Date: Tue, 06 Dec 94 15:26:06 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V5#070 Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 06 Dec 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 070 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars (Article) New Penal Code in Spain Three Hits and you're Out DMV Records DMV Records Help Needed for Internet Study Internet Security Monthly Information Highways for a Smaller World (long) Info on CPD (unchanged since 11/28/94) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Paul Robinson Date: 03 Dec 1994 10:30:49 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA rutgera@rd.mey.nl (Rutger Alsbach), writes: [Quoting Dave Moore about the card:] because if you lost it, you could report it stolen and have it disabled. I infer from this that your personal ID is tied to the card and that it is not anonymous. It could also be that the card is identifiable by a number...If the card is stolen, DC Metro can disable the card and pay a refund (minus charges) to the person that reports its number. All this can be done anonymously (as long as you pay cash and receive a cash refund). DC Metro could still track the use of the card but they don't have a name to connect it with. WMATA, which operates the DC Metro System would, at best, probably provide a replacement card in the amount of the unused card. As an actual user of the system, I can state categorically that DC Metro would never refund the money. Metro *never* issues refunds. Not for any reason, even for their own mistakes. All they will do is issue credit valid toward future uses of the metro system. Metro *never* issues cash refunds. ------------------------------ From: mduman@astro.ocis.temple.edu (Michael Duman) Date: 04 Dec 1994 07:42:03 GMT Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Organization: Temple University, Academic Computer Services Rutger Alsbach (rutgera@rd.mey.nl) wrote: Dave Moore writes about the DC Metro Smart Card: It also stated that it was far more secure than a standard fare card because if you lost it, you could report it stolen and have it disabled. I infer from this that your personal ID is tied to the card and that it is not anonymous. It could also be that the card is identifiable by a number. You could write that down and keep it at a safe place (away from the card). If the card is stolen, DC Metro can disable the card and pay a refund (minus charges) to the person that reports its number. All this can be done anonymously (as long as you pay cash and receive a cash refund). DC Metro could still track the use of the card but they don't have a name to connect it with. Additional advantage is, that it is harder for personal enemies or practical jokers to have your card disabled (and get the refund) by saying your name and reporting it stolen - they need the number. Yes, but, as somone else said before, how would this be of any benifit? You would still need a turnstyle, or some method of stopping those without/with a forged/disabled card... Maybe they should just use armed guards. -- Mike [mduman@astro.ocis.temple.edu] [Is it time to go home yet?] ------------------------------ From: dave.moore@tcbbs.cais.com (DAVE MOORE) Date: 03 Dec 94 23:53:00 -0500 Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards Organization: The Tech Connect BBS / Tech Connect Computers / 703-590-5198 From: rutgera@rd.mey.nl (Rutger Alsbach) It could also be that the card is identifiable by a number. I got a chance to dig the article out of the recycle. Here are some quotes: "... Only the rider will know how much is in the account, although Metro will keep track of who owns a GO CARD in case it is lost." Correction: I had previously stated that that the card had to be within 14 inches of the reader. That's incorrect, it says "4" inches. "... "If we could wave a magic wand and have anything we want, we would have a computer chip implanted in people at birth so you could just walk through" a fare gate, said Raymond DeKozan, chairman of the board and chief executive of Cubic, the San Diego company that has spent six years developing the smart transit cards. "So we tried to create something that comes pretty close to that." dave.moore@tcbbs.cais.com -- * A good catchword can obscure analysis for fifty years. * CMPQwk 1.42-17 1347 ------------------------------ From: wbe@psr.com (Winston Edmond) Date: 03 Dec 1994 18:41:29 GMT Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Organization: Panther Software and Research Someone (the attribution was missing in Prof. Levine's reply) asked: ... I have been told that when using the per call blocking feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the number is *still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only suppresses it being displayed. Can this be confirmed? "Prof. L. P. Levine" replied: My understanding is that unlisted phone numbers with per-line blocking have no greater security; that the calling number information is passed through the entire network and is stopped only at the very end, before the final user. Is that correct? I'm no expert, but since the caller's number would have been delivered if the called party had ANI (Automatic Number Identification), it makes sense to assume that the phone system always forwards the number to the far end, and decides there what, if anything, to do with the information. -- WBE ------------------------------ From: fd@wwa.com (Glen L. Roberts) Date: 03 Dec 1994 