Date: Tue, 07 Nov 95 16:14:56 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V7#039 Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 07 Nov 95 Volume 7 : Issue: 039 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: Is Someone Already Watching All International Net Traffic? Re: GovAccess.183.snoops Re: GovAccess.183.snoops Cont. Saga with Bank/DL/Unemployment Re: Uncolicited email Advertising Re: Uncolicited email Advertising Re: Stolen SSN -> Fake Credit Card; Real Examples Re: Balancing Voters' Privacy and Access Rights Re: Balancing Voters' Privacy and Access Rights Re: Act Now to Stop the Religious Right from Shutting Down the Net Arrest Records and Employment Re: Phone Number Privacy Re: Telephone Odds and Ends Re: The Information Rights Act of 1996 Update Info Request: EFFs' Online Activism Resource List Re: Copying Driver's Licenses Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/18/95] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Paul R. Coen" Date: 05 Nov 1995 18:38:18 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: Is Someone Already Watching All International Net Traffic? Organization: Drew University Academic Technology Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through the same Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their destination. I.e., the second message went through Virginia to get from Switzerland to Israel. Is that really that uncommon? Since a lot of lines were established from certain areas to the United States, often the traffic gets routed though the US to get to a third region. I expect that will lessen over time. The whois servers at the InterNIC and at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information report, ``No match for "134.222.9.1". '' and `` No match for "134.222.35.2".'' Hmm. Maybe it's a class B address, and the whole range of numbers is registered with rs.internic.net: $ whois 134.222 European Unix Users Group (NET-EUNET-X25) Kruislaan 413 NL-1098 SJ Amsterdam NETHERLANDS Netname: EUNET-X25 Netnumber: 134.222.0.0 Coordinator: EUnet Ltd (EU-NIC) hostmaster@nic.eu.net +31 20 5925109 +31 20 5925165 (24hr Emergency) +31 20 5925163 (fax) Domain System inverse mapping provided by: NS.EU.NET 192.16.202.11 SUNIC.SUNET.SE 192.36.125.2 192.36.148.18 NS.UU.NET 137.39.1.3 NS2.NIC.FR 192.93.0.4 Record last updated on 07-Mar-94. Hey, wow, there we go! Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? The European Unix Users Group? This sort of speculation really undermines real concern over issues like the wiretap proposal. [moderator: the same sort of response came from "David H. Klein" and jesse@oes.amdahl.com (Jesse Mundis)] ------------------------------ From: James Tomlinson Date: 06 Nov 1995 00:42:47 -0400 (EDT) Subject: Re: GovAccess.183.snoops This is from the November 5, 1995 issue of Edupage: NEW YORK TIMES CORRECTS WIRETAP STORY Correcting its front page story on the FBI's plans for expanding national wiretapping capability (New York Times 2 Nov 95 A1; Edupage 2 Nov 95), the newspaper says the plan would allow monitoring of 1 in every 1,000 phone lines (not every 100, as mistakenly reported). In a letter to the Times from FBI director Louis Freeh says, "We have not and are not asking for the ability to monitor 1 out of every 100 telephone numbers or any other ridiculous number like that. To obtain that many court orders and conduct that extent of wiretapping would be nearly impossible." (New York Times 3 Nov 95 A1,A14) Even if the actual number is 1 in a 1000 that is a tremendous amount of capacity! James Tomlinson ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ IMCI/NEWSCORP Other modes of communications MCImail: 704-0964@mcimail.com, Jamest1234@aol.com "Minds are like parachutes...They only function when their 're open" unknown ------------------------------ From: "Dave Banisar" Date: 06 Nov 1995 00:29:05 -0500 Subject: Re: GovAccess.183.snoops I can't say that I'm particularly impressed by the assertions by Mr. Freeh that they are not asking for any "ridiculous number". The fact is that rather than issuing regulations mandated by the law setting up the number of taps, pen registers etc. that they needed in any particular areas based on current and estimated use, they decided to go for the brass ring and went for percentages based on seemly arbitrary numbers. Even taken at their assertion that it only refers to the switch capacity of calls that can be done at one time, this is far more than they currently use. This is clearly not what Congress had intended in the CALEA, who'se purpose was to "maintain the status quo." And as switch technology progresses and more lines and coversations are done per switch, this capability will increase automatically without any further public notice by the FBI. This is hardly open decisionmaking. Court orders have never posed a problem. In 26 years, only 27 have ever been turned down out of 19,000 requests. The Supreme