Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:33:15 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@PICA.ARMY.MIL Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V3#083 Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 29 Nov 93 Volume 3 : Issue: 083 Today's Topics: Moderator: Dennis G. Rears re: Guns Control/Registration/Confiscation Re: Privacy of cellular phones [Subject field chosen by MODERATOR] Questions California DMV's SSN requirements Voice authentication The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@pica.army.mil and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil. Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133]. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: David Horvath Subject: re: Guns Control/Registration/Confiscation Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 9:10:45 EST > I have been taking all of this Brady Bill info in with utter amazement > at the NRA stand, which is that once an instant background check is > available, the waiting period should be phased out. Am I missing > something here? An instant background check sounds to me like a > [more stuff about registering and confiscation of firearms that in > theory should be protected by the 2nd admendment DELETED] > Where is the NRA's head at with this, anyway? This whole "instant, > computerized" nonsense scares me more than any stupid waiting period (which > by the way, we have had here in Minnesota for years). While I share many of these same concerns, I feel it *would* be possible to implement such a system without identifying *what* or *how many* you were buying. A simple NCIC check would show if you were a convicted felon and the addition of a 'mental stability' flag to the database would be a simple matter. In Pennsylvania, we do *not* have an instant check system and we *do* have a 3 day waiting period. But during those three days, a copy of the paperwork is sent to the state police so they can report back if you are a member of the "excluded from owning" list (ie felon or mentally ill). In order to get a permit to concealed-carry a handgun in Pennsylvania, you have to supply references, answer a questionaire (are you a drunkard, etc), supply 2 passport sized photos, and pay a fee. The references, the local police (who better to know if you're a trouble maker), and often your neighbors are contacted. I assume a lookup is done in the NCIC. Recently the City of Philadelphia passed an ordinance preventing certain types of guns (like Smith & Wesson 9mm semi-automatics [looks like an Army Colt-45 used in WWII]) - the courts threw it out because of the state constitution and gun control laws. The state legislature is in the process of passing a law *preventing* local governments from regulating guns. - David Horvath ------------------------------ From: Percival Wendel Wippenheimer Subject: Re: Privacy of cellular phones [Subject field chosen by MODERATOR] Organization: University of Virginia Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1993 14:07:10 GMT The answer to this is simple: Do not use Cellular Phones until proper scrambling becomes widespread. Furthermore, any ham radio operator who knows even a little bit can modify a cellular phone so that monitoring can take place. PWW ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 17:59 EST From: WHMurray@dockmaster.ncsc.mil Subject: Questions Two decades ago I was on a program on privacy and computer security in Vienna, Austria with Joe Wiezenbaum. In those days the two issues were so intertwined as to be inseparable. The good professor was trying to make the audience understand the threat to individual privacy that the computer represented. In part because of the general confusion surrounding the issues, I saw his position as being that the generality and flexibility of the computer could not be restricted in such a way as to preserve its utility while, at the same time preventing a compromise of the confidentiality of the data. Having just presented my masterwork, an access control system, I considered this to be a solved problem and could not understand why he did not see it as such. In fact, the good professor's point was that the threat to privacy represented by the computer had much less to do with whether or not the computer could preserve the confidentiality of the data than with the data that would be collected in its presence that would not be collected without it . I thought that he was talking about the deficiencies of the technology, my technology, while in fact he was talking about its capabilities. In retrospect I realize that it was the government bureaucrats that were casting the issue in terms of the preservation of confidentiality, not Professor Wiezenbaum. They have done an extraordinary job of keeping the question miscast in those terms. They do not want us to see the question in terms of the data collected. We have three cases in point. The first is the Clinton Health Plan. The bureaucrats have got us arguing about the inability of the technology to restrict the use of the data in the intended direction. We are talking about the "unauthorized use of the data." We are talking about whether the identifier of the data should be the social security number or some other number, about whether the card should be smart or dumb. What we are not talking about is what data ought to be collected in the first place. The second case is the Brady Bill. We are talking about whether the waiting period of five days should be replaced by a computer-based "background inquiry" in four years or five. We are not talking about the chilling impact of such a system. We are not talking about whether or not we should have such a system or what ought to be in it. We are not talking about what data should be in the system or how it is to be kept accurate and current. We are not talking about what response from the system should disqualify you from the purchase of a gun. We are not talking about whether a record should be made of the inquiry or how long such a record might be kept. We are not taliking aobut what may legitimately be inferred from such an inquiry. The third case is the government's cryptography initiatives. We are arguing about whether or not the Skipjack algorithm is strong. We are arguing about who the "escrow" agents ought to be or what procedures they ought to use. We are arguing about whether or not a marginal denial of strong crypto to foreigners justifies putting American software publishers at a huge competitive disadvantage. We are not arguing about whether the right of the citizen to have a private conversation in a language of his own choosing is superior to the right of the government to investigate crime. We are not talking about what level of real abuse of cryptography