18:54:21 GMT Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Organization: WorldWide Access - Chicago Area Internet Services 312-282-8605 708-367-1871 Prof. L. P. Levine (levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu) wrote: I have been asked the question: I have been told that when using the per call blocking feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the number is *still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only suppresses it being displayed. Can this be confirmed? I am currently on hold from my phone company -- Ameritech in Indianapolis (whose motto seems to be: "we don't care -- we don't have to -- we're the phone company") to get the 'official' response. I was also informed that per line blocking is neither available, nor would it be. The information (caler's phone number is ABSOLUTELY NOT sent down the telephone line to called party when blocked with *67. It may well, be sent to the switch that handles the called party. The called party gets an "P" in place of the number in the data stream. The problem is, then, if it only suppresses the display of the information, then it is as useless as my unlisted phone number. Of more concern, I suspect is that if you have an unlisted number and call someone... without blocking... your NAME & NUMBER is transmitted. (of course, name service is more limited than number... but it is expanding quickly). -- Glen L. Roberts, Editor, Full Disclosure Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,065 khz - Sundays 7pm central) email fd@wwa.com for catalog on privacy & surveillance. Does 10555-1-708-356-9646 give you an "ANI" readback? With name? email for uuencoded .TIF of T-Shirt Honoring the FBI Remember, fd _IS FOR_ Full Disclosure! ------------------------------ From: johnl@iecc.com (John R Levine) Date: 03 Dec 94 16:25 EST Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Organization: I.E.C.C., Cambridge, Mass. Calling Line ID (please don't call it caller id) is designed so that it always sends the calling phone number. When you set blocking, either per call or per line, it sends along a do not display flag. The reason they do it that way is that CLID is part of a package of other features such as priority ring, call block, call trace, and return call, all of which still makes sense if call display is blocked. I am among those who believe that CLID is more useful for telemarketers than for dealing with annoying calls (and who finds it outrageous that they charge for call trace, since the annoyance call bureau was always free). But the way that CLID is deisgned makes technical sense. Regards, John Levine, johnl@iecc.com Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies" ------------------------------ From: rem@world.std.com (Ross E Mitchell) Date: 03 Dec 1994 16:44:13 GMT Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless? Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA Prof. L. P. Levine wrote: the per call blocking feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the number is *still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only suppresses it being displayed. Can this be confirmed? I am currently on hold from my phone company -- Ameritech in You are correct that your phone number is passed throughout the network, regardless of the privacy setting of your line. However, a "privacy bit" is also set which informs the carriers that you do not want the number displayed on the receiving end to subscribers who have purchased Caller ID service. The FCC requires that phone companies honor the setting of this bit. Unfortunately, the FCC has also ruled that, beginning in April '95, per line blocking may NOT be used to block display of the caller's number interstate calls; only *67 (1167 for rotary phones) is to be used! I have an article in the current issue of MIT's Technology Review which addresses the Caller ID privacy issue in it's entirety. I will post it here under its title: Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars. -- Ross Mitchell - rem@world.std.com - Phone: 617-965-7010 - Fax: 617-630-0140 ------------------------------ From: rem@world.std.com (Ross E Mitchell) Date, 3 Dec 1994 17:01:12 GMT Subject: Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars (Article) Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA The following article, which I co-authored, has just appeared in the November/December 1994 issue of MIT's Technology Review. This article is distributed with permission of the publisher. The entire issue is available on the World Wide Web. The home page can be found at: http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena/org/t/techreview/www/tr.html If you would like to re-post this article elsewhere, please be sure to include the Copyright notice. ----------------------------------------------- Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars Ross E. Mitchell and Judith Wagner Decew New telecommunications technologies are undermining our ability to remain anonymous. The situation has inspired a sensible solution that would make privacy self-regulating. People want information about others but are reticent to divulge it about themselves. Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the telephone feature known as caller identification, or caller ID, which allows those receiving calls to see the telephone number and name of the caller before answering the phone. Telephone companies are promoting and installing caller ID throughout the country. Proponents of the technology argue that it provides a valuable service to those pestered by obscene or harassing phone calls or persistent telemarketing. But some privacy advocates vehemently disagree, maintaining that callers should be able to choose to remain anonymous. In a world of interlinked computer networks and massive data banks, they say, people already give away too much personal information without their knowledge and consent. They further worry that the prospect of identification will deter anonymous police tipsters and callers to hot lines for drug abusers, AIDS victims, or runaways. There is, however, a logical and intuitive way to implement this technology that should satisfy both camps. This new way of thinking about privacy regulation, which we call ``dynamic negotiation,'' permits us to enjoy the benefits of new telecommunications technologies - including, but not limited to, caller ID - without sacrificing our right to privacy. Most caller ID systems automatically release the caller's phone number. To prevent this information from being divulged for a particular call, the caller must enter a code (typically *67) before dialing the number. In other words, callers must take an extra step to retain the privacy that they had taken for granted. They must learn how to block transmission of the data, and must remember to dial the code each time. This is known as ``per-call'' blocking. Some phone systems allow ``per-line'' blocking - the caller's number is kept private by default and is released only when the caller enters an ``unblocking'' code. But in rules scheduled to take effect next April, the Federal Communications Commission has decided that the potential public value of caller ID outweighs the privacy concerns of those who want automatic blocking of numbers. The commission stated that per-line blocking was ``unduly burdensome'' and ruled that on interstate calls, only per-call blocking is to be permitted - preempting state regulations that allow per-line blocking. We propose an alternative - a system that allows people to dynamically negotiate the degree of privacy they wish to sacrifice or maintain. Here's how such a system would work with caller ID. Initially, all phone subscribers' lines would, by default, block the release of the caller's number. Subscribers could choose to release their number on a per-call basis by dialing an unblocking code (other than *67). So far, this is just per-line blocking. But in the system we suggest, phones with caller ID displays can also be set up to automatically refuse calls when the number has not been provided by the caller. When an anonymous call is attempted, the phone doesn't ring. The thwarted caller hears a short recorded message that to complete the call, the originating phone number must be furnished. This message then instructs the caller what code to dial to give out the number. Otherwise, the call is incomplete and the caller is not charged. Thus, a caller has the chance to decide whether a call is important enough that it is worth surrendering anonymity. This solution preserves choice and ensures privacy. Callers can control, through a dynamic and interactive process, when to give out their numbers; recipients can refuse anonymous calls. Most callers, of course, will want to release their number when calling friends and associates. And if such calls dominate their use of the phone, they might choose to change the default on their line so that it automatically releases their number unless they dial in a blocking code. Thus, a dynamic negotiation system may well lead many people to change from per-line to per-call blocking - precisely what the phone companies and the FCC favor. But when these customers change their default setting, they will know what they are choosing and why; they will be actively consenting to give out their numbers as a matter of course. Most businesses will want to take all calls, whether numbers are provided or not. But certain establishments might want to reject anonymous calls - for example, pizzerias that want incoming numbers for verification to avoid bogus orders. Most callers will happily unblock their numbers when such a business asks them to. Some display units that can be purchased for use with caller ID are already able to reject anonymous calls, but they are a far cry from the dynamic negotiation system that we propose. With these caller ID units, every call, whether accepted or not, is considered to have been answered - and charged to the caller. But a call that is rejected because of its anonymity should entail no charge. This requires that the call be intercepted by the phone company's central office switchboard before it reaches the recipient's line. Although inspired by the debate over caller ID, the concept of dynamic negotiation of privacy can apply to other telecommunications technologies. One likely candidate is electronic mail. With traditional paper mail, people have always had the right - and the ability - to send anonymous correspondence. Delivery of the envelope requires neither that a letter is signed nor that a return address is provided. On the receiving end, people have the right to discard anonymous mail unopened. Applying the principles of dynamic negotiation, senders of electronic mail would have the option to identify or not identify themselves. Recipients could reject as undeliverable any e-mail with an unidentified sender. The sender would then have