Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 19 Sep 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 035 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Reason 3: Public Opinion Reason 22: Encryption Roadway Monitoring Internet Spies Wiretap Emergency Net Security Help With Bugging Devices Re: FBI Wiretap Bill Re: PGP Back Door Re: PGP Back Door Re: Afraid of Big Brother? Re: Government Survailance --------------------------------------------------------------------- Housekeeping information is located at the end of this Digest. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Marc Rotenberg Date: 16 Sep 1994 13:55:48 EST Subject: Reason 3: Public Opinion Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center Reply to: Reason 3: Public Opinion 100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill Reason 3: Americans from all walks of life oppose wiretapping. Surveys taken every year by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on public attitudes toward wiretapping show that American oppose wiretapping by roughly a three to one margin (Question: "Everything considered, would you say that you approve or disapprove of wiretapping?"). The opposition to wiretapping is found across all demographic groups, from sex, race and education to region, religion and political affiliation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ What To Do: Fax Rep. Jack Brooks (202-225-1584). Express your concerns about the FBI Wiretap proposal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org. ======================================================================== ------------------------------ From: Marc Rotenberg Date: 16 Sep 1994 16:13:21 EST Subject: Reason 22: Encryption Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center 100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill Reason 22: The wiretap bill will require communication carriers to decrypt private messages and will discourage the incorporation of encryption features in future network services. The wiretap bill says that RA telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt, any communications encrypted by a subscriber or customer, *unless* the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communications." 2602(b)(3). This provision could have an immediate effect on the deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies, such as encryption, in wireless communication networks and other network services. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ What To Do: Fax Rep. Jack Brooks (202-225-1584). Express your concerns about the FBI Wiretap proposal. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org. ======================================================================== ------------------------------ From: flb@flb.optiplan.fi (F.Baube[tm]) Date: 15 Sep 94 18:56:32 EET Subject: Roadway Monitoring anonymous stated: I have noticed, and you may also have noticed, this form of surveillance going on right here in Milwaukee. On I-94 and I-43 I have noticed communication towers and surveillance cameras that have been erected within the past two months. It makes me a bit paranoid too. Your average freedom-loving American would probably not be worried by this under ordinary circumstances. But let us not forget that Ollie and crew had plans for handling dissent if the US had invaded Nicaragua. Concentration, er, detention camps for trouble-makers. Weren't there some other nasty ideas ? In the heat of the moment, how much would he and his ilk be able to "get away with" before Guardians of the Constitution like William Rehnquist got around to (maybe) stopping it ? Besides, the totalitarian fantasies of Oliver North that came to light were just that, *only* the parts that came to light. How useful such roadway monitoring might be, some time, some place, in a land so very similar to late 20th-century America .. -- * Fred Baube(tm) * Greece out of the * GU/MSFS/88 * European Union NOW ! * baube@optiplan.fi * #include ------------------------------ From: Kissell@gacsrv.gactr.uga.edu (Laura Kissel) Date: 15 Sep 1994 20:35:50 GMT Subject: Internet Spies Organization: Georgia Center Have you noticed the people on the NET from SEARCHNET? I would be very careful about what I said with these people around. A net is something you use to catch something or search for something. The NET has a net or is a net. I suggest that the people from SEARCHNET are seeking, marking and dealing with those on the NET who will not fit in with the New World Order....Just a suggestion. ------------------------------ From: nzook@bga.com (Nathan Zook) Date: 16 Sep 1994 14:33:29 GMT Subject: Wiretap Emergency Organization: Real/Time Communications - Bob Gustwick and Associates [ Article crossposted from talk.politics.misc ] [ Author was Nathan Zook ] [ Posted on 16 Sep 1994 14:31:07 GMT ] From nzook@bga.com Thu Sep 15 22:42:08 1994 Date: 15 Sep 1994 21:05:42 -0500 (CDT) From: Nathan Zook To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Wiretap Emergency I just spoke with Joe Barton (R) from Texas about the FBI wiretap bill. He is on a subcommittee that is hearing the bill. He has heard _no_ citizen opposition to it. I was not prepared, but he did invite me to send him my concerns :-D Congressman Joe Barton 1514 Longworth Building Washington, D.C. 20515 p:202-225-2002 f:202-225-3052 Folks, if we can generate a few hundred calls and well-thought-out faxes tommorrow, we might have some effect. I don't know a lot about him, but he seemed to be of the opinion that he didn't really know that much about the bill. It's up to us to educate him. -- Nathan ------------------------------ From: Kissell@gacsrv.gactr.uga.edu (Laura Kissel) Date: 16 Sep 1994 18:22:43 GMT Subject: Net Security Organization: Georgia Center Because of recent negative activity observed I ask, has anyone noticed the people on the NET from SEARCHNET? I would be very careful about what I said with these people around. A net is something you use to catch something or search for something. The NET has a net or is a net. I suggest that the people from SEARCHNET are seeking, marking and dealing with those on the NET who will not fit in with the NEW WORLD ORDER....Just a suggestion. ------------------------------ From: Carl Evert Smith Date: 18 Sep 1994 17:25:57 -0400 Subject: Help With Bugging Devices Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA THIS IS FOR SECURITY REASONS Hello I am in quite a jam. I am looking for the postal adresses of all mail order companies dealing in communication equipment/ microphones, receivers, and transmitters. Also on the detection of microphones, receivers, and transmitters. Any information of any companies would be great. Thank you -- Marc Madjaric - Infojunkie - Forum - Pittsburgh PA cs6q@andrew.cmu.edu ------------------------------ From: mea@intgp1.att.com (Mark E Anderson +1 708 979 4716) Date: 19 Sep 94 04:50:00 GMT Subject: Re: FBI Wiretap Bill >Reason 52: The FBI wiretap bill will cost taxpayers at least > $500,000,000. I happened to watch a C-SPAN rebroadcast of Tuesday's Congressional hearings over this issue with FBI head Louis Freeh as one of the people testifying. The only thing that was an issue was who should pay this $500M. Each of the Congresscritters on the panel expressed their support for providing law enforcement every tool they need in continuing their wiretapping capabilities. Some of the Congresscritters, IMHO, obviously didn't seem to know that much about telephony in particular and telecommunications in general from the content of their statements. My take on this situation is pretty onerous. If there aren't any dissenting opinions on the sub-committee, can there be many votes against in the general House on a subject as complicated as this? Can public support be enmassed to block these bills when it's extremely difficult to explain to the average Joe as to their implications? I know, I've tried. It's almost impossible to get people concerned about this because this bill's content only can be understood by technical people and the bill's wording can only be understood by technical people who happen to be schooled in law. I have a feeling this bill will pass. -- Mark Anderson mea@intgp1.att.com ------------------------------ From: ws@shore.net (William Stallings) Date: 15 Sep 1994 10:21:38 -0400 Subject: Re: PGP Back Door Organization: North Shore Access/Eco Software, Inc; (info@shore.net) Ryan Wilson (ryan_wilson@kvo.com) wrote: Is there any truth to the rumor that certain versions of PGP, released after a certain date or version number, contain a back door which is accessible by the NSA or other so-called intelligence entities? IMO, the answer is almost certainly no. First, every executable version is signed by one or more of the developers. You can take the trouble to verify the key of the signer and then verify the signature. Second, the source code is also available and can be re-compiled to make sure that you have the correct object. While most people do not have the time and/or expertise to check the source code for back doors, enough people do have such time and expertise that if the source code did have a back door, its presence would be detected and announced, with high probability. Third, most of the concern has been centered on the MIT versions (2.6, 2.6.1). These versions were developed by a group well known to the PGP community and included involvement of Phil Zimmermann, who has blessed the final product. -- | Bill Stallings | PGP fingerprint: | public key from Stable | Comp-Comm Consulting | B1 4E 2A BD 96 08 8B A4 | Large Email Database | P. O. Box 2405 | 67 83 D1 09 FE 52 56 6C | contact | Brewster, MA 02631 | | sledinfo@drebes.com ------------------------------ From: "Michael T. Palmer" Date: 16 Sep 1994 21:30:52 GMT Subject: Re: PGP Back Door Organization: Georgia Institute of Technology ryan_wilson@kvo.com (Ryan Wilson) writes: Is there any truth to the rumor that certain versions of PGP, released after a certain date or version number, contain a back door which is accessible by the NSA or other so-called intelligence entities? Why take anyone else's word for it either way? If you must have absolute trust in it, then get the source code (which is available via ftp from many sites) and check it and compile it yourself. Note that many net.personalities have done so and found nothing. But sometimes it pays to paranoid, eh? -- Michael T. Palmer (palmer@chmsr.gatech.edu) RIPEM Public Key available Center for Human-Machine Systems Research, Dept of Industrial & Systems Eng Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0205 ------------------------------ From: bernie@fantasyfarm.com (Bernie Cosell) Date: 16 Sep 1994 02:13:25 GMT Subject: Re: Afraid of Big Brother? Organization: Fantasy Farm, Pearisburg, VA Daryl George Thornton II writes: I market smartcards blah blha bhal blah....but No one ever asks or mentions or voices corncern (though it would seem obvious to do so) the big brother-national ID aspects of smartcards EXCEPT government employees and in particular military employees. IMHO It would seem to me that government employees are the most aware of the abuse possibilities. Most likely from thier own day to day inside view of the government at work. I don't quite understand. What does "smartcards" have to do with "Big Brother"? also see : Forbes ? Fortune? mining the datadump? American Expresses use parallel computer processing machines to figure when you would buy something in the future from what you have purchased in the past and send coupons/discounts etc. to entice to repeat such purchase again. (i.e. ever three months you buy XXX you have not purchased XXX in 9-months send discounts/promo.) In short business loves big brother(s). But this strikes right at the heart of the true point, and why it is *NOT* "Big Brother" [perhaps more folk should go reread 1984]. I am under no compulsion to use my AmEx or MasterCard or anything else. "Smart" or not, the use of such cards is purely discretionary and I have the *CHOICE*, realizing that I'm trading the convenience [and cash-flow advantage and perhaps the luxury of the "on the spot loan"] and in exchange they get some information about me [and other things, but the point is that the _information_ is part of the transaction]. If I prefer not to have that information disclosed, I can simply choose not to use their card. I don't see the problem [other than for the naive or uninformed, who will be surprised [or at least feign surprise] when they learn that "information" was part of the transaction]. The key point about a _real_ "Big Brother" is that it is *compulsory*. Is the government big brother Is the government afraid of big brother(s)? Can any one big brother control/influence thousands of big brothers? Can thousands of big brothers control/influence one big brother? Only one of those, the "government" one, is really a 'Big Brother', and the answer is that *of*course* they can control/influence the thousands of little information collectors: they simply pass a law requiring that the little information collectors *must* turn their records over to the gov't [as they already have to do for a rather broad spectrum of transactions]. You see, that's the real point about a "Big Brother". AmEx has no way to convince MasterCard to give them info about your buying patterns. Now, they might -agree- to share data, and, indeed, Master Card might well offer to _sell_ AmEx that info. But AmEx has no way to *force* Master Card to help with their market research. By contrast, the government wields a *huge* amount of coercive power, and they *can* compel MasterCard and everyone else to tell them what they want to know, if they so choose. -- Bernie Cosell bernie@fantasyfarm.com Fantasy Farm Fibers, Pearisburg, VA (703) 921-2358 --->>> Too many people; too few sheep <<<--- ------------------------------ From: bernie@fantasyfarm.com (Bernie Cosell) Date: 16 Sep 1994 02:30:51 GMT Subject: Re: Government Survailance Organization: Fantasy Farm, Pearisburg, VA anonymous writes: The following excerpt is from the newsgroup: sci.military 616. Rome to aid highway managers GRIFFISS AFB, N.Y. (AFNS) --- America's highways should become less congested as the result of signal processing and computer technologies developed at the Air Force Material Command's Rome Laboratory here. [Obviously the USAF is putting a "government is your friend" spin on this story, but this program is just a small step from more draconian forms of surveillance.] Care to expand on that rather paranoid remark? First off, you talk about 'spin' but don't actually address the issue at hand. In many places around the country, traffic congestion is a nontrivial problem. Having worked on the ARPAnet routing algorithms [back in the old days], I know some about this problem and I can attest that it is a *very* difficult one. It is almost impossible for drivers sitting in their cars to get [or derive] the information they need to make proper "routing" decisions; but conversely, the quality of those distributed-decisions will have a first-order impact on the performance of the overall network[*]. And so I don't think it is at all unreasonable to investigate techniques to gather information and provide proper feedback for drivers. What about the release did you find 'spin'-like? [*] This is not a place for a technical discussion of routing algorithms, but let me elaborate a tiny bit: most drivers drive VERY selfishly. Now the "greedy algorithm" works in some venues, but is really quite dismal for routing. BUT: even if a driver _does_ realize that he is one component of a complicated, distributed problem, for the most part there's not much he can do. Making a proper [local] routing decision _inherently_ depends on having access to information that is not available locally. And so to do routing effectively you need _some_ way for the participants to exchange information. In networks, since the agents involved are cooperating, the information exchange is explicit. Obviously, no such scheme could work for cars [what would you use... CB?] and so some plan to gather global flow information and use it to provide feedback to allow for better local-routing decisions is, technically at least, a perfectly reasonable plan. And so that's why I think that calling it "spin" is inappropriate. As for the second part, what "small step" and what "more draconian"? Are we going to get a rehash of the "ID transponder in every car" stuff? It is always interesting [for me at least] in chatting with folks who are seriously into paranoid conspiracies to find out just what they think a "small" step is, since that seems to almost always end up being the place where we end up disagreeing. -- Bernie Cosell bernie@fantasyfarm.com Fantasy Farm Fibers, Pearisburg, VA (703) 921-2358 --->>> Too many people; too few sheep <<<--- ------------------------------ The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy or vice versa. 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