Date: Sat, 27 May 95 21:41:52 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#049 Computer Privacy Digest Sat, 27 May 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 049 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: Nautilus Re: Sending VISA Card Details Across the Net Re: Databases Re: CIBC and Royal Bank to do MONDEX pilot ACLU's Analysis of Revised Exon ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert #5 Prodigy Held Liable Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Linda_Collette@brown.edu Date: 22 May 1995 15:40:11 -0400 Subject: Re: Nautilus Is there a similar program for the Macintosh? -- thanks Lin Collette Brown University School of Medicine Medical Faculty Affairs Office Box G-A215 Providence, RI 02912 401/863-1139 Email: Linda_Collette@brown.edu OR Bi599128@brownvm.brown.edu [moderator: I know of none at the moment.] ------------------------------ From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning) Date: 24 May 1995 06:52:49 GMT Subject: Re: Sending VISA Card Details Across the Net Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Recently I've seen several suppliers saying something like "as the internet is not a secure network, you may not wish to post your credit card details across the net" Is this caution necessary? After all, in order to use a credit card down the phone one has to give one's card details to a total stranger, and we all do that (don't we?) My understanding is that unless the Well, I've never had a credit card account, so I can honestly say that I don't give my visa number over the phone, or is it that I've done this with every visa card I've ever had?:-) Seriously though, it is common for RCMP to advice the public not to give credit card numbers, or their bank card PINs(!) over the phone, particulary not in response to an incoming call and not to a business they haven't dealt with before. But on the other hand I've had people give me quite ignorant responses when I've gone to an ATM and had them hang around the machine after they've done their business and urge me to use it saying "I'm done now" while they peer at their transaction receipts or shuffle them around and slowly put them in their wallets or purses. They seem quite taken aback or facetious when I state(in a few more words) that I'm well aware of police advice not to use one of these to enter your PIN when someone is standing near you. From the frequency of seemingly amused responses to this simple statement it seems that there are a lot of sheep out there waiting to be sheared. I never leave my transaction receipts around either, since they seem to have the card number on them and I've heard news reports that an ATM fraud ring used them and shoulder surfing in a major ripoff. A credit union I used to deal with just didn't get the point when their system had a programming error once and retained transaction receipts to spit out for the next client to use the machine. When I complained about this the manager droid who replied to me commented that it is common for people to toss receipts into the scrap bucket. Guess why I don't keep my money there any more. If they can't see the problem or issue in handing my financial information out to whoever happens to use a machine next I have no doubt that they may have trouble exercising good judgement about loaning my money to credit seekers and other about matters. Point of sale debit card machines have become common in the past few years in my province. I've yet to see a privacy shield around one of these. Even in I didn't have a professional interest in computer system authentication and security I hope I would be unfavourably impressed about seeing no privacy shield around PIN entry keypads carrying Royal Bank logos in McDonalds restaurants. It is also galling to see shields around all of the staff PIN entry keypads behind a bank brank counter and none around the client keypads at ATMS and in front of the counter. Obviously someone around the bank has an inkling that this is an issue, but it hasn't been addressed consistently wherever people have to enter PINs. Even if I didn't care about leaving a electronic purchase trail I wouldn't be very eager to punch in my PIN at a restaurant where over a score of people can see me do it. This cash replacement concept has a way to go. ------------------------------ From: danpatents@aol.com (DanPatents) Date: 24 May 1995 03:35:05 -0400 Subject: Re: Databases Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364) This is in response to your questions about what huge databases exist with personal information. One is the Medical Information Bureau, Inc. They keep all your medical info so that insurance companies can use it when you apply for insurance. There may be other uses of which I'm not aware at this time. To see what information they have on you that they will allow you to see, and possibly change, write to P.O. Box 105, Essex Station, Boston, MA 02112. You'll receive a questionairre, which you'll need to return with a check for $8. I did this and got a questionnaire, a schedule of charges, a pamphlet called, "The Consumer's MIB Fact Sheet," and a return envelope. I still have not yet sent in the $8. The questionnaire states that you may receive "the nature and substance of any information that MIB may have in its files pertaining to you, the name(s) of the MIB member companies that reported information to the MIB, and the name(s) of the MIB member companies that received a copy of your MIB record(s) during the 6 months preceding your request for disclosure." By the way, I learned of the existence of the MIB long ago, but I learned of the availablility of records from page 104 of the June 1995 issue of "Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine." Hope this helps. Good luck. -- DanPatents ------------------------------ From: mckeever@cogsci.uwo.ca (Paul McKeever) Date: 25 May 1995 19:17:26 GMT Subject: Re: CIBC and Royal Bank to do MONDEX pilot Organization: University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. Canada Kelly Bert Manning wrote: The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Royal Bank have announced plans to pilot a "smart" cash card. Apparently this is based on a chip based card used in Europe. Unlike a credit card there would be no name or other personal data on it. Users would supposedly refill it at an ATM or by dialing into their bank if they are unconcerned enough about banking by phone to get it activated for their account. The cards would have no PIN or other password and if they were lost or stolen the user would be out of pocket unless it was returned to the bank. Is this one likely to take off? The bank representative I spoke with seemed quite up front about the idea of it being a cost saving measure for the banks(an attempt to reduce the use of cash in ATMs) as a well as one that would let them charge new fees to the users and merchants. I, for one, think that this card is a MUST for electronic purchasing. If it is true that the smart card allows one to buy goods anonymously, then it is the only form of electronic payment to date (among debit and credit cards) to protect the privacy of the buyer and, thereby, to protect freedom. It is perfectly acceptable for a buyer to choose to tell banks and stores what sorts of things they buy. The problem to date has been that MOST users don't realize that information about their buying behavior is recorded and potentially sold for profit (with the buyer not receiving a dime of the profit for his/her disclosure of personal information). And, for those who have realized that banks and stores pay you nothing in exchange for information about your preferences, they have found that a term of holding the debit/credit card is to give that info to the banks for free. By launching the smart card, the CIBC and the Royal Bank have acted quite morally, and have demonstrated that they are not as opposed to anonymous purchasing as some other banks (an article about TD's "war on cash" and anonymous purchasing comes to mind... TD's president, in 1990, praised his own position that, without cash, we could catch all of the 'bad guys'....which, of course, would include any member of society that held unpopular believes or engaged in unpopular behavior: the nudie-bar frequenter, the communist, the cigar lover who visits Cuba, etc. could not avoid authoritarian stoning by paying cash...neither would the frequenter of bars for homosexuals, the paying user of an abortion clinic, the person who donates money to the religious organization of his/her choice, or the person who pays the kid next door $5 to mow the lawn...but doesn't pay GST). This is not to say that smart cards should replace government-issued bills and coins. You must pay to use a smart card (though, I still have been unable to find out what the fee schedule will be/is). You don't have to pay to take a $20 bill out of your wallet. Secondly, it is immeasurably more easy for government to regulate the use of the machines that will transfer credits from one's card to a business's account than it is for government to regulate the use of your hands and fingers to exchange bills and coins for goods and services....for those who fight the GST by not paying it, smart cards will probably allow government to tax you by grabbing extra cash from your card each time you pay someone with it. Finally, a word on the morality of issuing the smart card: things that fall into disuse are more easily legislated out of existence. Smart cards may (or may not) allow people to buy goods and services anonymously, but one should take care to remember the benefits of paper and coin that place a duty on all of us never to let government dispense with it:] 1. You don't have to pay a bank to take cash out of your pocket (though, in some cases, there may be a small charge to take money out of your account). 2. Bills and coins can be exchanged without government knowing it...the same cannot be guaranteed with cards which are read by machines (card readers) that can be used to record who gave how much to whom...all that is required is the stroke of a pen to pass legislation requiring card readers to record info, or to subtract GST etc from one's card automatically, and without the consent of the buyer. So, the morality of the CIBC and Royal Banks is dependent upon their motives for issuing the smart card. If those banks, like the TD, are actually at "war" with bills and coins, then the smart card is being issued to discourage people from using bills and coins so that they can be phased out of existence (this, by the way, is in the bank interest not only because of the expense of handling cash, but because effective taxation of EVERY transaction increases the likelihood that the federal and provincial governments will be able to pay the banks what is owed to them). For now, I give the CIBC and the Royal Bank the benefit of a doubt. I probably will pay for the convenience of paying electronically yet anonymously. If, however, I hear either bank issue statements about the "evils" of paper and coin, I'll be turning my "smart card" in for a refund. Regards, Paul McKeever ------------------------------ From: ACLUNATL@aol.com Date: 25 May 1995 16:49:42 -0400 Subject: ACLU's Analysis of Revised Exon ACLU Cyber-Liberties Analysis: Revised Exon Amendment May 25, 1995 ---------------------------------------------- The American Civil Liberties Union has previously expressed its strong opposition to the "Communications Decency Act," introduced by Senator Exon as S. 314 and adopted by the Senate Commerce Committee as an amendment to