@uwm.edu From: name removed to protect the guilty Newsgroups: alt.sex.stories, alt.sports.football.pro, alt.tasteless.jokes, comp.society.privacy, soc.men, soc.penpals, talk.atheism, talk.environment, clari.news.crime.abductions, clari.news.sex, clari.sports.football.nfl.games, clari.sports.local, [...] Subject: Apology X-Newsreader: WinVN 0.99.6 I have received a lot of mail concerning my posting. I didn't mean to post to almost ANY of these groups but WinVN (which I don't know how to use that well) accidentally posted to all of my subscribed newsgroups. (I've got it figured out now) I'm sorry for the trouble and believe me my mailbox won't let me forget it. I DO understand Usenet rules and manners but please understand that this was an honest mistake and not a deliberate SPAM. Sorry for the inconvienence and thank you for your understanding. ------------------------------ From: kwn@ingenioeren.dk (Kurt Westh Nielsen) Date: 08 Feb 1996 12:46:58 GMT Subject: Big Brother is Listening In Organization: Customer at DKnet Europe: Danish legislation concerning tapping telephone call - both data- and spoken - is about to change. It might become easier for the Police to listen in if a recent proposal turns into an actual law. Of course it sounds ok to catch criminals - but is it possible ? - and if not why then a new law ?? My questions: Are encryption techniques so advanced now, that it is not practically possible do decode encrypted tcp-ip traffic over a phone line ? Is it a commonly applied strategy for hackers to install encryption software on invaded servers, so the communication going through the hackers' modem to the first machine in the line og target machines is encrypted. How common is software to encrypt data-communication (not speaking of mail messages) ? Is it indeed possible for the Law equipped with the right technology (which is ?) to tap into (encrypted) datacommunication ? Thanks for your time - comments will deeply valued ------------------------------ From: PHILS@RELAY.RELAY.COM (Philip H. Smith III, (703) 506-0500) Date: 08 Feb 96 08:16:16 EST Subject: Re: AOL Mail Retention References: <199602071932.NAA10030@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> Aaron Zaugg said: While this may be skirting the true issue with AOL's mail retention without user's consent, I wonder if there isn't an easy way around this. I do not use AOL, but more than likely a user should be able to edit their e-mail messages. I doubt that AOL is going to save a back up of every message you edit. Therefore replacing any mail you want to delete with a bunch of spaces or any other character you wish should block anyone's attempts to read such e-mail with a very minimal inconvienience. Right, assuming that AOL uses only one set of backup tapes, this will certainly do it. Umm...even on a home PC, three sets of tapes are a *minimum*. For a real data center, cycling through a set of several thousand tapes (using a bunch per backup) is more likely, with offsite backup, periodic (or every-time) twinning and permanent retention of one of the twins, etc. Despite being aimed at the home market, presumably AOL has figured out how to run a real data center by now (if not, I know several people who will happily educate them at several hundred $$$/hour), so I kind of doubt that what is being proposed here will achieve anything other than to waste an AOLer's time. ...phsiii ------------------------------ From: jon healey Date: 08 Feb 1996 09:41:22 -0600 (CST) Subject: Re: Telecomm Bill Translation In response to comments by Gary McGath and Monty Solomon, the only new law in the following section: (B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number or who receives the communications; is the additon of the words ``or utilizes a telecommunications device.'' The rest already was part of the US Code. ------------------------------ From: Robert LeRoux Hernandez Date: 09 Feb 1996 08:17:47 -0800 Subject: Privacy, MV Registry Records Organization: The Internet Access Company DOE v. MASSACHUSETTS REGISTRY OF MOTOR VEHICLE: CALL FOR POTENTIAL AMICI CURIAE In the annals of invasive privacy invaders, our state motor-vehicle registries are particularly remarkable. Often bellicose, sanctimonious, and unencumbered by democratic or spiritual scruples, they are the razor's edge of the modern police state, and they have it all. They have guns, police powers, and computers linked together across the country. And for those of us who drive, they have custody of our private personal data... Which they turn around and sell or give away! They do this in the name of open government or whatever ails you. They hand it out to people that most of us wouldn't let into our homes, for example hack media reporters, private investigators, stalkers, nosy neighbors, hucksters, government agents, and personal data wholesalers. Our names, home addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, etc. are being delivered in gigabyte quantities to all manner of government agencies and to commercial bulk mailers. Eleven years ago, a small group of us in Massachusetts discovered these facts and brought suit. We obtained a landmark decision in state Appeals Court and