the option to retransmit the message - this time with a return address. As with caller ID, the users negotiate among themselves. The system itself remains privacy neutral. Several criteria guide such an approach: the need to protect individual privacy for all parties to a communication, the importance of letting new technologies flourish, and the need for national guidelines to provide consistency in system use and privacy protection. Since technological innovation proceeds rapidly, we must continually examine how best to make possible new features while preserving or enhancing our existing level of privacy. The technology for implementing dynamic negotiation is already available. All that is needed is for the FCC to amend its recent ruling. If the FCC refuses, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee should propose legislation to require dynamic negotiation. With this system as the national norm, privacy concerns would become self-regulating. ------------------ ROSS E. MITCHELL, based in Newton, Mass., is a designer of telecommunications software. JUDITH WAGNER DeCEW is a professor of philosophy at Clark University in Worcester, Mass.; she is working on a book on legal and ethical disputes over privacy protection, to be published by Princeton University Press. ------------------ TECHNOLOGY REVIEW ON-LINE COPYRIGHT NOTICE Technology Review (ISSN 0040-1692) , Reg. U.S. Patent Office Copyright 1994, Technology Review, all rights reserved. Published eight times each year by the Association of Alumni and Alumnae of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The editors seek diverse views, and authors' opinions do not represent the official policies of their institutions or those of MIT. Articles may not under any circumstances be resold or redistributed for compensation of any kind without prior written permission from Technology Review -- Ross Mitchell - rem@world.std.com - Phone: 617-965-7010 - Fax: 617-630-0140 ------------------------------ From: Rafael Fernandez Calvo Date: 05 Dec 94 00:23:33 -0100 Subject: New Penal Code in Spain Organization: ATI (Asociacion de Tecnicos de Informatica) Could you please post the following urgent message at your fora? Thanks in advance, Rafael ------------------------------------------- Subject: New Penal Code in Spain A new Penal Code is about to be discussed in the Parliament of Spain. CLI (*) is putting up a proposal on crimes related to misuse of Information and Communications Technologies against the rights of citizens (specially --but not solely-- privacy). That proposal will be sent to the political parties represented in the Parliament. Legislation to that respect existing in different countries would be of great help to achieve our purposes. Please send text of such legislations --before Dec. 12-- via email or fax to the following addresses: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Rafael Fernandez-Calvo | rfcalvo@guest2.atimdr.es Member of the Presidential Board of | CLI (Comision de Libertades e Informatica) * | (34-1) 309 3685 Fax (Commission for Liberties and Informatics)| (34-1) 402 9391 Phone Padilla 66, 3 dcha., E28006 Madrid Spain | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- * CLI is an independent coalition created in Madrid on Dec. 1991 by several entities (consumers leagues, trade unions, associations of human right advocates, DP professionals and judges, and the direct marketing sindicate) with a joint membership of about 3 million people. Its main purpose is to promote citizens' rights, specially privacy, against misuse of Information and Communications Technologies. ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 05 Dec 1994 22:43:33 -0600 (CST) Subject: Three Hits and you're Out Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Taken From RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Monday 5 December 1994 Volume 16 : Issue 60 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator Date: 05 Dec 1994 16:29:30 GMT From: gsk@world.std.com (Geoffrey S Knauth) Subject: 3 hits and you're out? (SSN use) Last week, a friend was writing software to make credit checks as part of a large project involving government loans to individuals. He returned home and told his wife we'd been using my social security number to test the interface, with my permission. His wife works at a bank, and she told him he'd better not do three checks on me, or I wouldn't get any more credit. I was surprised to hear that a credit check carries with it this sort of penalty. Can anyone from the credit industry confirm this? My friend was recently given a "test" SSN to use, so I shouldn't have to worry more. Geoffrey S. Knauth http://www.marble.com/people/gsk.html Marble Associates, Inc., (617) 487-0050 CRASH-B Sprints, Cambridge Boat Club ------------------------------ From: Robert Ellis Smith <0005101719@mcimail.com> Date: 05 Dec 94 12:02 EST Subject: DMV Records John Kwiatkowski (Nov. 29) asked what services compile motor vehicle files and market them. Dataflo Systems, a subsidiary of Equifax (which runs one of the major credit bureaus), dominated this field for many years but in 1994 TRW, Equifax' major competitor, entered the field, by marketing its Motor Vehicle Database with data from 30 states (and growing). This information is from PRIVACY JOURNAL newsletter. A sample copy of the electronic edition is available upon request, 0005101719@mcimail.com. -- Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher ------------------------------ From: Nancy_Welborn@bendnet.com (Nancy Welborn) Date: 06 Dec 94 12:55:24 PST Subject: DMV Records Organization: Electronic Communities Limited With just a little bit of research I discovered a virtual directory of online sources for investigating people. It appears any of these information suppliers will supply to the public. The directory is "How to Investigate by Computer", is marketed to private investigators (but available to anyone), and published by: Thomas Investigative Publications, Inc. P.O. Box 33244 Austin, TX 78764 (512)928-8190 I called and received information from two such services who will provide background info. on individuals or businesses (DMV records, credit reports, real estate owned, personal property owned, previous employer comments, school records, worker's comp. claim histories, etc. etc.) for a minimal fee. Those two services are: Online Searches Lynwood, WA 1-800-858-5294 AVERT, Inc. Fort Collins, CO 1-800-367-5933 It seems our lives are now an open book to anyone who wants to look! ------------------------------ From: c2fine@hermes.acs.ryerson.ca (Corbett Fine - AIMD/F94) Date: 05 Dec 1994 01:39:31 GMT Subject: Help Needed for Internet Study Organization: Ryerson Polytechnic University I am a senior university student doing a research paper on privacy on the internet. I would appreciate it if you would take a minute to respond to the following questions. Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter. (Please respond to the address listed below) QUESTIONS: 1) What is your sex/age? 2) Where do you live (country)? 3) What are your feelings regarding privacy on the Information Highway? Is it a concern of yours, and what actions do you take to ensure it (if any)? Please send response to: yu125859@yorku.ca ------------------------------ From: nso@tam.cs.ucdavis.edu (NSO account) Date: 06 Dec 1994 08:22:19 GMT Subject: Internet Security Monthly Organization: Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis NETWORK NEWS RELEASE USA - Washington DC Network Security Observations, leading international research journal on network security, announces the birth of its sister publication INTERNET SECURITY MONTHLY. Internet Security Monthly will serve as the International News Bulletin for the Security, Safety and Protection of Datacommunications on the Information Superhighway. Internet Security Monthly s contents will be specially composed for the new users of datanetworks linked to the Internet, as international service providers Prodigy, America Online, Delphi, PSI Link, CompuServe, and many others. A mix of news briefs on incidents, accidents and potholes on the datahighway, and a carefully selected set of essentials of immediate importance to the network user, fill Internet Security Monthly. Professional reporting on and senior network experience in network system security warrant so. Focussing on firewalls, unix security, cryptography, privacy, legislation, and contributions to the international debates on how to protect your connections, the security of the net , integrity of data/messages, risks, and many more vital topics are covered. Internet Security Monthly will be published in the English language and Worldwide distributed. As with Network Security Observations, the definitive source for complete technical and research information on computer network security, Internet Security Monthly is a not-for-profit initiative, hence it features no advertisement. Special sponsorship has made it possible to keep the subscription rates low: including airmail delivery an international subscription costs US $ 120, in the United States US $ 95. The introduction rate (valid until December 31, 1994) for international subscribers is US $ 100, in the United States US $ 75. If you order a subscription to Internet Security Monthly and Network Security Observations at thesame time, before December 31, 1994 and pay with your American Express card, you will be enrolled free of charge for the 1995 personal membership of the Internet Society. Overwhelming Worldwide interest prevents to honor requests for trial-orders,samples and review copies. For details and subscription ordering contact: Network Security Observations/Internet Security Monthly Suite 400, 1825 I (eye) Street NW, Washington DC 20006 United States Tel.: +1 202 775 4947 Fax +1 202 429 9574 Internet: nso@delphi.com _______________________________________________________ NETWORK SECURITY OBSERVATIONS Tel: +1 202 775 4947 Suite 400, 1825 I Street NW Fax: +1 202 429 9574 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 UNITED STATES --------> email: nso@delphi.com <--------------- ------------------------------ From: jyl@yiscgw.yonsei.ac.kr (Lee JaiYong) Date: 05 Dec 1994 12:33:06 GMT Subject: Information Highways for a Smaller World (long) Organization: Yonsei University Following is the SECOND CALL FOR PAPER for ICCC'95(revised version) to be held in Seoul Korea 1995. Publicity Chair, ICCC'95 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CALL FOR PAPERS ICCC '95 "Information Highways for a Smaller World & Better Living" Seoul, Korea August 21 - 24, 1995 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- The ICCC, the International Council for Computer Communication (ICCC), founded in 1972, is an Affiliate Member of the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP). Its purposes are to foster: scientific research and the development of computer communication; progress