Date: Mon, 09 May 94 08:58:04 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V4#064 Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 09 May 94 Volume 4 : Issue: 064 Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine Info Needed for Privacy Advocate FCC Ruling on CNID: Not Good USPS & IRS Mull Nat. ID Card, Clinton to Sign Orders Re: NSA remarks at "Lawyers and the Internet" The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password "yourid@yoursite". The archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy". Archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: samuel@cs.wisc.edu (Samuel Bates) Date: 7 May 1994 19:43:23 GMT Subject: Info Needed for Privacy Advocate Organization: University of WI, Madison -- Computer Sciences Dept. Last year, the State of Wisconsin created the position of Privacy Advocate, with the following charge: The Privacy Advocate is responsible for support and advocacy in development and implementation of state and local government policies that protect personal privacy. In this support and advocacy role, the Advocate conducts reviews of state and local authorities' policies and recommends, as appropriate, statutory changes to the governor, legislature, and local units of government. The Advocate also serves to assist individuals in exercise of their privacy-related rights. Specifically, the Advocate performs such activities as arranging meetings between individuals and the staffs of relevant authorities to obtain information or discuss complaints regarding policies, practices, and procedures relating to personally-identifiable information. The position was filled by Carole Doeppers in November; she has a strong policy background, having directed Common Cause of Wisconsin and been on the Wisconsin Ethics Board. Her technical background is not as strong, and I have met with her a number of times to give her information on computers and their capabilities with regard to privacy issues. Her questions are starting to get out of my area of knowledge, however, so I would like to pass on some areas of interest to this group and ask for assistance. Carole is looking for any information on privacy and electronic medical records, and more generally, methods and policies relating to maximizing privacy in electronic record-keeping systems. She is concerned with the prevalent use of the Social Security Number as an identifier, and would like to come up with a realistic alternative to suggest. I mumbled something in our last meeting about digital signatures and applications of zero-knowledge proofs to get authentication without identification, but I don't have a firm enough grasp of these topics to give her the detail she needs. What I would like to get are any references to books or magazine articles that discuss any of the above topics. Please send me anything you know of, and I will pass it on to her. Thank you. Samuel Bates Chair, CPSR-Madison samuel@cs.wisc.edu ------------------------------ From: jjohnson@FirstPerson.COM (Jeff Johnson) Date: 6 May 1994 18:50:10 GMT Subject: FCC Ruling on CNID: Not Good Organization: FirstPerson Inc., Palo Alto, CA The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently announced its long-awaited ruling on the controversial Calling Number ID service. The news is unfortunately *not* good. Over the past several years, 40 states have considered phone company applications to offer CNID, and a large number of states have issued rulings that interfere with telco plans for CNID. Specifically, some states have denied telco applications to offer CNID, citing privacy concerns; other states have OK'ed CNID, but have imposed requirements (e.g., mandatory availability of per-line blocking) that telcos find onerous. Telcos want to provide CNID with only one blocking option: users must remember to block on each call (per-call blocking). In response to the variety of state-imposed requirements, telcos went to the FCC to try to get a ruling that would apply to the entire nation, and that would impose less onerous conditions than many state's conditions. For the time being, it appears that the telcos have got what they wanted. The FCC has jurisdiction over interstate, not intra-state telecommunications. They have ruled that interstate CNID must conform to their rules, which require only per-call blocking. Interstate CNID doesn't actually exist yet; where CNID is in place, it is only for local calls. [Note: CNID is distinct from Automatic Number Identification, or ANI, which identifies calling numbers to 800- and 900-service providers.] The FCC is essentially saying, "When the overall system is intercompatible enough to allow CNID information to be transmitted interstate, it comes under our jurisdiction and must conform to our rules, namely, per-call blocking is the strongest form of blocking allowed." This of course makes it more difficult for states to impose different (i.e., stronger) protections in-state. The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and other PUCs that have imposed stronger restrictions plan to appeal the FCC ruling. Also, some public-interest organations, e.g., California's TURN, are contesting the ruling, arguing that it makes much more sense, when CNID goes interstate, for the system to simply honor the privacy blocking code attached to each call, regardless of whether it was generated via per-call or per-line blocking. In other words, a interstate communications system that discriminates between per-line blocking and per-call blocking actually is *more complicated* than one that simply marks calls as "blocked" or "not blocked", regardless of how the blocking occurred. CPSR's position on CNID has been that people *do* want better control over who calls them, and there are ways to provide that, but CNID is not a good way. It isn't very useful for residential call recipients because it tells them only what phone is being used to call them, not who is calling. It is very useful to businesses for collecting marketing data because the telephone number is a perfect link back to a calling household, not to mention a good data-base key for construction more extensive consumer dossiers. CPSR would like to see services put into place that are more