Date: Tue, 23 Jun 92 16:57:49 EST Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator To: Comp-privacy@PICA.ARMY.MIL Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V1#054 Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 23 Jun 92 Volume 1 : Issue: 054 Today's Topics: Moderator: Dennis G. Rears Re: What can be done about ADVO mailings? Re: What can be done about ADVO mailings? Can Merlins be used as bugs? FBI Digital Telephony Proposal Re: Privacy in video rental records? Structure of the SSN Re: Computer Privacy Digest V1#053 The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@pica.army.mil and administrative requests to comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil. Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.200]. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- From: David Ruggiero Date: Mon, 22 Jun 92 13:00:29 PDT Subject: Re: What can be done about ADVO mailings? pciszek@isis.cs.du.edu (Paul Ciszek) writes: PC>ADVO, as some of you may know already, is a charming organization that PC>sends people a half-pound of newsprint once a week. The newsprint is PC>delivered with a postcard, which somehow makes it "mail". I have just PC>sent my second request to ADVO asking that they stop sending my this stuff; PC>[...] PC>I have yet to hear back from ADVO. I called up the local (Seattle) office of Advo last week (hard to find - they aren't in the white pages or even the yellow pages under 'Advertising' or 'Mailing Lists'). The person answering was pleasant and helpful, taking my name/address and saying I should give it twelve weeks or so before the pre- printed labels are exhausted and I stop receiving mail under their cards. (She also mentioned they get almost as many requests from people to get *on* their lists as off them.) Apparently the lists are all controlled by the national organization (Conneticut?) and send electronically to the local branches. PC>The post office says that these folks cannot be delt with in the same PC>fashion as other direct marketers, as my name is not on any list; they PC>just send a bundle to every possible address, inhabited or not. Hmmm, this isn't quite true, at least in my area. The cards are all individually printed and an exact street address. My letter carrier (a veteran) says if he doesn't receive a card, I don't get the flyers; several homes on his route are always skipped. PC>SO, what can be done about ADVO? If I ask them to stop several times and PC>they don't, is it harassment? Who would be willing prosecute them, anyway? Give it a bit more time, then raise some more hell. Deal with the local office (look at the fine print on one of the flyers/coupons for the "Product of Advo (xxx) xxx-xxxx" to get their number). PS: Stay tuned (seriously) for my upcoming FAQ in misc.consumers on "How to Slay the Junk Mail Demons". -- | J. David Ruggiero Osiris Technical Services Seattle, WA | | osiris@polari.online.com or !uunet!polari.online!osiris | | Living in Seattle is like being in love with a beautiful woman... | | who's sick all the time. | ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 23 Jun 1992 12:59:25 PDT From: Hans_Lachman.OSBU_North@xerox.com Subject: Re: What can be done about ADVO mailings? cc: hlachman.osbu_north@xerox.com In article pciszek@isis.cs.du.edu (Paul Ciszek) writes: >ADVO, as some of you may know already, is a charming organization that >sends people a half-pound of newsprint once a week. The newsprint is >delivered with a postcard, which somehow makes it "mail". > >The post office says that these folks cannot be delt with in the same >fashion as other direct marketers, as my name is not on any list; they >just send a bundle to every possible address, inhabited or not. >SO, what can be done about ADVO? > >Paul Ciszek, pciszek@nyx.cs.du.edu I don't get newsprint-type junk mail, but I get other kinds. A few days ago I asked an administrator at my local post office if they had any advice on reducing the amount of junk mail I receive. She handed me a slip of paper that said: The Direct Marketing Association's Mail Preference Service has a new address. Upon request, the free service arranges to keep consumers' names off national mailing lists. Customers interested in receiving fewer advertising and promotional mail pieces should write to Mail Preference Service, Box 3861 Grand Central Station, New York, NY 10163-3861. Stop bulk mail!! You can write to ADVO SYSTEMS. This is one of the Nation's largest mailers of advertising mail. In order to request removal from the ADVO lists, you should write: DIRECTOR OF LIST MAINTENANCE, ADVO-SYSTEMS, INC., 239 WEST SERVICE ROAD, HARTFORD, CT 06120-1280. Hans Lachman hlachman.osbu_north@xerox.com ------------------------------ From: "Daniel P. B. Smith" Subject: Can Merlins be used as bugs? Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA Date: Tue, 23 Jun 1992 00:30:50 GMT Our office AT&T Merlin systems offer a built-in speakerphone mode (great for listening to music on hold hands-free while trying to get through to Microsoft!), a "hands-free answering" mode, and a veritable host of features too numerous to understand. It's all programmable. Indeed, you control which buttons perform what function. In fact, the thing on the desk that I think of as a "telephone" is, according to AT&T, a "voice workstation." (And for only $150 you can buy an add-on box that lets you plug a modem into it. Sigh). Here's the question. Potentially, it seems as if the system could be used to eavesdrop on offices. The phone installer assured me that this was impossible (translation: if there IS a way, they don't tell him how). But I wonder if there are really engineered protections, or whether eavesdropping is simply not a feature supported by the "standard" software. Could a hacker reprogram it somehow? If a big company said to AT&T, "we'll buy a bunch if you add this feature," would it be hard to add? --Daniel P. B. Smith dpbsmith@world.std.com ------------------------------ Organization: CPSR, Washington Office From: Dave Banisar Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1992 21:11:04 EDT Subject: FBI Digital Telephony Proposal The following is the latest version of the FBI Digital Telephony Proposal, introduced in May 1992. This version removes the previous language that authorized the FCC to set standards and now places it solely in the hands of the Attorney General. Fines are $10,000/day for non compliance with services within the public switched network having 18 months to comply and services outisde having three years. The proposal now manadates that the capability for remote government wiretapping must be included into the system. This proposal clearly enhances the ability of the FBI to monitor communications. It takes the unprecendented step of placing control over certification of telecommunications equipment in the hands of the Attorney General and requires that the equipment be constucted to allow government have the ability to monitor communications from a "government monitoring facility remote from the target facility." All telecommunications users should be concerned by the privacy and security implications of creating systems that have holes for the government or any other knowledgable user to plug into. David Banisar CPSR Washington Office banisar@washofc.cpsr.org _______________________________________________________________ 102nd Congress 2nd Session S. _____ [H.R. _____] IN THE SENATE [IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES] M. ________________ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on__________________ A BILL To ensure the continuing access of law enforcement to the content of wire and electronic communications when authorized by law and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SEC. 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. (a) The Congress finds: (1) that telecommunications systems and networks are often used in the furtherance of criminal activities including organized crime, racketeering, extortion, kidnapping, espionage, terrorism, and trafficking in illegal drugs; (2) that recent and continuing advances in telecommunications technology, and the introduction of new technologies and transmission modes by the telecommunications industry, have made it increasingly difficult for government agencies to implement lawful orders or authorizations to intercept wire and electronic communications and thus threaten the ability of such agencies effectively to enforce the laws and protect the national security; and (3) that without the assistance and cooperation of providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators, the introduction of new technologies and transmission modes into telecommunications systems without consideration and accommodation of the need of government agencies lawfully to intercept wire and electronic communications would impede the ability of such agencies effectively to carry out their responsibilities. (b) The purposes of this Act are to clarify the responsibilities of providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators to provide such assistance as necessary to ensure the ability of government agencies to implement lawful court orders or authorizations to intercept wire and electronic communications. SEC. 2. (a) Providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators shall provide within the United States capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and electronic communications when authorized by law: (1) concurrent with the transmission of the communication to the recipient of the communication; (2) in the signal form representing the content of the communication between the subject of the intercept and any individual with whom the subject is communicating, exclusive of any other signal representing the content of the communication between any other subscribers or users of the electronic communication services provider or private branch exchange operator, and including information on the individual calls (including origin, destination and other call set-up information), and services, systems, and features used by the subject of the interception; (3) notwithstanding the mobility of the subject of the intercept or the use by the subject of the intercept of any features of the telecommunication system, including, but not limited to, speed- dialing or call forwarding features; (4) at a government monitoring facility remote from the target facility and remote from the system of the electronic communication services provider or private branch exchange operator; (5) without detection by the subject of the intercept or any subscriber; and (6) without