in the evaluation of applications of computer communication to educational, scientific, medical, economic, legal, cultural and other peaceful purposes; study of the potential social and economic impacts of computer communcation and of policies which influence those impacts. This 12th conference aims at providing a forum to exchange ideas, discuss key issues and to present the late research results for "Information Highways for a Smaller World & Better Living." The main program includes technical presentations, invited talks, tutorials, and technical visits. TOPICS : Areas of interest include but are not limited to . Strategies, Policies, and User . Wireless Communications Perspectives of Information . Intelligent Networks Superhighways . Personal Communications Systems . Social and Economical Impacts . Broadband Communication of Information Superhighways . ATM Switching . Computer Communication for . International Emergencies Developing Countries . Distance Learning . Network Planning . Optical Communications . Security and Privacy in Computer . Multimedia Communication and its Communications Applications . Evolution towards the High-Speed . High-Speed Protocols Networks including Frame Relay . Network Management and SMDS . Protocol Engineering . Packet Radio Technologies . Satellite Communications SUBMISSION OF PAPERS Prospective authors should send 5 copies of a full paper to the following address; ICCC'95 Dr. Seon Jong Chung ICCC'95 Technical Program Chairman ETRI, Yusong P.O.Box 106, Taejon, Korea, 305-606 Tel: +82-42-860-8630 Fax: +82-42-860-6465 E-mail: iccc95@giant.etri.re.kr The manuscript should not exceed 4000 words in length and should include author's name, affiliation, and addresses(telephone, e-mail, fax), and 150-200 words abstracts in the title page. Also, authors are encouraged to send a Postscript version of their full paper to the Technical Program Committee Chairman by e-mail iccc95@giant.etri.re.kr |-------------------------------| | Important Dates | | Submission of Paper | | February 1st, 1995 | | Notification of Acceptance | | May 1st, 1995 | | Camera-ready Papers | | June 15th, 1995 | |-------------------------------| ---------------------------------------------------------------- Sponsored by The International Council for Computer Communication Hosted by Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute Korea Information Science Society Under the Patronage of Ministry of Communication, The Republic of Korea Conference Governor Ronald P.Uhlig, Northern Telecom, U.S.A. Conference Organizing Committee Chair : Chongsun Hwang, KISS, Korea Co-Chair : Seungtaik Yang, ETRI, Korea Local Arrangement Dongho Lee, Kwangwoon Unvi., Korea Publication Keosang Lee, Dacom, Korea Publicity Jaiyong Lee, Yon-Sei Univ., Korea Registration Samyoung Suh, NCA, Korea Treasurer Seungkyu Park, Ajou Univ., Korea Tutorial Sunshin An, Korea Univ., Korea Social Program Nosik Kim, KTRC, Korea Secretariate Yanghee Choi, SNU, Korea Jinpyo Hong, ETRI, Korea Technical Program Chair : Seonjong Chung, ETRI, Korea Co-Chairs : Serge Fdida, MASI, France Nicholas Georganas, Univ. of Ottawa, Canada Roger Needham, Univ. of Cambridge, U.K. Otto Spaniol, Aachen Tech. Univ., Germany Hideyoshi Tominaga, Waseda Univ., Japan Pramode Verma, AT&T, U.S.A. Members : Sunshin An, Korea Univ., Korea Yanghee Choi, SNU, Korea Jin Pyo Hong, ETRI/PEC, Korea Byungchul Shin, KAIST, Korea Yongjin Park, Hanyang Univ., Korea Donggyoo Kim, Ajou Univ., Korea Seungkyu Park, Ajou Univ., Korea Dongho Lee, Kwangwoon Univ., Korea Kwangsue Chung, Kwangwoon Univ., Korea Daeyoung Kim, Cheoungnam National Univ., Korea Ilyoung Chung, ETRI, Korea Chimoon Han, ETRI, Korea Woojik Chon, ETRI, Korea Hoon Choi, ETRI, Korea Jaiyong Lee, Yonsei Univ., Korea Tadao Saito, Tokyo Univ., Japan Tahahiko Kamae, HP Lab., Japan Reigo Yatsuboshi, Fujitsu Lab., Japan Kinji Ono, NACSIS, Japan Michel Diaz, LAAS-CNRS, France Christophie Diot, INRIA, France Jean-Yves Le Boudec, IBM, Zurich Lab., Swiss Georgio Ventre, Univ. di Napoli, France David Hutchison, Lanchaster Univ., U.K. Augusto Casaca, INES,Portugal Martina Zitterbart, Univ. of Karlsruhe, Germany Ulf Koerner, Lund Univ., Sweden David J. Farber, Univ. of Pennsylvania, USA Reg A. Kaenel, Marcicopa-County Comm. College, USA Ira Cotton, USA Martin E. Silveretoin, USA Albert Kuendig, Swiss Federal Inst. of Tech., Swiss ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 28 Nov 1994 08:46:14 -0600 (CST) Subject: Info on CPD (unchanged since 11/28/94) Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply. If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned into eMail to the submission address below. On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing. Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of submission. An article is printed if it is relevant to the charter of the digest and is not redundant or insulting. If selected, it is printed within two or three days. The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the subject line of an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit or append to the text except for purely technical reasons. A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu. Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu | Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu ---------------------------------+----------------------------------------- ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #070 ****************************** .