an injunction which lasted five years. The case, Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, is now entering its third and perhaps most decisive round of appellate review. We already know that the Boston Globe -- the area's largest so-called newspaper (recently downsized, corporately taken over, and pulped down) -- will be sending its lawyers instead of its reporters to this round of proceedings. The Globe's lawyers helped to defeat us last time in lower Court. We are confronting a very powerful adversary in court proceedings with national implications, and it is lonely up there. Accordingly, WE INVITE AND URGE PRIVACY ADVOCACY GROUPS TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING AS AMICI CURIAE IN THIS IMPORTANT CASE. Our brief filing deadline is 3/25/96. For further information, e-mail the plaintiffs' attorney, Robert L. Hernandez, at rlhern@civiljustice.com or call plaintiff organizer Stan Robinson at (508) 358-2282. ------------------------------ From: Paul Robinson Date: 09 Feb 1996 11:53:48 EST Subject: Access to DMV Records by Rental Car Companies Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company/TDR, Inc. Silver Spring, MD USA According to a report over the radio, a little-noticed provision of one of the crime bills which have come out allows a rental car company to check your driving record. According to the report, two or three incidents - an accident or certain types of tickets - is enough to cause you to be blacklisted. Where are the problems in this? 1. There is no announcement of this practice; you're not likely to find out until you get to the counter and can't rent a car. 2. There is no appeals process available. 3. There is no means available to provide for corrections or to determine where or how the error occurred in the event you are caught short by this happening. 4. No consideration is made as to the severity of the offenses or whether you were even at fault in the accident; if the information is there, you walk. Questions: 5. What proof do we have that those who are inquiring into the database are authorized to do so, that they are actually looking up the record for that customer, and what privacy protections do we have against unauthorized inquiries? Do we have the right to password-protect our own account? 6. What protections do we have against the risk of erroneous data in a report? 7. Is this the same data as is available at a DMV or DPS office, and if not, in what way is it different? 7. Are there rights under law to get errors corrected? For damages for inconvenience due to errors? Any right to collect damages for misconduct if knowingly false information is placed in a database? Or for failure to timely followup inquiries and remove errors? Government agencies are not known for speed in action unless, like with large organizations, damages and fines are available to those who are injured due to error, negligence or misconduct. Advice: 1. Whenever making a reservation for a car at a rental agency, book it with multiple agencies, then once you have the car, cancel or reschedule the ones not needed. (I do this because I have been extremely inconvenienced when there are conditions imposed at the rental counter I couldn't meet when I'd booked a car and made plans weeks in advance; if I had known about them beforehand I could have done something about them.) 2. If you get caught short in any circumstances, try another agency if (as is usually the case) asking for a supervisor doesn't help. 3. When making a reservation, ask if they do checking of one's driving record. If they do, and you want or must use that particular agency, then ask them to check your record in advance so you can know if there are any problems. 4. Get a copy of your driving record so you can know if there are any errors or inaccurate reports. In Maryland, where I live, a 3-year report costs $5 if uncertified, and $8 if certified; a full-report of everything on file is $10 and $15, respectively. (My report showed nothing at all.) 5. The above could also apply to certain issues regarding credit reports, for the same or similar reasons. -- Paul Robinson ------------------------------ From: Jerry Rainko Date: 10 Feb 96 11:03 EST Subject: GM unlocks your car with a phone call The following is an internal GM Newsline announcement from 2/9/96. GM ANNOUNCES ONSTAR .... General Motors today is expected to announce at its annual Chicago Auto Show press luncheon, a new on-vehicle communications technology called OnStar -- the most comprehensive and user-friendly services and communications package in the industry. OnStar integrates on-board advanced vehicle electronic architecture with Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite technology and a cellular phone. These comprehensive technologies link the driver and the vehicle with the OnStar Customer Assistance Center, where advisors will provide person-to-person help using the latest computer databases to instantly offer personalized information and services. With the touch of a button -- OnStar creates what may be the easiest-to- use feature GM has ever introduced. For instance, if a driver's car breaks down, has a flat tire or runs out of