degradation of any subscriberUs telecommunications service. (b) Providers of electronic communication services within the public switched network, including local exchange carriers, cellular service providers, and interexchange carriers, shall comply with subsection (a) of this section within eighteen months from the date of enactment of this subsection. (c) Providers of electronic communication services outside of the public switched network, including private branch exchange operators, shall comply with subsection (a) of this section within three years from the date of enactment of the subsection. (d) The Attorney General, after consultation with the Department of Commerce, the Small Business Administration and Federal Communications Commission, as appropriate, may except from the application of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section classes and types of providers of electronic communication services and private branch exchange operators. The Attorney General may waive the application of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section at the request of any provider of electronic communication services or private branch exchange operator. (e) The Attorney General shall have exclusive authority to enforce the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section. The Attorney General may apply to the appropriate United States District Court for an order restraining or enjoining any violation of subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section. The District Court shall have jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin violations of subsections (a) of this section. (f) Any person who willfully violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty of $10,000 per day for each day in violation. The Attorney General may file a civil action in the appropriate United States District Court to collect, and the United States District Courts shall have jurisdiction to impose, such fines. (g) Definitions--As used in subsections (a) through (f) of this section-- (1) Tprovider of electronic communication serviceU or Tprivate branch exchange operatorU means any service or operator which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communication, as those terms are defined in subsections 2510(1) and 2510(12) of Title 18, United States code, respectively, but does not include the government of the United States or any agency thereof; (2) TcommunicationU means any wire or electronic communication, as defined in subsections 2510(1) and 2510(12), of Title 18, United States Code; (3) TinterceptT shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 2510(4) of Title 18, United States Code; and (4) Tgovernment' means the Government of the United States and any agency or instrumentality thereof, any state or political subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States. DIGITAL TELEPHONY AND INTERCEPTION BY CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES The telecommunications systems and networks are often used to further criminal activities including white collar and organized crime, racketeering, extortion, kidnapping, espionage, terrorism, and trafficking in illegal drugs. Accordingly, for many years, one of the most important tools in the investigation of crime for Federal and State criminal law enforcement agencies has been the court authorized interception of communications. As illustrated below, the majority of original authorizations to intercept wire or electronic communications are conducted by State criminal law enforcement agencies. Interception Applications Authorized State Federal Total 1984 512 289 801 1985 541 243 784 1986 504 250 754 1987 437 236 673 1988 445 293 738 1989 453 310 763 1990 548 324 872 Total 3,440 1,945 5,385 Approximately, 3/8 of authorized interceptions were conducted by Federal agencies, while 5/8 of the authorized interceptions were conducted by State criminal law enforcement agencies.1 The recent and continuing advances in telecommunications technology, and the introduction of new technologies by the telecommunications industry, have made it increasingly difficult for government agencies to implement lawful orders or authorizations to intercept wire and electronic communications, as well as to implement pen register and trap-and-trace court orders or authorizations. These new technologies inadvertently undermine the ability of criminal law enforcement agencies to enforce effectively the criminal laws and protect the national security. Without the assistance and cooperation of the telecommunications industry, these new technologies will impede the ability of the telecommunications industry, these new technologies will impede the ability of the government to enforce the criminal law. Accordingly, the purpose of this bill is to clarify the existing responsibilities of electronic communication services providers and private branch exchange operators, as established, for example, in 18 U.S.C. ____ 2518(4), 3124(A), (B), to provide such assistance as necessary to ensure the ability of government agencies to implement lawful orders or authorizations to intercept communications. Over the past twenty-five years, the working relationship between the criminal law enforcement community, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the federal governmentUs