Date: Mon, 19 Jun 95 14:15:51 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#055 Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 19 Jun 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 055 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: Defences Against Cyber-Seduction Re: Freedom to Read Re: Protecting Kids From Porn on Web Simon Weisenthal Plea for International Censorship Jurisdiction Re: Smart Cards and Privacy Information Warfare Online Conference Credit-Privacy Resources eCash - Comments from Users Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Out of his mind Date: 13 Jun 1995 16:11:56 -0400 Subject: Re: Defences Against Cyber-Seduction Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op] wrote: o I will tell my parents right away if I come across any information that makes me feel uncomfortable. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I find this the most important line in the brochure. All this talk about "protecting kids from pornography".... The truth is, that those that do not know about sex *will* be uncomfortable with that kind of material, and those who are more educated about sex will be more comfortable with this kind of information. A ten-year-old boy may say "Oh look! Boobies!" while his friend's over at the house, and think not much more of it. The fifteen year old, however, is under a hormonal surge and this material, while 'pornographic', is actually also *educational*. Don't forget that. ----- === Todd Vierling - UFNet, AmiNIX - todd@ufnet.ufl.edu, aminix@aminix.org === == Have you done your reality check today? == Hey Kids...what time is it?? == == LAISSEZ-FAIRE - No Internet Censorship! == (It's Pol-i-ti-cian Time!!!) == == Go Woody! Now I wonder how the Shuttles stand up to those meteorites... == ------------------------------ From: taliesin@netcom.com (Glenn R. Stone) Date: 14 Jun 1995 00:36:19 -0400 Subject: Re: Freedom to Read In CPD V6.54, Carl Kadie submitted the ALA Freedom To Read statement as a position to take on censorship in cyberspace. It is my belief that, while this is the extreme position, it may also be the most viable. Freedom To Read essentially says nix to anything that even smacks of censorship, be they labels, reviews, compartmentalizing, etc. It does not allow for even the smallest iota of leeway, instead embracing freely and with eyes open the very danger the censor-wannabes pound their bully pulpits about. The policy encourages, nay, demands, the way pointed to by the age-old Yiddish adage, "Think for yourself, schmuck!" It recognizes very explicitly that freedom is, in fact, quite dangerous, and that life itself is, in fact, quite shocking, and tacitly encourages us to pull our heads out of the sand and deal with it like the men and women we claim to be. Knowledge is power. Censorship is the effort to restrict that power. A censor is someone with the audacity to think that he knows better than we do what we should know. That person is also a few fries shy of a Happy Meal for thinking I'm going to let him get away with usurping my right, endowed to me by my Creatrix, to think for myself. Freedom is also power, because freedom is the knowledge that each of us has the ability to shape, at least in part, our own destiny, and the knowledge of how that shaping is done. Thus censorship is an attack on ALL freedom, not just a single right... and must be defended against in all its forms and at all costs. The ALA has defended its position for over 40 years, against the likes of McCarthy, the Silent Majority, and the New Right. It has a proven track record in the print media. It also means we here in cyberspace need do nothing insofar as programming, configuring, etc.; we need only stick to our idea(l)s and not let folks get to them and change them without our consent. If it ain't broke, don't fix it. Yes, this is the extreme position. No compromise. But, as I have pointed out, it is one which is defendable, having no "slippery slope" down which to slide... and, furthermore, by joining the librarians (and the print media publishers in general) we gain their credibility, which may well have been lacking as the proverbial propellorhead behind a CRT, and they gain our ability to network and thus send and receive large amounts of on-topic data about a given subject. We can fight this thing, gang. But, in Poor Richard's timeless words, we had best all hang together, or we shall surely all hang separately. -- taliesin he who gives up a little freedom for a little security DESERVES to lose them both. ------------------------------ From: peter@nmti.com (Peter da Silva) Date: 14 Jun 95 14:37:16 GMT (Wed) Subject: Re: Protecting Kids From Porn on Web Organization: Network/development platform support, NMTI Philip H. Smith III, (703) 506-0500 wrote: Ah yes, now I know why it WON'T work.. kids could simply access a URL for an adult GIF (or JPEG, or ...) directly if they knew what it was. And you can bet they would find such URLs. No HTML. No tag. No security. If a kid wants to get around the security, they can. Just like they can get an older kid to buy their Playboy or Hustler. And if you have the browser look for the tag in the header as well as the body you can block GIFs as well. Surfwatch won't work because it can't keep up with the exponential growth of the net. -- Peter da Silva (NIC: PJD2) `-_-' Network Management Technology Incorporated 'U` 1601 Industrial Blvd. Sugar Land, TX 77478 USA +1 713 274 5180 "Har du kramat din varg idag?" ------------------------------ From: mckeever@cogsci.uwo.ca (Paul McKeever) Date: 15 Jun 1995 03:52:29 GMT Subject: Simon Weisenthal Plea for International Censorship Jurisdiction Organization: University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. Canada It was reported that a representative of the Simon Weisenthal (SP?) centre gave a speech today (Wednesday, June 14, 1995) in which he said that the governments of all of the worlds countries will have to be involved, and should be involved, in setting up a legal system (e.g., an international agreement) to: (a) ban the transmission of 'harmful' messages and information (e.g., bomb-making instructions, racist propoganda, etc.) (b) regulate service providers (including BBSs), and treat them in the same manner as television stations (i.e., content censorship by hook or by crook). There are any number of intelligent readers out there who will point out that such laws would be unenforceable given today's encryption techology (and other technologies, such as embedding encrypted messages in certain bits of images). BUT: my problem is that such laws are (a) in conflict with the constitutions of many countries (most notably that of the USA), and are therefore laws which would be unconstitutional in one or more countries, (b) encouraging countries to compromise differences between their respective constitutions (especially