Court has also eliminate the mandate set in the law the a wiretap been a technique of last resort and that interceptions be "minimized" to prevent interception of irrelevent calls (only 19% of calls intercepted in 1994 were found to be relevant by the prosecutors own reports). What happens to current financial limitations when voice recognition becomes a reality is a whole other topic. I imagine the number will increase substantially when humans dont have to transcribe every word. -- Dave Banisar EPIC -------------------------------------- Date: 11/5/95 11:48 PM To: Dave Banisar From: James Tomlinson This is from the November 5, 1995 issue of Edupage: NEW YORK TIMES CORRECTS WIRETAP STORY Correcting its front page story on the FBI's plans for expanding national wiretapping capability (New York Times 2 Nov 95 A1; Edupage 2 Nov 95), the newspaper says the plan would allow monitoring of 1 in every 1,000 phone lines (not every 100, as mistakenly reported). In a letter to the Times from FBI director Louis Freeh says, "We have not and are not asking for the ability to monitor 1 out of every 100 telephone numbers or any other ridiculous number like that. To obtain that many court orders and conduct that extent of wiretapping would be nearly impossible." (New York Times 3 Nov 95 A1,A14) Even if the actual number is 1 in a 1000 that is a tremendous amount of capacity! James Tomlinson ------------------------------ From: Maryjo Bruce Date: 05 Nov 1995 17:00:19 -0800 (PST) Subject: Cont. Saga with Bank/DL/Unemployment I have now gotten a certified letter from the bank where I withdrew over 10K from savings, regarding the unacceptability of being unemployed. I think I am going to contact a PRO with the IRS about this. Mary Jo Bruce, M.S., M.L.S. Sunshine@netcom.com ------------------------------ From: prvtctzn@aol.com (Prvt Ctzn) Date: 05 Nov 1995 20:00:36 -0500 Subject: Re: Uncolicited email Advertising Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364) clouds@rainbow.rmii.com (Philip Duclos) wrote Question: How big a stretch is it to claim your computer is a FAX machine under the Federal laws governing unsolicited FAXs? If it fits, how does one file charges under that statute? Question: What other methods have been effective is stopping or preventing unsolicited email? The TCPA (47 USC 227) regulated unsolicited advertisements through the use of a telephone facsimile machine (inbound or outbound). The law defines a fax machine as equipment that has the capacity to receive signals over regular telephone lines and convert that signal into text on paper. Thus, there is no stretch at all. junk-email is a junk fax. (Note: the are certain other conditions concerning this matter, but such e-mail ads are generally a violation of the law. -- Robert Bulmash Private Citizen, Inc. 1/800-CUT-JUNK ------------------------------ From: gmcgath@condes.MV.COM (Gary McGath) Date: 07 Nov 1995 12:25:09 GMT Subject: Re: Uncolicited email Advertising Organization: Conceptual Design clouds@rainbow.rmii.com (Philip Duclos) wrote: Yesterday I received the first piece of unsolicited email addressed to me. It was an advertisement for a Web site. I have no idea how the sender discovered my email address, though I'm sure it isn't hard. I have no idea why I was picked as a recepient. Question: How big a stretch is it to claim your computer is a FAX machine under the Federal laws governing unsolicited FAXs? If it fits, how does one file charges under that statute? If you regard first-time unsolicited E-mail as so heinous an assault on your person that you want to prosecute the person who did it, then you should at least take some reasonable precautions against letting your E-mail address be known to strangers. For example, just by posting to a newsgroup, you're letting many people know your address. The mania of today is that if somebody does something which we don't like, we look for a law to keep him from doing it. This has resulted in a society in which we are all criminals in more ways than we can know. Have we reached the point where people can't deal with annoyance except by calling the cops? -- Gary McGath gmcgath@condes.mv.com http://www.mv.com/users/gmcgath ------------------------------ From: merlyn@stonehenge.com (Randal L. Schwartz) Date: 07 Nov 1995 11:03:22 -0800 Subject: Re: Stolen SSN -> Fake Credit Card; Real Examples Organization: Stonehenge Consulting Services; Portland, Oregon, USA Randolph U Franklin writes: This one is for the people who don't think that it hurts to let your SSN be public. It is from the Albany Times Union, Wed Oct 25, page B-4, POLICE BLOTTER: Bethlehem, 2:23 pm. IMPERSONATION: Someone used complainant's son's name and SSN to obtain a MC/V card from Citibank... When the application was checked, fraud was discovered. Victim also learned the same person illegally used his SSN to get a Discovery card.... I have a scanner watching all of usenet for certain keywords, like Perl and my name. When it kicked up an occasional resume that had perl on it, I was shocked one day to find an SSN on a net-published resume! So, I added a check for SSNs into my usenet scanner in the misc.jobs.