primary criminal law enforcement agency, and the telecommunications industry, in response to the appropriate court orders or authorizations, has provided government agencies with timely access to the signals containing the content of communications covered by the court orders or authorizations. As a general proposition, this has involved providing the means to acquire the communication as it occurs between two individual telephone users at a remote location, not dissimilar to a call in which the two originating parties do not know that a third party is listening, and in which the third party (the criminal law enforcement agency) records the authorized and relevant calls. Historically, and with relatively few exceptions, the telecommunications industry has provided the criminal law enforcement community with the ability to monitor and record calls: 1. at the same time asthe call is transmitted to the recipient; 2. in the same form as the content of the call was transmitted through the network, notwithstanding the use by the target of custom features of the network; 3. whether stationary or mobile; 4. at the government monitoring facility; 5. without detection by the target or other subscribers; and without degrading any subscriberUs service. However, the introduction of new technology has begun to erode the ability of the government to fully effectuate interceptions, pen registers and trap-and-race court orders or authorizations that are critical to detecting and prosecuting criminals. As technology has developed, the telecommunications industry has not always ensured the continued ability to provide the same services to the criminal law enforcement community. The telecommunications industryUs introduction of certain types of new technology poses real problems for effective criminal law enforcement. Legislation is necessary to ensure that the government will be provided with this capability and capacity in the future by all providers and operators and to maintain a level playing field among competitive providers and operators in the telecommunications industry. There have been instances in which court orders authorizing the interception of communications have not been fulfilled because of technical limitations within particular telecommunications networks. For example, as early as 1986, limited capabilities became apparent in at least one network which will only be corrected later in 1992. This technical deficiency in a new technology forced criminal law enforcement agencies to prioritize certain interceptions to the exclusion of other court orders. Accordingly, for approximately six years, there have been court orders that have not been sought by the criminal law enforcement community or executed by the telecommunications industry and, as a consequence, important criminal investigations have not been brought to fruition or have been less than efficiently concluded. This is one classic example of new technology affecting adversely the criminal law enforcement community: a microcosm of what may be expected on a nationwide basis without enactment of this legislation. Section 1 of the bill states Congressional findings and purpose. Section 2 is divided into seven subsections. Subsection (a) establishes as a matter of law the responsibility of electronic communication services providers and private branch exchange operators to continue to provide, within the United States, the capability and capacity for criminal law enforcement agencies to intercept wire and electronic communications when authorized by law. These subsections delineate the existing attributes of wire or electronic communication interception. 1. Concurrent with Transmission. The application for a court order to intercept telecommunications conversations or data transmissions is rarely a leisurely process. For example, on the Federal side, the development of the required affidavits, submission to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice for approval, transmission of approval to the Assistant United States Attorney, the appearance of the Assistant before a judge to request the order and the delivery of the judgeUs order to the appropriate telecommunications company is frequently completed in a very short time. However, crime waits for no one and the system for approval of interceptions must and does conform with the realities of the activity that is sought to be investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted as criminal offenses. Since time is of the essence, current law requires that service providers and operators provide the government forthwith all information, facilities and technical assistance necessary to accomplish its mission. It is critical that the telecommunications industry respond quickly to execute the court order or authorization. The ultimate problem of timeliness, however, is the real-time monitoring of the intercepted communications. As serious and potentially life- threatening criminal conduct is detected, it may be necessary to move quickly to protect innocent victims from that conduct. Accordingly, Rreal-timeS monitoring is critical. 