gas, the driver simply presses the customer service button on the cellular telephone to reach the Customer Assistance Center. The Customer Assistance Center advisor then dispatches the nearest service provider to the vehicle's location. Or, if there is an emergency, the driver simply needs to touch the emergency services button on the cellular phone, and the Customer Assistance Center advisor locates the vehicle's position on a digital map and alerts the nearest emergency services provider. OnStar also eliminates the need to call a locksmith. If a driver has locked the keys in the car, a toll-free number will connect the driver with the Customer Assistance Center advisor who will send a cellular data call to the automobile that instructs the vehicle to unlock itself at a specified time. OnStar's user-friendly technologies What really caught my eye was the "ability" to bypass a locksmith by calling into the Customer Service Center to have them unlock the car. They however don't mention how secure this type of communication is. If everything seems to go right, check your zipper. -- Jerry Rainko rainman@mich.com ------------------------------ From: Hugh Giblin Date: 13 Feb 1996 15:34:59 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: whois, netfind, finger,etc. I have a strong sense that this question has been much discussed in previous issues of CPD but I am coming in late so I need to ask. Is there any way one can keep their e-mail identity private unless they chose to not do so in the messages they send? -- Hugh Giblin [moderator: What Mr Giblin is addressing is the question of the equivalent of callerid for email, and the equivalent of 'per line blocking' for that feature. 'per call blocking' already exists in the form of anonymous remailers, addressed at length below. This would be a new feature. Let's talk about it.] ------------------------------ From: Declan McCullagh Date: 12 Feb 1996 20:53:29 -0800 (PST) Subject: Anonymous Remailers are a Virus Spreading Online Given this paper's Rimmesque, hysterical tone, unsupported assertions, and wildly inaccurate conclusions, I'd like to think it's a joke. Unfortunately, I think it's for real. -Declan // declan@eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan@well.com // http://www.strassmann.com/pubs/anon-remail.html Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Information Infrastructure Project Symposium on the Global Information Infrastructure: Information, Policy & International Infrastructure Cambridge, MA, January 28-30, 1996 Risk-Free Access Into The Global Information Infrastructure Via Anonymous Re-Mailers by Paul A. Strassmann, US Military Academy, West Point; and Senior Advisor, SAIC and William Marlow, Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Quoted portions are excerpted from Raph Levien's Remailer List. ------------------------- The Context By far the greatest threat to the commercial, economic and political viability of the Global Information Infrastructure will come from information terrorists. Information terrorism has ceased to be an amateur effort and has migrated into the hands of well organized, highly trained expert professionals. Information terrorist attacks can be expected to become a decisive element of any combined threat to the economic and social integrity of the international community. Nations whose life-line becomes increasingly dependent on information networks should realize that there is no sanctuary from information-based assaults. Commercial organizations, especially in telecommunications, finance, transportation and power generation offer choice targets to massive disruption. Information terrorism, as a particularly virulent form of information warfare, is a unique phenomenon in the history of warfare and crime. For the last two hundred years the theory of warfare has been guided by "force-exchange" equations in which the outcome was determined by the rate of attrition of each opposing force. In information attacks these equations do not apply because the attacker remains hidden and cannot be retaliated against. Since biblical times, crimes have been deterred by the prospects of punishment. For that, the criminal had to be apprehended. Yet information crimes have the unique characteristic that apprehension is impossible, since even identification of the criminal is not feasible. Information crimes can be committed easily without leaving any telltale evidence such as fingerprints, traces of poison or bullets. Changes Introduced By Anonymous Re-Mailers The introduction of Anonymous Re-mailers into the Internet has altered the capacity to balance attack and counter-attack, or crime and punishment. The widespread use and easy access to acquiring the capacity to launch anonymous messages and software has so far not received adequate attention from a policy and legal standpoint. This topic is sufficiently technical that it has been largely avoided by experts who have so far concentrated on debating social, legal, political and economic consequences of the Global Information Infrastructure. Yet, unless there is a thorough understanding of the technologies that make the Anonymous Re-mailers sources of a