* groups. Amazingly enough, I get a hit about once a week. I always reply to the poster, sending him/her the following canned text: You recently posted a resume that contained a social security number. Given that, and your address and name, and I could have applied for a credit card in your name and ruined your rating. Or I could have filed a 1099 on you for a large amount of money, and you would have had an instant tax audit in 12 to 18 months. Admittedly, both are fraud, and subject to severe penalties if caught, BUT DO YOU REALLY WANT TO RISK IT? I know of no legitimate reason to broadcast a social security number. Just trying to keep you from getting hurt, badly. I think I'll add this Citibank example to the end of the standard text. Just another person concerned about security, -- Name: Randal L. Schwartz / Stonehenge Consulting Services (503)777-0095 Keywords: Perl training, UNIX[tm] consulting, video production, skiing, flying Email: Snail: (Call) PGP-Key: (finger merlyn@ora.com) Web: My Home Page! Quote: "I'm telling you, if I could have five lines in my .sig, I would!" -- me ------------------------------ From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning) Date: 06 Nov 1995 04:00:02 GMT Subject: Re: Balancing Voters' Privacy and Access Rights Organization: The National Capital FreeNet Jeff Sonstein (jeffs@ncgate.newcollege.edu) writes: This issue of GovAccess exclusively concerns access to information that is absolutely crucial to grassroots political empowerment -- and appropriate limits on such access. The claim that access to lists of voter addresses is essential for some sort of social good, eg. "grassroots political empowerment" seems like a rather dim retelling of the old direct marketing "economic neccessity" claim that people who didn't want their addresses released to strangers and others they have no business relationship with should just get used to it because "direct marketing produces x $ of economic activity each year and would be even bigger if we could include these silly people". The fallacy is that someone who really doesn't want to have their name and address released for direct marketing will not buy no matter how many solicitations they are sent. The real "economic activity" here is empire building by direct marketers. If they can boost their solicitation volume by 10% they can charge more for the activity even though the 10% are hopeless prospects. Any grassroots political organizer who intrudes on someone who values their privacy is likely to be told to drop dead, at the least, and sued at the worst. If people don't want to have their addresses disclosed this is the worst way to try and get them to accept your views and vote for your choices. The only legitimate electoral function of voter lists is to prevent electoral fraud. That may require names, but not addresses. Few elections are decided by a single vote. Even if the margin was 1% it shouldn't take that large a random sample of the list to confirm that whatever level of fraud is present is insufficient to alter the result. My challenge proposal should be adequate to achieve this. Ie. allow people to have only their names on the list without the addresses being disclosed outside the registry, and to appear with documenation of their residential status if challenged. Judicial review/appeal could be an option if the political hacks involved don't accept the result, but there could also be an analog of "barratry" applied. Ie. if they exhibit a pattern of challenge appeals that turn out to be unfounded they could have their right to appeal voter residency decisions restricted. ------------------------------ From: "James Brady" Date: 06 Nov 1995 14:03:51 U Subject: Re: Balancing Voters' Privacy and Access Rights Jeff Sonstein writes: Small wonder that citizens feel powerless and voters don't bother to vote. Effective political action appears limited only to wealthy politicians and well-funded campaign professionals. Grassroots activism seems to be functionally useless - demolished by incumbents' choke-holds on access to the body politic. Have you ever considered the size of a congressional district and the = impossibility of one candidate actually being seen by, much less actually meeting, even half of his constituent voters? Having considered the possibility of candidacy as a way of making sure my local congressman does not run un-opposed again, I did some quick mental math the other day because I didn't have the figures handy.... If America has about 240M people, something like half of them are likely to be registered voters. Choose 130.5M just to make the math easy. There are 435 congressional districts, so there are 130.5M/435=3D300,000 voters per