useful to residential phone users and less useful to businesses, e.g., services that allow callers to identify themselves (not the phone they happen to be using), willingly and consciously, to callees, and services that allow callees to take or refuse calls based on whether they want to receive unidentified calls or not. There are good ways to do that, and CNID isn't one of them. CPSR's *fallback* position is that if CNID is allowed, people must have the option of telling the phone company once (i.e., on a per-phone-line basis) that they do not want their number given out *unless* they OK it on a particular call. Forcing people to remember to punch a blocking code each time they want to preserve their privacy is not sufficient. As you may know, I participated in the California PUC hearings on CNID, supplying testimony that helped guide the PUC to its decision (i.e., language from my testimony was included in their decision). My testimony and other CNID-writings were circulated in other states, and were considered in hearings there. I also sent information to the FCC last year to try to influence their decision. I am considering participating in the various attempts to get the FCC to reconsider. I'd like to make this a CPSR effort, rather than a Jeff Johnson effort, so I'd like feedback on what you think about this, and would appreciate any advice or input you can give me. Chair, CPSR Board of Directors ------------------------------ From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" Date: 7 May 1994 20:43:21 -0500 (CDT) Subject: USPS & IRS Mull Nat. ID Card, Clinton to Sign Orders Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee From: EFFector Online Volume 07 No. 08 May 6, 1994 editors@eff.org A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation from: Mitch Ratcliffe Date: Thu, 5 May 1994 07:43:22 -0700 (PDT) Ever Feel Like You're Being Watched? You Will... Digital Media has learned that the Clinton administration is debating not if, but how, to create a card that every American will need in order to interact with any federal government agency. Combined with two potential executive orders and the Postal Service's designs on putting its stamp on personal and business electronic transactions, the card could open a window on every nuance of American personal and business life. The wrangling among the administration, the U.S. Postal Service, the Internal Revenue Service and Department of Defense, emerged into the public eye at this April's CardTech/SecureTech Conference. The gathering of security experts was convened to discuss applications for smart card and PCMCIA memory card technologies in business and government. The Postal Service, at the conference presented a proposal for a "general purpose U.S. services smartcard," which individuals and companies would use to authenticate their identities when sending and receiving electronic mail, transferring funds and interacting with government agencies, such as the I.R.S., Veterans Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services. President Clinton is also considering signing two executive orders that would greatly expand the government's access to personal records, including an order that would allow the I.R.S. to monitor individual bank accounts and automatically collect taxes based on the results, said sources close to the White House. The collection service will be presented as a convenient way to avoid filling out a tax return. The White House did not respond to requests for comments about this report. The Post Office: We deliver for you. The Postal Service's U.S. Card would be designed to use either smart cards (plastic cards with an embedded microprocessor carrying a unique number that can be read by a electromagnetic scanner and linked to computerized records stored on a network) or PCMCIA cards, which can contain megabytes of personal information. (You've probably seen this type card in AT&T's "You Will" ad campaign, which shows a doctor inserting a woman's card in a reader in order to access a recording of a sonogram). The Postal Service said it is considering AT&T and other companies' smart card technologies. In a slide presentation at the conference, Postal representative Chuck Chamberlain outlined how an individual's U.S. Card would be automatically connected with the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Treasury, the I.R.S., the banking system, and a central database of digital signatures for use in authenticating electronic mail and transactions. The U.S. Card is only a proposal, Chamberlain insists. Yet the Postal Service is prepared to put more than a hundred million of the cards in citizens' pockets within months of administration approval, he said. "We've been trying to convince people [in the different agencies] to do just one card, otherwise, we're going to end up with two or three cards," said Chamberlain. He said in addition to the healthcare card proposed by President Clinton last year, various government agencies are forwarding plans for a personal records card and a transactions (or "e-purse") card. Chamberlain said the I.R.S in particular is pursuing plans for an identity card for taxpayers. Don't leave home without it. Though he did not name the U.S. Card at the time, Postmaster General Marvin Runyon suggested that the Postal Service offer electronic mail certification services during testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee in March. The proposal is clearly intended as a way to sustain the Postal Service's national role in the information age, since it would give the agency a role in virtually every legally-binding electronic transaction made by U.S. citizens. For instance: * When sending or receiving electronic mail, U.S. Card users would be able to check the authenticity of a digital signature to screen out impostors. * Banking transactions (notably credit card purchases) that depend on authentication of the participants identities and an audit trail, would be registered in Postal Service systems. * Veterans, or for that matter college students and welfare recipients, could check their federal benefits using the identification data on their U.S. Cards. * Visitors to an emergency room would have instant