pathological danger, there is little hope that effective preventive measures and safeguards can be put in place. In many respects, the avoidance of technical discussions about some of the pathological aspects of the Internet remind me of the state of medical diagnosis prior to the recognition that bacteriology, prophylactics and inoculation can be only applied following the acceptance of rigorous, analytic and experimental disciplines. Our Agenda The purpose of this paper is to bring to the attention of policy-makers some of the relevant facts about Anonymous Re-mailers. All of the material quoted here comes from public sources which are easily accessible to anyone. The wide-spread current uses of Anonymous Re-mailers should be sufficient warning that this topic cannot be considered any more as something hidden, confidential or inappropriate for public discussion. We find many similarities in the initial denials to the threats from AIDS by the medical and public health establishment. We are dismayed by the avoidance of a candid assessment by public officials about the vulnerability of the Global Information Infrastructure to destructive information epidemics. The purpose of this paper is to increase the awareness of potentially deadly risks that may inhibit the potential gains from the creation of a global information community. What Is A Re-Mailer? A re-mailer allows anyone to post messages to newsgroups or to individuals while remaining anonymous. The identity of the sender is hidden from the recipient and remains practically untraceable. An anonymous re-mailer is a program that runs on a computer somewhere on the Internet. When you send mail to the re-mailer address, the re-mailer takes your name and your address off of the mail message and forwards it to its next destination. The recipient gets mail that has no evidence of where it originally came from, at least not in the headers. You might give away your secret identity in the body of the message, but that would be the sender's own fault. Anonymous re-mailers can be "chained" so that a message is passed on from one anonymous re-mailer to another, in two or more separate anonymous "hops" as a way of making physical tracing or monitoring increasingly difficult. One of the most prominent anonymous re-mailers is is in Finland. It is frequently used by the Russian (ex-KGB) criminal element. assigns a numeric identification to each address from which it receives mail. Internet recipients can reply to that secret number. will also assign to them another anonymous number, and then forward the reply. This creates a double-blind situation where two people could have an ongoing exchange and never know who the other person was. This method of communication is favorite for engaging services of cybercriminals and for authorizing payment for their acts through a third party. can be also used to post a message to Usenet as well. The message can be read by thousands of people, and anyone can send an anonymous reply to the secret Finnish identity. The readers of this paper can easily avail themselves of these services without any special training. Detailed instructions for the use of a remailer service are usually included in the "help" software posted in the remailer's files. For example: To get an anonymous re-mailer address follow the following instruction. First, you should send mail to: . You'll get back a nice help file automatically. Next, send mail to . This will allocate your number--from now on you'll be something like , where XXXXXX is your number. Once you have received your anonymous address you can use it like your normal e-mail address. These capabilities are not trivial, but a source of an exhaustive body of software and communications know-how which can be learned best by consulting one of the many tutorials about this topic, such as: Cyberpunk re-mailers allow a person to send mail with no trace of identity. To use a re-mailer simply do the following: * Add the header Request-Remailing-To: and sending to one of the addresses listed below. These headers must be typed in exactly. Mail without these headers is either rejected or delivered to the re-mailer administrators. * If you cannot add the required headers, place two colons (::) on the very first line of your message, then on the next line type Request-Remailing-To: and the address you want to send anonymously to. * Skip a line, and then begin the message. By using this method you can send the message through more than one re-mailer which will certainly ensure that it will be anonymous. * Many re-mailers only allow one recipient per message. A number of standard Cyberpunk Re-mailers are available. There is a wealth of easily accessible step-by-step instructional material available on the Internet how to use re-mailers and how to evade countermeasures or possibility of detection from any source. Re-mailer operators are in frequent contact with each other and exhibit many of the fraternal habits that previously were shared between amateur radio operators. Some of the most interesting sources of information are: Andr=8E Bacard's anonymous re-mailer FAQ is an excellent nontechnical introduction. For a different take