2. Isolated Signal and Services Used. Nearly all of the communications network is partially RanalogS at this time. In conducting an interception, for example, of a telephone conversation, the government is allowed to monitor and record criminal conversation such as a conspiracy, minimizing the acquisition of non-criminal or innocent conversation. When an electronic communication services provider or private branch exchange operator introduces a new technology--such as a digital signal--the communications are converted into a different and more efficient form for transmission, but a more difficult form to monitor during interception. The bill requires only that the provider or operator isolate and provide access to the electronic signal that represents the content of the communications of the target of the intercept2 from the stream of electronic signals representing other communications. This provision seeks to ensure that, in the new electronic environment in which signals are mixed for transmission and separated at another switch for distribution, the government does not receive the communications of any individual other than the individuals using the targetUs communications point of origin and receipt; the government must remain subject to the minimization standards of 18 U.S.C. __ 2518(5). This provision also makes it clear that an electronic communication services provider or private branch exchange operator is not required to provide for reconversion of the isolated communication to analog or other form. The government expects that this process will be accomplished by the government. 3. Mobility and Features. Increasingly, criminal acts are being conducted or discussed over cellular telephones or by using special telecommunications features. As this mobility is introduced, the electronic communication services providers and private branch exchange operators would be required to assure the capability and capacity for criminal law enforcement agencies to continue lawful interception. Further, this subsection makes it clear that features used by the target do not defeat the court order or authorization. For example, communications which have been addressed to the telephone number of the target, but which may have been programmed through a call-forwarding feature to another, otherwise innocent, telephone number, must be captured and made available to criminal law enforcement authorities pursuant to court order or authorization. This requirement will obviate the need for applications for authority to monitor otherwise innocent telephone numbers that receive, only intermittently, calls forwarded by the target. The effect of this provision is to further minimize monitoring of calls of innocent parties. Similarly, certain speed dialing features that mask the telephone number called by the target must be identified for criminal law enforcement investigation. The ability to consistently determine the destination of calls is critical to minimizing the monitoring of innocent calls. 4. Government Monitoring Facility. Government agencies do not normally request the use of telecommunications industry physical facilities to conduct authorized interceptions nor is it encourage by the industry. Normally, the government leases a line from the electronic communication services providerUs or private branch exchange operatorUs switch to another location owned or operated by the government. This minimizes the cost and intrusiveness of interceptions, which benefits the service provider or operator, as well as the government. Accordingly, the ability to monitor intercepted communications remotely is critical. 5. Without Detection. One of the reasons that governments operate their own facilities is to reduce the risk of detection of the interception, which would render the interception worthless. At the present time, the existence of an interception is unknown to any subscriber and is not detectable by the target, notwithstanding folklore and spy novels. This provision merely ensures that the secrecy of effective interceptions will be maintained. 6. Without Degradation. Maintaining the quality of the telephone network is in the interest of the government, the industry and the public. Presently, the existence of an interception has no effect on the quality of the service provided by any network to the target or any subscriber. This provision ensures that the quality of the network will continue to be uncompromised. Absent the assistance delineated by this legislation, the execution of court orders and authorizations by the government could well disrupt service of the newer technological systems, a result that this legislation seeks to avoid. Subsection (b) provides that electronic communication services providers and private branch exchange operators with the Rpublic switched networkS must be in compliance with the minimum intercept attributes within eighteen months after enactment. Thereafter, new technologies must continue to meet these minimum attributes. Subsection (c) provides that electronic communication service providers and private branch exchange operators that are not within the Rpublic switched networkS must be in compliance with the minimum intercept attributes within eighteen months after enactment. Thereafter, new technologies must continue to meet these minimum attributes. Subsection (d) provides that the Attorney General may grant exceptions to the affirmative requirements of subsection (a), as well as the implementation deadlines of subsections (b) and (c). In