the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995. Yesterday, we obtained a revised version of the Exon Amendment, which was apparently written by members of Senator Exon's staff in consultation with representatives of online service providers, the Department of Justice, and pro-censorship lobbying groups. The following analysis presents the ACLU's objections to the revised draft and clarifies the ACLU's continuing concern that the Exon amendment, in its existing or revised form, violates both free speech and privacy rights. I. Interactive Cyberspace Must Not Be Constricted by Old Media Models The most fundamental flaw of the revised Exon amendment is that it still wrongly attempts to force the new interactive environment of cyberspace and online services into the censorship straitjacket foisted on old media. In fact, the Exon amendment even uses as its model the most restrictive of the old media. This is wrong-headed policy. It is also a violation of the Free Speech and Privacy guarantees of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional. The Exon amendment would make the interactive environment one of the most censored segments of communications media when logic dictates that cyberspace, with its emphasis on user-choice and user-control, should make it the least censored. At a minimum, the extremely limited rules of content-regulation for print media, and the safeguards against censorship for print materials, should be applied to online communications. The ACLU, moreover, believes that the characteristics of cyberspace, including the private and interactive nature of the communication, dictates that cyberspace should be even more free than print. We stress that there is no revision of the Exon amendment -- no tinkering of its censorship provisions -- that eliminates this problem. The Exon amendment cannot be "fixed." It must be rejected. II. The Exon Amendment Would Still Restrict Online Communications to Those Appropriate for Children Section (d) of the revised Exon amendment would still unconstitutionally restrict all online content to that which is suitable for children. Even under existing case law, non-obscene speech that is deemed "indecent" is protected by the First Amendment. _Sable Communications v. FCC_, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The Government may only regulate indecent speech if it establishes a compelling governmental interest in the regulation AND narrowly tailors the restriction to achieve that interest. _Id._ at 125. See also _Pacifica Foundation v. FCC_, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); _Carlin Communications v. FCC_, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (Carlin I); _Carlin Communications v. FCC_, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) (Carlin II); _Dial Information Services v. Thornburg_, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, much of what consenting adults prize about some of their personal communications could well be deemed by outsiders as "indecent" if addressed to a child. The revised draft, like the original Exon amendment, is unconstitutional because requiring users and content providers to reduce their content to what is suitable for children is not the least restrictive means for protecting minors from indecent material. The "justifications" for regulation of indecency in broadcasting and telephone audiotext services do not apply to interactive communications, in which users - including parents - have much more control over the content of the messages they receive. We are also prepared to argue that the "justifications" asserted for censorship in any of the old media, including print, do not apply to cyberspace. III. Some Specific Problems in the Revised Exon Draft Again, the ACLU strongly believes that the anti-cyberliberty Exon amendment cannot be "fixed." It needs to be defeated. So, even if all of these specific problems were solved, the Exon amendment would still be a terrible idea. Still, it may be useful to consider briefly some of the specific problems in the revised Exon draft. *Revised section (d) outlaws the online transmission of obscene materials without defining "obscenity." Using the test for obscenity articulated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), the federal government has chosen to stage prosecutions of online obscenity cases in conservative jurisdictions in order to take advantage of more restrictive "community standards." See Thomas v. United States, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 94-6648 and No. 94-6649. This trend poses a severe threat that online users and providers will be forced to reduce content to that which would be acceptable under the "community standards" of the most conservative jurisdiction. The ACLU has filed an amicus brief in the Thomas case strongly opposing the government's misuse of the censorship laws. *Revised sections (d) and (e) extend liability for transmission of obscene or indecent communications to non-commercial in addition to commercial providers. This change would render the revised draft more restrictive of free speech than the original Exon amendment. *While revised section (f) provides some defenses for online service providers, these defenses place smaller system operators at risk because they cannot afford to assert the defenses in court. Moreover, the defenses are incomplete and many larger service providers would likely find themselves in jeopardy at the hands of prosecutors motivated by the political advantages of currying favor with certain pro-censorship groups. *Revised section (f)(2) fails to protect providers who cede editorial control to an entity "which the defendant knows or had reason to know intends to engage in conduct that is likely to violate this section." This could pose serious