by criminals is required to justify a general restriction on its legitimate use. I marvel at the effectiveness of their misdirection. If the bureaucrats can succeed in getting us to focus on the wrong questions, then they need not worry about what answers we reach. William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security 49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840 1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL ------------------------------ From: bruces@sco.com (Bruce Steinberg) Subject: California DMV's SSN requirements Organization: The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1993 23:07:05 GMT Thanks to TJ Merritt's original query on the subject of "SSN required to renew Cal. DL" (posted October 29th, 1993, and by now expired online on my system), I was motivated to directly contact my California State Senator (the Senate Majority Leader, it turns out) and get some answers to specific questions straight from an elected legislative representative who had to have voted on this recent law (of which I was previously unaware, having submitted neither a driver's license nor vehicle registration renewal form requiring an SSN since its apparent passage). Having received a timely written response at this point, I'd like to now share this complete correspondence with you, FYI. Those of you who have been following this thread from early on will recognize that I have incorporated some of the more salient issues that were raised in this newsgroup during initial discussions, and I would like to thank everyone for those ideas and concerns. I also trust that my letter represented the views of many others on this newsgroup and elsewhere, and that the response I received (and its virtual non-response to any of the actual privacy or confidentiality issues) is useful in stimulating more substantive thought, discussion, and action in this regard. (Please also note that in the response letter -- as well as in certain other discussions here on the net -- the point appears to be getting effectively lost that SSN usage now applies to new and renewed vehicle registrations, as well as driver's licenses.) In fairness, it should be noted that in the actual language of the final amended law as passed, the SSN -- while mandatory for license and registration applications and renewals (as well as DMV-issued ID cards, BTW) -- is proscribed from *appearing* anywhere on any license, reg, or ID certificate issued by the DMV (including any magnetic tape or strip on the license). Instead, the DMV is authorized "to require all applications for driver's licenses to contain other number or identifiers," presumably like the existing CA driver's license ("CDL") number. The law also stipulates that the SSN "is not a public record and shall not be disclosed by the department" except for requests from such specific "authorized agencies" as the Controller, the Franchise Tax Board, or the CA Lottery Commission, for info related to the pursuit of outstanding fines, taxes, assessments, penalties, etc. related to a wide range of concerns -- from parking and traffic violations, to income tax, to child support, to lottery winnings. (There is, BTW, a notion of literal "urgency" in this law having been passed when it was, presumably in the face of a serious financial crisis, so any railroading is at least understandable: "This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article V of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect.") In any case, I've clearly put myself on record here as being against the use of SSNs in any relation to any DMV activities, whether driver's licenses or vehicle registrations. If you don't agree, please spare me any flames and simply take comfort in the fact that you're in some good political company: introduced by Assembly Member Bentley in March, 1991, the amended law passed both the California State Senate and Assembly *UNANIMOUSLY* in August, 1992 -- 35 to 0, and 68 to 0, respectively -- and was signed into law by the governor in September, 1992. If, on the other hand, you do agree that this law is highly questionable (if not downright objectionable), then let the unanimity of this vote by the entire California State Legislature be a reminder and measure of their best recent collective privacy consciousness, and a rude wake-up call to action where it counts. It's not hard to locate an appropriate elected respresentative to whom to similarly express your views: if you live in California, ANY CURRENT State Senator and Assemblyperson (barring any recent mid-term special replacement elections) clearly voted to sweep this bill into law -- yours, and every other single one of them. I don't know how many of these 103 legislators directly represent California readers of this newsgroup, but I think it would be a compelling and powerful application of the "information superhighway" (or even just our current "online two-lane blacktop" :) if a large number of them were to suddenly hear from concerned professional constituents on this issue, in writing and/or by phone (and perhaps in some progressive cases, even by Internet itself, where possible). It would certainly appear that no one effectively expressed any doubts or objections to any of these folks in August of 1992 -- if indeed anyone outside of the legislature and the requesting agencies knew anything about the bill at all. FYI, and thanks, Bruce Steinberg -------- THE CORRESPONDENCE: //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// November 9th, 1993 Senator Henry J. Mello Senate, California Legislature 701 Ocean Street, Room 318A Santa Cruz, CA 95060-4096 Dear Senator Mello: Thank you very much for your prompt November 5th letter of response to my telephone call to your Santa Cruz office on November 2nd regarding the new requirement of providing one's Social Security Number to the DMV for application or renewal of one's driver's license as well as automobile registration. In your letter you explained that this requirement became law under AB 1823 in 1992, and kindly provided an accompanying copy of the bill for my information. (Actually, I already had a copy of this bill, thanks to <...