district. Now, let's say you wanted to knock on the doors of all your constituents like all the old movies would have us believe used to be done.... If we assume that the average household has 1.5 voters, then you only need to knock on 200,000 doors! So, if you spend: 30 seconds saying "hello, I'd like your vote," and one minute getting to the next voter's residence, it will take you 300,000 minutes, or 416 12-hour days, by which time the first 90% have forgotten you even existed. Even if you personally only visited 10% of your constituents, you'd spend 42 solid 12-hour days right before the election doing so!!!!! Now, dare I suggest how long it would take to actually have a conversation with the people and find out what their problems are? To me it's no wonder the people feel disconneted. And this is only a gongressional district. What must the senators from states like California think? Last month's column proposed using the public computer networks to partly redress this outrageous access inequity, between big-bucks professionals and under-funded grassroots activists. Obviously, the media play a VITAL role in modern politics. Perhaps they have abused that position, but the American system could not function without them. And I suspect the NET will become a large player in the future. I am concerned about: The most crucial component of effective political advocacy is access to completely current voters' information. Thus, we urged that such information be made most-easily available to all advocates, by placing copies on the computer nets without charge - possible at very little cost to Registrars, except for those that are profiting from peddling voter data to those the well-funded. My biggest concern comes from the simple question: who decides who is a qualified political activist who should be allowed access to these records? I don't believe you can expect campaigns to be self policing. Witness the "scare calls" scam our Governor Chiles campaign staff pulled just before the last election, making calls claiming to be other organizations that the elderly voters would trust.... In direct violation of campaign laws and, supposedly, without the Governor's knowledge or consent. There are recognized party organizations and they should be given such data only with specific individuals in charge of the handling of such private data and with specific legal responsibilities and penalties for abuse. Otherwise every Tom, Dick, or Harriet with a political axe to grind will cheerfully log on to any system and answer any questionairre you like and get access to these data. When data about individual voters is requested - e.g., suspicious citizens independently checking allegations about "graveyard," out-of-district or otherwise-unqualified registrants - the requester data should include the names of each voter requested, AND complete details of the request should be automatically emailed by the file-server to each named voter or their designee, for voters who provide such email addresses. This is even more scary since it directly allows irate citizens to get access to voter records. Or businesses pretending to be irate citizens. And e-mail notification will not get to everyone. And if we DID have to put an e-mail address on our voter registration card, then that data too becomes available for exploitation. I have no problem with summary data being available on-line to anyone who wants it. But specific information about voters, no. Keep that controlled or what semblance of privacy we have in regards to voting will be gone forever. Allowing your neighbors to electronically find out if you voted in the last election is dangerous and not many steps away from knowing who or what you voted for.... Views expressed are my own, and not necessarily those of my employer or political party..... -- Jim Brady email: jlbc@qmgate.eci-esyst.com ------------------------------ From: shabbir@vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar, VTW) Date: 06 Nov 1995 15:40:54 -0500 Subject: Re: Act Now to Stop the Religious Right from Shutting Down the Net CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE EXON/COATS COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT Nov 2, 1995 PLEASE WIDELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT WITH THIS BANNER INTACT REDISTRIBUTE ONLY UNTIL December 1, 1995 The Religious Right has proposed shutting down speech on the net more tightly than ever before. Their activities could succeed, resulting in Internet providers screening your mail, postings, and conversations to avoid criminal liability. WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. The proposals from the Religious Right will literally destroy online speech as we know it. The odds of stopping this are not certain. There is a very real chance that this legislation will pass, and we will experience a period of uncertainty and chilling of speech while an appropriate test case attempts to reach the Supreme Court (should it even get there!) The Religious Right has a strong grass-roots network. We need to counter their energy and ensure cyberspace is not lost due to them. IMMEDIATELY CALL House Speaker Gingrich (R-GA) and Senate Leader Dole (R-KS) and urge them to oppose the Christian Coalition's proposal. Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ======================== ============== ============== R GA Gingrich, Newt 1-202-225-4501 1-202-225-4656 R KS Dole, Robert 1-202-224-6521 1-202-224-8952 If you're at a loss for words, try one of the following: Please oppose the recent proposal from the Religious Right to censor the Internet. The only effective way to address children's access to the Internet is through parental control tools outlined by the Cox/White/Wyden approach. or As a religious person and a parent, I oppose the Religious Right's attempts to censor the Internet. I am the best person to monitor my child's access to the Internet using parental control tools as outlined in the Cox/White/Wyden approach. 2. Watch vtw-announce@vtw.org or the relevant newsgroups for more details. End Alert ======================================================================== ------------------------------ From: nahe@aol.com (Nahe) Date: 07 Nov 1995 11:55:39 -0500 Subject: Arrest Records and Employment Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364) I am interested in hearing from anyone who has had problems in obtaining employment or other benefits as a result of access to computerized court records which are sold to background investigation firms and then provided on line to clients of these firms. This problem is increasing in California as local courts sell computer tapes containing all previous court filings. ------------------------------ From: chazl@leonardo.lmt.com (Chaz Larson) Date: 06 Nov 1995 09:56:26 -0600 Subject: Re: Phone Number Privacy bcn@world.std.com (Barry C Nelson) said: On a recent NYNEX commercial advertising *69 to call back the last person who called you... It would also mean that anyone who picks up your phone can call the last person who called you just by pressing *69, which may be an amusing pastime for snoops. This doesn't seem to me to be a very big issue at all. Am I missing something? This prospective snoop is going to be _in my house_, since that's where my phone is, presumably when I or my family are not. Having this person find out who I last called is going to be the least of my worries. I don't really expect to catch someone I've invited into my house surreptitiously dialing *69 to find out who last called me. They'd do better to just ask me, as I don't have many secrets from the people I bring into my house, and frankly I think they'd be bored by the information anyway. It'd be a whole lot easier for them to just look at the CallerID box. Must think...bubble pipe will relax me and I think... Chaz Larson - chazl@leonardo.lmt.com - LaserMaster TRTS Software Testing [moderator: The way it would work is that you have an unlisted number and call someone (a toll call) who would like to get your number. He (not you) dials *69 when you hang up. He reconnects to you and later finds your number on the toll charge for the call he made to you.] ------------------------------ From: chazl@leonardo.lmt.com (Chaz Larson) Date: 06 Nov 1995 10:13:39 -0600 Subject: Re: Telephone Odds and Ends peter@nmti.com (Peter da Silva) CALL TRACE has not proven to be an effective deterrent... Since CALLER ID was popularized we haven't even had to deal with these minor creepazoids. The problem with CALL TRACE is, you have to be willing to involve the law. Involving parents is a much less stressful solution. I second Peter's comments. I installed Caller ID because I was recieving a large number of "call-and-hang-up" calls. I have no reason to believe that anyone harbors animosity toward either my wife or myself, but since these calls annoyed and scared Katie, we installed CallerID and blocked anonymous calls. Since then, we have recieved none of the "hang-up" calls we were regularly [average one every two days] recieving prior to Caller ID. In this situation, we didn't want to use Call Trace, because the calls were not harrassing or specifically frightening. We just wanted to know who the caller was, and if they weren't interested in identifying themselves, disallow their call. I view CallerID as the telephone equivalent of the window in my front door. If someone wants to get into my house, either through the door or through the phone, they'll have to identify themselves first. I don't want to accept anonymous calls any more than I want to invite masked individuals in through my front door. On the emergency situation: Here in Minneapolis, someone with Call Blocking who calls my number hears a message saying that my number does not accept anonymous calls, and that they can dial *67 to unblock their number before placing