on Net anonymity, see L.Detweiler's home page. Tools * Private Idaho is an anonymous re-mailer utility for Windows, supporting PGP, the cypherpunks re-mailers, and Mixmaster, and the alias server. It too automatically configures itself based on this re-mailer list. * is a re-mailer chaining utility for Mac users, by Jonathan Rochkind. To use it, you need Eudora, MacPGP, and applescript, in addition to a number of applescript scripting additions. * is a PGP-aware mailer that also supports Mixmaster. * The Community ConneXion has put the Web-premail gateway on its SSL server. That means that you can send anonymous email from the Web without exposing your message in the clear on the connection between your Web browser and the gateway. * Sameer Parekh's NEXUS Berkeley / Community ConneXion has a web page set up for sending anonymous mail from your Web client. * Michael Hobbs has set up Web gateway to premail. Now you can send anonymous email directly from your Web browser. Don't use this for extremely sensitive stuff, though, because it isn't quite as secure as running premail yourself (in particular, the connection between your Web browser and the gateway is not encrypted). * A good source for re-mailer information is the Anonymity, re-mailers, and your privacy page compiled by "Galactus". This is also the best place to look for information about anon.penet.fi. * Matt Ghio's re-mailer list is available by fingering re-mailer.help.all@chaos.taylored.com. This file also has all the public keys for PGP-friendly re-mailers. Matt also has a pinging service similar to this one, available by fingering re-mailer-list@chaos.taylored.com. * Chaos is having problems getting recognized on the Net. Try re-mailer.help.all@204.95.228.28 and see if that works any better. Newer information can be gotten by sending mail to mg5n+re-mailers@andrew.cmu.edu. * Help for the Alpha alias server (also available in a plain email version. This is the best way to create an alias for anonymous replies to mail. Not only is it the most cryptographically secure, but you get to pick the alias nickname of your choice. The email addresses are of the form . Highly recommended. * Usura's home page has a bunch of re-mailer related stuff on it, including a help page on chaining re-mailers. * The Armadillo re-mailer now has its own Web page. * Crown re-mailer help and statistics. * Ecafe re-mailer has its own Web page, including quickie info about how to use the re-mailer without encryption or any other extras. Other resources * You want to send secure mail to someone, but don't know their key. Where are you going to get it? Try the keyserver at MIT. * Vince Cate's Cryptorebel and Cypherpunk page has pointers to lots of cypherpunk resources. * John Perry's jpunix page has info on his MX service for hidden re-mailers, as well as cool links for Mixmaster and other stuff. * Lance Cottrell's home page, which has his Chain script, the Mixmaster re-mailer client (including Sun binaries!) as well as other cypberpunk related topics. * Vince Gambino's re-mailer page has a good collection of re-mailer help files. Where Do You Find Re-Mailers? Computers that offer remailing capabilities are operated by individuals or organizations as a public service, almost always at no charge because it costs so little to set one up. They are available globally. We offer a partial list of re-mailers: $remailer{"extropia"} =3D " cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} =3D " cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} =3D " eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} =3D " penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} =3D " cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} =3D " cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} =3D " cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} =3D " mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} =3D " cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} =3D " cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} =3D " cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'alpha'} =3D ' alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} =3D ' alpha pgp'; Much of the knowledge about the characteristics of these re-mailers is available from Role Of Encryption For added protection, users of Anonymous Re-mailers tend to encrypt their messages just in case one of the remailing links are compromised. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) encryption is favored because it is freely available and easy to use. A typical digital signature would look like this: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMPDy4WV5hLjHqWbdAQEqYwQAm+o313Cm2ebAsMiPIwmd1WwnkPXEaYe9 pGR5ja8BKSZQi4TAEQOQwQJaghI8QqZFdcctVYLm569I1/8ah0qyJ+4fOfUiAMda Sa2nvJR7pnr6EXrUFe1QoSauCASP/QRYcKgB5vaaOOuxyXnQfdK39AqaKy8lPYbw MfUiYaMREu4=3D =3D9CJW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- For responses the sender will choose a passphrase. This phrase will be used to encrypt messages sent back to you. The encryption will be single-key encryption, not PGP's normal public-private key encryption. The reason for this is that public key encryption is usually not necessary in such