problems for Internet providers that may have "reason to know" that certain sites are likely to contain communications deemed to be obscene or indecent. *Revised section (f)(3) gives the Federal Communications Commission the power to issue regulations regarding methods in which providers may restrict access in order to avoid liability. Giving federal regulators the authority to determine the rules for distributing online content will radically affect the freedom of cyberspace and will have a severe direct effect and an equally severe chilling effect on online speech. *Revised section (f)(4) could still make it impossible for users or content providers to remedy a violation of rights by an online service provider if the service claimed it was attempting to comply with the Exon amendment. Conclusion The revised Exon draft continues to subject an industry that has blossomed without government control to an unprecedented amount of interference and intrusion over content. It gravely threatens the free flow of information and the diversity of content transmitted over online networks. To achieve the liberating potential of the information superhighway, Congress must ensure that interactive technologies enhance rather than stifle democratic values. The American Civil Liberties Union therefore opposes the Exon amendment, both in its original form and as revised. -- ACLU Free Reading Room gopher://aclu.org:6601 **NEW** ACLU Constitution Hall on AmericaOnline: keyword ACLU ------------------------------ From: Lynnclu@aol.com Date: 26 May 1995 18:35:05 -0400 Subject: ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert #5 ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert: 05/26/95 Feinstein Amendment Would Censor Online Info About "Explosive Materials" Senator Feinstein (D-CA) has indicated that she will offer an amendment to the broad counter-terrorism bill (an incredibly unconstitutional and anti-liberty bill) now pending in the U.S. Senate. The ACLU opposes the Feinstein amendment as a blatant violation of the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. While the amendment applies to all media, it grew out of Senator Feinstein's vilification of the internet at the Senate's May 11 counter-terrorism hearings. The Feinstein amendment must be **rejected** -- it cannot be "fixed." Join the ACLU, People for the American Way, and others in opposing this amendment. **ACT NOW** Fax, write, or call Senator Feinstein to express your opposition to the amendment. Senator Dianne Feinstein FAX 202/228-3954 Voice 202/224-3841 SH-331 SOB Washington, DC 20510-0504 ----------------------------------------- Earlier today, the ACLU faxed the following letter in opposition to the amendment to all U.S. Senators. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ American Civil Liberties Union Washington National Office 122 Maryland Avenue, NE VIA FAX RE: The Feinstein Amendment on Disseminating Information on Explosives Dear Senator: The American Civil Liberties Union has already communicated its position on the proposed anti-terrorism legislation. Senator Feinstein has indicated she intends to introduce an amendment making a criminal offense out of the dissemination of information about manufacturing explosives. The Feinstein amendment would, for example, make it a felony, punishable by 20 years imprisonment, for any person "to disseminate by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture of explosive materials if the person . . . reasonably should know that" the materials are likely to be used to further a federal crime. Because it covers pure speech, without even a focus on a particularized threat of violence, the Feinstein amendment is clearly unconstitutional. In fact, it is difficult to contemplate an amendment in this area that would be more demonstrably unconstitutional. The amendment is also unnecessary. Current law, 18 U.S.C.sec. 231, makes it a felony to teach explosives to any person if it is known or should have been known that that person intended to use the explosives unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder. Current law, however, focuses on a particular person using the information for a particular criminal purpose. The Feinstein amendment, however, criminalizes merely putting out information -- in print, on radio or television, in cyberspace -- without any requirement of knowledge of the particular would-be criminal or would-be crime. In fact, the media coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing has left everyone with sufficient knowledge so that everyone could be prosecuted if he or she published information on explosives, regardless of the purpose. Even an article that described how a fertilizer-based bomb was built in order to suggest prophylactic measures to preclude such threats could be the basis of its author's prosecution. Under the Feinstein amendment, all the newspapers and broadcasters who described how bombs are built in the coverage on Oklahoma City could be prosecuted if they ran similar stories again. There are many reasons -- quite distinct from engaging in violence -- why individuals might wish to disseminate information about explosives. These range from county extension agents with suggestions on tree stump removal, to OSHA guidelines on demolition of buildings, to construction company planning excavations, to newspapers reporting on current events. The Feinstein amendment would subject to criminal prosecution the people involved in all these situations -- because, after Oklahoma City all of them would meet the absurdly low standard for criminal culpability in the amendment. As the ACLU, People for the American Way and others have noted: The Feinstein amendment takes the lowest standard used for culpability under the criminal statutes and seeks to apply it to actions