their call again. Every member of my family or other individual or organization that would need to contact me in an urgent situation speaks English, so I have no doubt that they will be able to contact me. Must think...bubble pipe will relax me and I think... Chaz Larson - chazl@leonardo.lmt.com - LaserMaster TRTS Software Testing ------------------------------ From: Riley Date: 06 Nov 1995 18:12:02 GMT Subject: Re: The Information Rights Act of 1996 Organization: Bell Atlantic RTFM Group, Silver Spring, Maryland I was just wondering if I wanted to see what information was being kept on me by the government which agency should I write to to get that data? -- Malik ------------------------------ From: freematt@coil.com (Matthew Gaylor) Date: 06 Nov 1995 13:15:26 -0400 Subject: Update Info Request: EFFs' Online Activism Resource List Hi everyone, I'm the new maintainer of The Electronic Frontier Foundations' Online Activism Resource List ver. 4.4 and upward. Stanton McCandlish has his hands full with a number of projects so I decided to give him and the EFF some help with the ever burgeoning new entries that should be included in this FAQ. I'm in the process of gathering possible entries for inclusion in an update. I'm requesting anything directly relevant to privacy/free-speech civil liberties advocacy, or provides some kind of general-purpose online activism tool/resources. I am not looking for any political party specific sources. If you have any hardcopy publications or newsletters or any other relevant materials please send them to the snail address at the end of this post. If you think you may know of any quality sources that meet this criteria please send them to me at . Thanks. An ACTION/EFF FAQ maintained by Matthew Gaylor Archived at: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Activism/activ_resource.faq http://www.eff.org/pub/Activism/activ_resource.faq See also /pub/Activism/activ_groups.faq, the Online Activism Organizations List. Please forward/and or cross post this request no later than December 15, 1995. For Individual liberty, Matt- TANSTAAFL ********************************** Matthew Gaylor freematt@coil.com 1933 E.Dublin-Granville Rd., #176 Columbus, OH 43229 ********************************** ------------------------------ From: Dean Ridgway Date: 06 Nov 1995 12:40:48 -0800 Subject: Re: Copying Driver's Licenses paperwork would be returned from the bank's internal affairs division as incomplete if they did not get the name of an employer on that form...so I HAD to provide one. I was then encouraged to say something, anything.....give the name of a former employer. I said I would call my lawyer and my cpa. Yes, very definitly contact your attorney, this sounds *VERY* unethical *AND* suspicious. Almost like they were trying to entrap you into comitting perjury, did the form have the standard "I _____________ do solemly swear that this information is true to the best of my ability" type clause in it? If so then be *VERY* *VERY* suspicious. Disclaimer: *NOT* a lawyer. /\-/\ Dean Ridgway | Two roads diverged in a wood, and I- ( - - ) InterNet ridgwad@peak.org | I took the one less traveled by, =\_v_/= FidoNet 1:357/1.103 | And that has made all the difference. CIS 73225,512 | "The Road Not Taken" - Robert Frost. http://www.peak.org/~ridgwad/ PGP mail encouraged, finger for key: 28C577F3 2A5655AFD792B0FB 9BA31E6AB4683126 ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 18 Oct 1995 13:55:25 -0500 (CDT) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/18/95] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned into eMail to the submission address below. On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing. Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored. They must be relevant, sound, in good taste, objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks. Do not include entire previous messages in responses to them. Include your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from .UUCP and .BITNET folks. Anonymized mail is not accepted. All contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers apply. All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy; publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the contributors. [new: Ordinary copyrighted material should not be submitted. If a] [copyright owner wishes to make material available for electronic] [distribution then a message such as "Copyright 1988 John Doe.] [Permission to distribute free electronic copies is hereby granted but] [printed copy or copy distributed for financial gain is forbidden" would] [be appropriate.] Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of submission. If selected, they are printed within two or three days. The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit the text except for purely technical reasons. A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V7 #039 ****************************** .