considering any request for exception, the Attorney General will consult with Federal Communications Commission, the Small Business Administration and the Department of Commerce, as appropriate. Accordingly, the Attorney General has the authority to except, for example, whole classes, categories or types of private branch exchange operators where no serious criminal law enforcement problems are likely to arise, such as hospital telephone systems. This subsection also permits the Attorney General to waive the requirements of subsections (a), (b) and (c) on application by an electronic communication services provider or private branch exchange operator. Accordingly, if a particular company can not comply with one or more of the requirements of subsection (a), or needs time additional to that permitted under subsections (b) or (c), the Attorney General may grant an appropriate waiver. Subsection (e) provides that the Attorney General has exclusive authority to enforce the provisions of the bill. While a number of States have authority to seek and execute interception orders, they will be required to seek the assistance of the Attorney General if enforcement of this legislation is required. This section also provides for injunctive relief from violations of the provisions of the bill. Subsection (f) provides for enforcement of the provisions of the bill through imposition of civil fines against any company that is not excepted from the provisions of the bill, does not acquire a waiver of the provisions of the bill, and fails to meet the requirements of subsection (a) after the effective dates set out in subsection (b) or (c), as appropriate. A fine of up to $10,000 per day for each day in violation may be levied; for most companies in the telecommunications industry this amount is sufficient to ensure that compliance will be forthcoming. Although this provision is not expected to be used, it is critical to ensure that compliance with the provisions of the bill will occur after the effective dates of the requirements of subsection (a). Subsection (g) carries forward a number of definitions from the current provisions for the interception of wire or electronic communications under RTitle III.S The definition of RgovernmentS that is currently in use includes all States, territories and possessions of the United States, as well as the United States, is made applicable to the bill. [Footnotes] 1Interceptions for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes are not counted within the figures used here, but would likewise benefit from enactment of the legislation. 2 Whether the content is voice, facsimile, imagery (e.g. video), computer data, signalling information, or other forms of communication, does not matter; all forms of communication are intercepted. ------------------------------ From: Carl Paukstis Subject: Re: Privacy in video rental records? Organization: ISC-Bunker Ramo, An Olivetti Company Date: Tue, 23 Jun 1992 17:08:22 GMT In article prener@watson.ibm.com (Dan Prener) writes: >In article carlp@frigg.isc-br.com (Carl Paukstis) writes: >>This weekend, I went to rent from them, and was told that they were >>now required to "update my card", and wanted my SSN. I told them they >Why didn't you just make up a number and give it to them? I doubt that >it is a violation of any law to give an incorrect SSN to a video rental >store. 1) I want to make them change, not just to circumvent their policy. 2) I don't want to give them somebody else's number. This is one of my objections to their policy in the first place. I suppose I could dig up that popular fake number that was, as I recall, printed on most sample wallet cards years ago. I DID try insisting that my SSN was 111-11-1115 (this passes the checking algorithm in our software, but I don't know the algorithm). They told me I was lying. I asked them how they knew, and what proof did the last person give that the number they gave was correct. They stared at me and asked for my REAL SSN. Sigh. -- Carl Paukstis, Software Generalist | War On (some) Drugs -> Police State USA ISC-Bunker Ramo / Spokane, WA | DoD #0432 I'm the NRA #TMB6692H Phone: +1 509 927-5439 | AMA #634630 HOG #0507772 Mensa #1086355 Mail: carlp@frigg.isc-br.com | My employer accepts no responsibility... ------------------------------ Subject: Structure of the SSN Date: Tue, 23 Jun 92 13:26:14 EDT From: "John R. Levine" Since the question of the structure of the SSN has come up again, here is a file I found on a local BBS a few years ago. The only thing that has changed is that some of the 600 series numbers which are listed as unused have been assigned to states that have run out. Perhaps a FAQ with a pointer to an archive with this item would be in order. Regards, John Levine, johnl@iecc.cambridge.ma.us, {spdcc|ima|world}!iecc!johnl The Social Security Number SSA has continually emphasized the fact that the SSN identifies a particular record only and the Social Security Card indicates the person whose record is identified by that number. In no way can the Social Security Card identify the bearer. From 1946 to 1972 the legend "Not for Identification" was printed on the face of the card. However, many people ignored the message and the legend was eventually dropped. The social security number is the most widely used and carefully controlled