the Constitution requires be given the highest level of protection -- the exercise of their right of free speech. Because the Feinstein amendment would criminalize such a broad scope of First Amendment-protected activity, it would also enormously increase the investigative and surveillance authority of the FBI. In order words, the Feinstein amendment would turn a whole host of actions into crimes thereby establishing the criminal predicate for which the FBI guidelines allow an investigation to be pursued. Even worse, the FBI investigates when it merely has a "reasonable indication" that a crime might have been committed. This means that anyone who simply disseminates -- on paper, over the airwaves, or in cyberspace -- information on manufacturing explosives is made subject to investigation by the FBI. This would happen even if the disseminator had no grounds to believe the information could be used for a crime, because the FBI could claim merely to be investigating to see whether a crime had been committed The Feinstein amendment would also have the effect of forcing the internet -- as well as libraries, broadcasters and publishers -- to do the impossible task of prescreening the recipients of their information. Such a requirement is obviously impossible to meet. It also destroys the very purpose of both the internet and libraries -- providing the widest possible access to information. The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges the United States Senate to defeat the Feinstein amendment on disseminating information relating to explosives. Sincerely, Laura Murphy Lee, Director ACLU Washington National Office Donald Haines Legislative Counsel -- For more information about the ACLU's Cyber-Liberties efforts and our opposition to the counter-terrorism bill, see our online resources: ACLU Free Reading Room -- gopher://aclu.org:6601 ACLU Constitution Hall on America Online -- keyword ACLU To request our FAQ, or be added to/dropped from our list, write to infoaclu@aclu.org ------------------------------ From: Dave Rasmussen Date: 27 May 1995 08:32:56 -0500 (CDT) Subject: Prodigy Held Liable Forwarded message: From: "Dave Banisar" Date: 26 May 1995 23:12:00 -0400 Subject: Prodigy Held Liable To: "Interested People" ------ A New York state trial court ruled on May 24 that Prodigy is responsible for the libelous statements of its users because it exercises editorial control over their posts. In the case, an anonymous Prodigy user made statements against New York Investment firm Stratton Oakmont accusing it of criminal and fraudulent acts. Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy and the volunteer moderator of the forum where the statements were published. The Court found that Prodigy was acting as a publisher and therefore was responsible for the content of the posts. The Court distinguished the case from the earlier Cubby v. Compuserve decision, which found that Compuserve was subject to the standards of a bookstore or library. It that case, the US District court ruled that Compuserve had no editorial control over the text. According to the New York state court: In contrast, here Prodigy has virtually created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who have the ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact do spend time censoring notes. Indeed, it could be said that Prodigy's current system of automatic scanning, guidelines, and Board Leaders may have a chilling effect on freedom of communications in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what Prodigy wants, but for the legal liability that attaches to such censorship. Let it be clear that this court is in full agreement with Cubby and Auvil. Computer bulletin boards should generally be regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries and network affiliates...It is Prodigy's own policies, technology and staffing decisions which have altered the scenario and mandated the finding that it is a publisher. The court also attempted to downplay the significance of its decision on the greater area of electronic networks: Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to greater liability that Compuserve and other computer networks that make no such choice. For the record, the fear that this Court's finding of publisher status for Prodigy will compel all computer networks to abdicate control of their bulletin boards, incorrectly presumes that the market will refuse to compensate a network for its increased control and the resulting increased exposure. The Court also found that the volunteer "Board Leader" of the Prodigy Bulletin Board was acting as an agent of the company. The Court found Prodigy exercised control over the Board Leaders though the the Bulletin Board Leader Agreement and the actions of Prodigy's employees. Prodigy has said that it will consider appealing the decision. EPIC has materials on free speech available at http://epic.org/free_speech/ We will be making a copy of the decision available in the next few days. -- David Banisar (Banisar@epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org Washington, DC 20003 * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic -- Dave Rasmussen - Information & Media Technologies (ex-CSD) Client Services Internet: dave@csd.uwm.edu Phone: 414-229-5133 2m HAM Radio: N9REJ USmail: Box 413 Bol213, Milwaukee, WI 53201 ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94] Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). 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The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the SUBJECT: line of an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit or append to the text except for purely technical reasons. A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #049 ****************************** .