those differences relating to the extent to which a country protects the freedom of expression), (c) in conflict with democracy (preventing the flow of information is prevention of *informed* choice), (d) a threat to freedom of speech generally (any compromise of a guarantee of non-interference by government renders the "guarantee" meaningless...thus, creating an exception for the sake of international cooperation (i.e., a new exception for many countries) constitutes the removal of a freedom), and (e) a threat to political asylum (when a centralized, single, government with jurisdiction over every inch of the globe has legal jurisdiction respecting speech, anyone who expresses a so-called (usually by the people standing to lose something as a result of the expression) "dangerous" political view will have no country in which to seek political asylum. If *any* matter is a matter over which it is dangerous to give world-wide jurisdiction to a single governmental body, expression is that matter. I would strongly urge all who value political freedom, and freedom of expression more generally, to give serious consideration to the danger implicit in world-wide legal jurisdiction over censorship. It is a radical idea, supported by the frightened or by the authoritarian. -- Regards in freedom, Paul McKeever ------------------------------ From: renaud@CAM.ORG Date: 16 Jun 1995 06:50:00 -0400 Subject: Re: Smart Cards and Privacy I think that may me of general interest. Following my precisions about Mondex and the smart electronic purse, Dick Mills wrote: You seem quite knowledgable about smart cards. Perhaps you can answer this question I saw on CPD, or some other forum recently. If a smart electronic purse has a unique serial number, say X, and there is a record that X was sold to person Y, and X was used with merchant Z, then Y's privacy is endangered, even if the audit trail to Y is not ironclad. Is this the case? I have two things to say. First, the privacy of Y depends on the link between the card X and Y. If the card was sold like another object in a store, nobody can made a link btween the card anthe person who bought it. I f it's generated by a bank, it is really possible that a link was made by the bank between the card and the owner of the account. You have to know wich information is stored in the card. Second, a unique serial number is difficult to keep. I have to introduce a little technology about that. It the first generation of smart cards, the memory is an EPROM. That means that you can't rewrite information at the place where an information is still stored. A unique serial number is possible without alteration.Now, the new generation has a Double EPROM memory. That means that you can erase previously stored information and replace it. That depends on the possession of the hardware to do that. In conclusion, I repeat what I put in my previous message: the security and the privacy of the information on a smart card depends entirely on the architecture of the supplier of the card and the security architecture of the application: encryption, keys,... I heard of projects with smart cards that aren't more secure that magnetic strip cards. I hope that responds to your question. -- Renaud renaud@cam.org ------------------------------ From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op]" <75300.3232@compuserve.com> Date: 16 Jun 95 18:09:35 EDT Subject: Information Warfare Online Conference * * Information Warfare On-Line Conference (GO NCSAFORUM) * * The National Computer Security Association (NCSA) is pleased to announce an on-line conference to explore the subject of Information Warfare. This on-line conference will be held in Conference Room 1 of NCSA's Information Security Forum, GO NCSAFORUM on CompuServe, on July 20th at 2:00 PM EDT. According to noted security expert and author Winn Schwartau: "Information Warfare is the use of information and information systems as weapons in a conflict where information and information systems are the targets". Information Warfare is broken down into three categories. Our guest speaker, Winn Schwartau, will examine each of these areas: Class I: Personal Privacy. "In Cyberspace You Are Guilty Until Proven Innocent." The mass psychology of information. Privacy versus stability and law enforcement. Class II: Industrial and Economic Espionage. Domestic and international ramifications and postures in a globally networked, competitive society. Class III: Global Information Warfare. Nation-state versus Nation-state as an alternative to convention warfare, the military perspective and terrorism. This on-line conference will be moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA's Director of Education. Mich can be reached at 75300.3232@compuserve.com; feel free to provide him with advance questions and suggestions. Detailed procedures for this on-line conference can be found in file conf.txt in library 1 of NCSAFORUM. -- M.E.Kabay,Ph.D. / Dir. Education, Natl Computer Security Assn (Carlisle, PA) ------------------------------ From: "Y.Landman" Date: 17 Jun 1995 10:44:15 GMT Subject: Credit-Privacy Resources Organization: Tel-Aviv University Computation Center Hy everyone, I am a law student making a research about the right to privacy and the computerized world. I'm focusing mainly on _CREDIT-REPORTS PRIVACY_ and on law and consumers dealing with the problem of electronic trails left by credit-cards and afterwards used by direct-mailing companies. After days of surfing the net, I came up with very little material about it (mainly from EPIC). I'm looking for online articles and working-papers about this subject, which could help me in my research. If possible (but not necessarily), with some international aspects and comparative point of view. Any help would be appreciated. Thanks in Advance, -- Yoav Landman ------------------------------ From: mcrisp@toursr.tas.gov.au (Martin Crisp) Date: 19 Jun 1995 03:29:55 GMT Subject: eCash - Comments from Users Organization: Dept. Tourism, Sport & Recreation Hi, I've only recently started wandering the www and in my meanderings came across a page advising that to order goods they only accepted ecash... After browsing through the digicash home page I decided it looked interesting enough to warrant further/closer examination. If anyone reading this group knows about ecash thru tales of horror or delight could you email (this is the first time I've looked in this group, unlikely to get back to it given the volume of the ones I do read) me some info on the product or their experiences with it. I'll gladly summarize if people are interested... -- Have Fun Martin try this: (one day that'll change to my own home page) ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. 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Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #055 ****************************** .