number in the country, which makes it an attractive identifier. With the exception of the restrictions imposed on Federal and some State and local organizations by the Privacy Act of 1974, organizations requiring a unique identifier for purposes of controlling their records are not prohibited from using (with the consent of the holder) the SSN. SSA records are confidential and knowledge of a person's SSN does not give the user access to information in SSA files which is confidential by law. Many commercial enterprises have used the SSN in various promotional efforts. These uses are not authorized by SSA, but SSA has no authority to prohibit such activities as most are not illegal. Some of these unauthorized uses are: SSN contests; skip-tracers; sale or distribution of plastic or metal cards; pocketbook numbers (the numbers used on sample social security cards in wallets); misleading advertising, commercial enterprises charging fees for SSN services; identification of personal property. The Social Security Number (SSN) is composed of 3 parts, XXX-XX-XXXX, called the Area, Group, and Serial. For the most part, (there are exceptions), the Area is determined by where the individual APPLIED for the SSN (before 1972) or RESIDED at time of application (after 1972). The areas are assigned as follows: 000 unused 387-399 WI 528-529 UT 001-003 NH 400-407 KY 530 NV 004-007 ME 408-415 TN 531-539 WA 008-009 VT 416-424 AL 540-544 OR 010-034 MA 425-428 MS 545-573 CA 035-039 RI 429-432 AR 574 AK 040-049 CT 433-439 LA 575-576 HI 050-134 NY 440-448 OK 577-579 DC 135-158 NJ 449-467 TX 580 VI Virgin Islands 159-211 PA 468-477 MN 581-584 PR Puerto Rico 212-220 MD 478-485 IA 585 NM 221-222 DE 486-500 MO 586 PI Pacific Islands* 223-231 VA 501-502 ND 587-588 MS 232-236 WV 503-504 SD 589-595 FL 237-246 NC 505-508 NE 596-599 PR Puerto Rico 247-251 SC 509-515 KS 600-601 AZ 252-260 GA 516-517 MT 602-626 CA 261-267 FL 518-519 ID *Guam, American Samoa, 268-302 OH 520 WY Northern Mariana Islands, 303-317 IN 521-524 CO Philippine Islands 318-361 IL 525 NM 362-386 MI 526-527 AZ 627-699 unassigned, for future use 700-728 Railroad workers through 1963, then discontinued 729-899 unassigned, for future use 900-999 not valid SSNs, but were used for program purposes when state aid to the aged, blind and disabled was converted to a federal program administered by SSA. As the Areas assigned to a locality are exhausted, new areas from the pool are assigned. This is why some states have non-contiguous groups of Areas. The Group portion of the SSN has no meaning other than to determine whether or not a number has been assigned. SSA publishes a list every month of the highest group assigned for each SSN Area. The order of assignment for the Groups is: odd numbers under 10, even numbers over 9, even numbers under 9 except for 00 which is never used, and odd numbers over 10. For example, if the highest group assigned for area 999 is 72, then we know that the number 999-04-1234 is an invalid number because even Groups under 9 have not yet been assigned. The Serial portion of the SSN has no meaning. The Serial is not assigned in strictly numerical order. The Serial 0000 is never assigned. Before 1973, Social Security Cards with pre-printed numbers were issued to each local SSA office. The numbers were assigned by the local office. In 1973, SSN assignment was automated and outstanding stocks of pre-printed cards were destroyed. All SSNs are now assigned by computer from headquarters. There are rare cases in which the computer system can be forced to accept a manual assignment such as a person refusing a number with 666 in it. A pamphlet entitled "The Social Security Number" (Pub. No. 05-10633) provides an explanation of the SSN's structure and the method of assigning and validating Social Security numbers. ------------------------------ From: Mark Seiden Subject: Re: Computer Privacy Digest V1#053 Date: Tue, 23 Jun 92 14:08:18 BST ... Blockbuster wants your SS#.... > >This really sucks. I like to rent there because they have great > >selection, and also music and books and magazines, etc. Very nice > >stores and helpful clerks. I'm bummed. Boycott Hastings?!? > > Why didn't you just make up a number and give it to them? I doubt that > it is a violation of any law to give an incorrect SSN to a video rental > store. > > -- > Dan Prener (prener @ watson.ibm.com) sorry, not right, if this is a credit application. providing false (fraudulent) information on a credit application is in fact illegal. consider the (similar) case of someone who prefers to have a phone listed under some contrived name, perhaps as a quick screen against cold-calling telemarketers... if one falls into the trap of *pretending to be* that imaginary person when applying for service (as opposed to: "my roommate wants the phone listed in her name, jq public, yeah, that's the ticket...") one exposes themselves to the possibility of arbitrary prosecution later on, regardless of whether the bill is paid or not. of course, tpc never explicitly *tell* you when they ask you all those questions that you're applying for credit and any false statements are prosecutable. -- mark seiden, mis@seiden.com, 1-(203) 329 2722 (voice), 1-(203) 322 1566 (fax) ------------------------------ End of Computer Privacy Digest V1 #054 ******************************