cases. Single-key encryption does not require a database (such as in the widely used database for mapping aliases onto addresses), thus increasing the security of communications among anonymous users. When a recipient responds to the e-mail, his response will be encrypted with the sender's pass-phrase. The sender can read the response by saving it to a file and using PGP on it. PGP will ask for the passphrase, enter the sender's reply, which will make it possible for the recipient to see the response to the e-mail. This feature allows both parties to be securely encrypted, protecting privacy and anonymity in both directions. How Reliable Are The Re-Mailers? The knowledge about the characteristics, reliability and trustworthiness of re-mailers is widely distributed through various bulletin boards. These are consulted by persons deeply immersed in Internet-related developments. There is an agile and very active global community that keeps track of the average latency time, uptime of frequently used re-mailers. They post their findings, which in many cases is superior to what a commercial customer is likely to find out about their own data center performance, or about the service quality offered by Compuserve, America-On-Line of Prodigy. Here is an excerpt from such a bulletin: hacktic remailer@utopia.hacktic.nl **** ******* 7:10 99.85% c2 remail@c2.org -.-++ ++-.-+ 2:10:42 99.83% rmadillo remailer@armadillo.com +++++ ++++++ 37:03 99.69% flame remailer@flame.alias.net ** * ******* 14:55 99.64% mix mixmaster@remail.obscura.com _ _-__...-++ 17:40:48 99.21% amnesia amnesia@chardos.connix.com -+ +--+--- 2:04:43 99.20% ecafe cpunk@remail.ecafe.org ## ##-## #-- 1:26:54 99.06% extropia remail@extropia.wimsey.com .- -.----_. 13:48:11 99.04% replay remailer@replay.com + +** ***** 5:36 98.84% shinobi remailer@shinobi.alias.net -- -- - - + 54:43 98.78% spook remailer@valhalla.phoenix.net * ***** - * 35:07 98.36% vishnu mixmaster@vishnu.alias.net ** #-*# 7:44 98.20% bsu-cs nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu # # ##.# 28:07 97.78% gondolin mix@remail.gondolin.org - --_.---- 9:45:55 97.62% wmono wmono@valhalla.phoenix.net ** * * 12:23 97.57% hroller hroller@c2.org #*+### -.. # 1:37:24 96.71% ford remailer@bi-node.zerberus.de ._...--._. 21:21:22 95.83% portal hfinney@shell.portal.com ########*# 27:36 95.55% alumni hal@alumni.caltech.edu # # * + 25:47 95.29% penet anon@anon.penet.fi . -- -- 13:55:20 87.78% rahul homer@rahul.net +* *+**+* # 4:34 93.71% robo robo@c2.org #-## 5:59 27.86% History key # response in less than 5 minutes. * response in less than 1 hour. + response in less than 4 hours. - response in less than 24 hours. . response in less than 2 days. Specialization Of Services The operators of various re-mailers are specialized in that they cater to select communities of Internet dwellers. They offer unique services to customers who are seeking different degrees of anonymity. Cognoscenti in the field can readily identify remailers who offer meets diffferent tastes and preferences. Here is an example of remailer characterizations: A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. Re-mailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. Re-mailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. Claims to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Re-mailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. Re-mailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with , then only messages destined for public Supports nyms according to the protocol used by alpha.c2.org. This list will be featuring reliability and latency measurements soon for these nymservers. A fascinating example of specialization is a re-mailer service advertising the capacity to defeat "traffic analysis" used by intelligence agencies. All mail to each destination is first sent through which is a standard "cypherpunk" re-mailer with PGP with a few added features. The outgoing mail is not forwarded immediately upon receipt. Outgoing messages are stored in a pool until five minutes after each hour, when all messages in the pool are re-transmitted in a random order, ignoring the order in which they came in. Each message from the re-mailer is sent through a random path of other re-mailers in the re-mailernet. This usually involves between five to 20 "hops" from one re-mailer to another. In each case care is taken for at least one of the "hops" to be in a country with especially relaxed laws concerning electronic messages. Such measures would greatly complicate any tracing that may be contemplated by a law-enforcement agency. Why Re-Mailers? E-mail is as fast and casual as a voice phone call, but can be stored and retrieved with infinitely greater efficiency than paper letters or taped conversations. An e-mail message can be re-broadcast the world over, by anyone who comes across a copy of the transmission. Parts of any message can be extracted, edited and easily modified. Meanwhile, the e-mail address of the originator remains a label of its origin. If the storage of that message is not protected - and it rarely is - it can be accessed by anyone who takes the trouble to rummage through any of the many archived computer