access to medical records at other hospitals, as well as their health insurance information. These examples may seem benign separately, but collectively they paint a picture of a citizen's or business's existence that could be meddlesome at best and downright totalitarian at worst. Will buying a book at a gay bookstore with a credit card that authenticates the transaction through the Postal Service open a Naval officer up to court marshal? If you have lunch with a business associate on a Saturday at a family restaurant, will the IRS rule the expense non-deductible before you can even claim it? "There won't be anything you do in business that won't be collected and analyzed by the government," said William Murray, an information system security consultant to Deloitte and Touche who saw Chamberlain's presentation. "This [National Information Infrastructure] is a better surveillance mechanism than Orwell or the government could have imagined. This goddamned thing is so pervasive and the propensity to connect to it is so great that it's unstoppable." Deep Roots; Deep Pockets; Long History. Chamberlain said the Postal Service has been working for "a couple years" on the information system to back up the U.S. Card. He said the project was initiated by the Department of Defense, which wanted a civilian agency to create a national electronic communications certification authority that could be connected to its Defense Messaging System. Chamberlain said the Postal Service has also consulted with the National Security Agency, proponents of the Clipper encryption chip which hides the contents of messages from all but government agencies, like law enforcement. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Ames Research Laboratories in Mountain View, Calif. carried out the research and development work for Clipper. "We're designing a national framework for supporting business-quality authentication," said John Yin, the engineer heading up the U.S. Card- related research for NASA Ames' advanced networking applications group. "This is not specifically with just the Postal Service. We'll be offering services to other agencies and to third-party commercial companies that want to build other services on the card." For example, VISA or American Express could link their credit services to the U.S. Card. Yin, who works on Defense Messaging Systems applications, said his group has collaborated with "elements of Department of Defense" for the past year, but would not confirm the participation of the National Security Agency, a Department of Defense agency. The NSA is specifically prohibited from creating public encryption systems by the Computer Security Act of 1987. Yin also would not comment on the budget for the project, which other sources said was quite large and has spanned more than two years. A false sense of security? According to Yin, the cards would allow individuals or businesses to choose any encryption technology. "It's not our approach to say, 'Here's the standard, take it our leave it,'" he said. "We're not trying to create a monopoly, rather it's an infrastructure for interoperability on which a whole variety of services can be built." Yet, NASA, which is a participant in the CommerceNet electric marketplace consortium will "suggest" to its partners that they adopt the U.S. Card certification infrastructure, he said. The reality is that government agencies' buying power usually drives the market to adopt a particular technology -- not unlike the way the Texas Board of Education, the largest single purchaser of textbooks in the U.S., sets the standard for the content of American classroom curricula. Since, the administration has already mandated use of Clipper and its data-oriented sibling, the Tesserae chip, in federal systems it's fairly certain that the law enforcement-endorsed chips will find their way into most, if not all, U.S. Cards. Even in the unlikely event that one government agency should weather the pressure and pass on the Clipper chip, it's still possible to trace the source, destination, duration and time of transactions conducted between Clippered and non-Clippered devices. "Most of this shift [in privacy policy] is apparently being done by executive order at the initiative of bureaucracy, and without any Congressional oversight or Congressional concurrence, " Murray said. "They are not likely to fail. You know, Orwell said that bureaucrats, simply doing what bureaucrats do, without motivation or intent, will use technology to enslave the people." EDITOR'S NOTE: Digital Media has filed a Freedom of Information Act request for Clinton and Bush Administration, Postal Service, NSA, Department of Defense, NASA, I.R.S. and other documents related to the creation of the U.S. Card proposal. Copyright 1994 by Mitch Ratcliffe and Seybold Publications. Mitch Ratcliffe Editor in Chief Digital Media: A Seybold Report 444 De Haro St., Ste. 128 San Francisco, Calif. 94107 415.575.3775 office godsdog@netcom.com ------------------------------ From: sgs@access.digex.net (Steve Smith) Date: 6 May 1994 02:01:43 -0400 Subject: Re: NSA remarks at "Lawyers and the Internet" Organization: Agincourt Computing Steve Brinich wrote: Until I have a Clipper or two to play with, I am going to reserve technical judgement. And when you do have a Clipper or two to play with, what kind of "technical judgment" are you going to make? The chips are designed to resist reverse engineering. Given a few Capstone chips to play with, I can think of a number of fun things to do: 1. Can you *really* superencrypt data? My bet is that it will not be easy. 2. What happens when you mess around with the LEAF? 3. How do the chips handle line noise? 4. Can you use two Capstones to build a "man in the middle" tap? It'd be fun to demo a working Clipper tap .... All of these are things that aren't in the specs and would be interesting to know. I'm sure other people can come up with more things to do with a Capstone "black box" without opening it. -- Steve Smith Agincourt Computing sgs@access.digex.net (301) 681 7395 "Truth is stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense." ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V4 #064 ****************************** .