> in your office, with whom I spoke when I first called.) You also provided the telephone number of the DMV Public Information Unit in Sacramento (916/657-6560) in case I needed any further clarification of these requirements. Unfortunately, however, there appears to be a miscommunication about the purpose of my call, which I will attempt to restate and clarify here. Since both my latest license renewal and auto registration apparently occurred before these requirements went into effect, I only recently found out about this law through heated discussions on the issue which have been occurring among computer professionals on the Internet (e.g., the "comp.society.privacy" newsgroup, if you or your staff have "Usenet" access). I am personally very concerned for a variety of compelling reasons about the creeping use of Social Security Numbers as universal identification numbers, an application far afield of their intended purpose of identifying Social Security and related personal tax accounts. Since this requirement is authorized by a new 1992 law, I assume that it was passed by a majority vote of the legislature, and in particular, that you participated in the vote, one way or the other. So in short, the reason for my call (and now the purpose of this letter) is to ascertain: (1) by what margin (and by whose votes) this bill became law, (2) in particular, how you voted on this bill, and, (3) how you stand on this issue today. Without going into great detail here, the use of the Social Security Number as a personal identifier provides relatively low confidence in uniquely and accurately identifying individuals, while unnecessarily providing a powerful key for compromising one's privacy in matters involving confidential records in many areas having no relation to the initial SSN solicitation. * * * Senator Henry J. Mello November 8th, 1993 Page two This is not some personal paranoid vision; one needs to look no further than the Privacy Notice required by federal law when Social Security Numbers are being solicited for any purpose to confirm that potential for abuse is a serious legislative consideration regarding the use of SSNs. I understand that there are a number of arguable economic and social motivations for wishing to use SSNs in this way (e.g., catching up with "deadbeat dads," among others), but I strenuously object to this misuse of the SSN -- and its attendant potential for abuse -- as an even greater long-term threat to our society. The "guilty until proven innocent" spirit of this requirement is to me reprehensible. And as a "fishing expedition" by which all applicants are screened for a variety of potential prior misdeeds completely unrelated to their ability to drive or maintain a car, it also reflects a major backslide in legislative privacy consciousness and progress. (I also find it incredible that the State of California still cannot seem to enact a reasonable requirement of mandatory insurance before registering and/or driving a car on its public highways, but can enact a law to catch tax and child-support scofflaws through DMV licensing procedures.) A logical extension of this kind of thinking (which would actually have more bearing on real driving issues) would be to require applicants to submit for screening complete medical and criminal records, family histories of substance abuse, and consumer credit reports before being approved for license and registration -- all in "confidence," of course. Where does it stop? As you are most likely aware, the entire issue of using SSNs as universal identifiers of various kinds (particularly by state governments) is controversial, and specious uses have in fact been challenged and prohibited by court rulings. One recent case worthy of note occurred in Virginia, where a newly legislated requirement for providing SSNs in order to register to vote was struck down as presenting too great a burden on exercising one's right to vote by compromising one's reasonable desire for assured privacy and SSN security (again, with the "unique identifier" aspect presumably argued as a compelling benefit in ensuring legitimately qualified, individual voters). I realize the long-standing principle in California (as elsewhere) that "driving is a privilege, not a right." But I still do not agree that this distinction gives the State the right to force such coercive requirements on those who must drive, but whose privacy principles and confidentiality concerns are also both legitimate and reasonable. I also think it's safe to presume that many people who truly fear having some major misdeed being caught in a DMV SSN screen will risk a misdemeanor of driving unlicensed and/or unregistered, and we already have enough illegal and/or uninsured drivers on the road as is. I know I share the views of many other concerned citizens here and I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience on this matter of personal importance. Please let me know where you stand on this law, as well as your views on the chances for its timely repeal. Sincerely, /s/ Bruce Steinberg ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// November 17, 1993 Bruce Steinberg <...> Aptos, CA 95003 Dear Mr. Steinberg: Thank you for your letter of Nov. 9th, 1993, regarding your concerns with AB 1823 which requires a person to provide their social security number (SSN) when applying for a California drivers license. On January 1, 1992, legislation (AB 1823, Chapter 635, Statutes of 1992) went into effect requiring social security numbers be provided when applying for an original California drivers license, and beginning January 1, 1993, California driver license renewals also require a social security number. I voted in favor of AB 1823 when it was presented on the Senate Floor. Both the Senate and the Assembly voted in favor of this bill. The Senate voted 35 to 0 and the Assembly voted 68 to 0. I continue to support the requirement to use the Social Security Number at the time of application and renewal of the driver's license. If legislation is presented to repeal the requirement for Social Security Number, I will have your letter in on file for my reference as I hear testimony and prepare to cast my vote. Again, thank you for sharing your concerns with me. Please do not hesitate to contact me again on any state-related business. Sincerely, /s/ HENRY J. MELLO Senate Majority Leader HJM:dp /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -- Bruce Steinberg (uunet!sco!bruces, bruces@sco.com) The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. "What if there were no hypothetical questions?" ------------------------------ From: Amit Zavery Newsgroups: alt.security,comp.society.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto,sci.crypt Subject: Voice authentication Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 17:20:54 -0500 Organization: Masters student, Information Networking Institute, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA Hi, I am looking for information on any security system based on voice authentication. So if anyone has knowledge of any implemented voice authentication system then please let me know. I would also like to find out what kind of problems people face using it and how successful is it in authenticating users. Thanks in advance --Amit ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V3 #083 ******************************