records that may have received such message. A casual e-mail exchange, with an identifying address, can be then used to compromise the originator. As e-mail traffic takes over an ever increasing share of personal communications, inspection of e-mail traffic can yield more comprehensive evidence than just about any wire-tapping efforts. E-mail-tapping is less expensive, more thorough and less forgiving than any other means for monitoring personal communications. Without protection of privacy, browsing through e-mail archives would become the preferred way for gathering evidence in law enforcement cases. It would also be used as the favorite means for collecting incriminating statements by lawyers engaged in civil litigation. In casual e-mail exchanges it is easy to make an error. When the message is archived it could be used to haunt a person for decades afterwards. A message intended for a particular individual may be passed on to hundreds or even thousands of others. Unless its origin is anonymous, all e-mail can be traced through identifying addresses that preserve the name of the originator - as well as the names of those who forwarded it - wherever the message traversed. Unless a message is handled anonymously, a trace is left about everyone who received it or passed it on. It would be like a letter that not only identifies the name and address of its author, but also fingerprints of anyone who ever touched it. It is one of the fundamental strengths of the Internet that it offers an almost universal capacity for free expression of ideas. A person's opinions can be sent anywhere in the world in a matter of minutes, with the originator's name displayed at the top. Is it consistent with the rights to individual privacy and freedom of expression to have one's name clearly associated with a message than may be easily disseminated to unintended recipients? The issues here are the rights to the freedom of speech and to the rights to personal privacy. Having the right to free speech may work well in the case of verbal expression, but it may cease to have its intended purpose in face of retaliation that may take place decades later. In a system that theoretically can have infinitely large memory and indefinitely long remembrance, the freedom of expression and become abused and perverted by a government that does not respect individual rights. With the widespread acceptance of Internet-mediated communications it was recognized that the simplest way of securing privacy is through anonymity. That's how anonymous re-mailers came into being. Given the technical characteristics of Internet, there is nothing to prevent anyone to set up a private (or public) anonymous remailing service. Any attempt to prohibit or regulate the use of anonymous re-mailers is technically unfeasible. In a democratic society it becomes politically unacceptable to suppress remailers as potential sources of criminal acts. Such absolute prohibitions would never pass through a legislative process in a free society. Conclusion Anonymous re-mailers are here to stay. Like in the case of many virulent diseases, there is very little a free society can do to prohibit travel or exposure to sources of infection. The best one can do is to start treating the pathologies inherent in the Internet in the same way as we have learned to deal with infectious epidemics. That calls for constructing new institutions and processes that are analogues to inoculation, immunization, prophylactics, clean water supply, sewers, hygiene, early detection of outbreaks of diseases, quarantine, the offices of health examiners, the Center of Disease Control and the World Health Organization. The introduction of most of these restrictive means, imposed mostly by government, were often opposed by those who saw in public health injunctions infringement of individual rights. In due course an informed electorate found it expedient to accept most of the sanitary measures for disease control a bargain that was well worth it. The history of public health teaches us that suppression of any disease must be preceded by a thorough understanding of its behavior, its method of transmission and how it creates its own ecology. As in the case of smallpox, yellow fever, flu epidemics, AIDS or malaria, it will take disasters before the public may accept that some forms of restrictions on the electronic freedom of speech and privacy may be worthwhile. It was the purpose of this paper to explain the characteristics of anonymous remailers as one of the potential sources of infectious threats to the well-being of our information-based civilization. We trust that this will be seen as a useful contribution to an already raging debate of how to find a balance between the desirable and the dangerous. Paul@Strassmann.com and William_Marlow@cpqm.saic.com will be pleased to respond to identifiable commentators on the points of view expressed herein= ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 30 Jan 1996 18:45:30 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. 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Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #014 ****************************** .